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千里之行,始于足下  - A thousand-mile journey is started by taking the first step. Lao-Tzu 
 
Years ago I took my first steps in the world of academic research. A world completely out of my 
comfort zone and very different from the world of practitioners, a world with its own rules and 
its own language and even its own sense of humor. Some of the conversations sounded like 
Chinese to me, and academics laughed when I was serious and they did not laugh when I tried 
to make a joke. And just when I thought I had got the hang of it, suddenly there appeared to be 
various ‘continents’ within the academic world, each with their own language and their own 
rules. The ‘continent of positivist research’, for example, with hypothesis and theory testing and 
the ‘continent of interpretative research’ trying to understand phenomena through accessing 
the meanings participants assign to them. After many years, I still have difficulties in 
understanding all these different languages and rules. Fortunately I am not the only one. The 
‘inhabitants’ of these different areas sometimes also seem not to understand, or not willing to 
understand, each other’s language and rules. They do, however, all have something in common; 
they share a passion for science and are always willing to help those with less knowledge, like 
me. I would like to express my gratitude to everyone whose path I crossed for their help and 
patience. Naming everyone individually would result in a very long list. However, a few names 
have to be mentioned:  I specifically thank Bernard Verstegen and Arco van de Ven for all their 
support. Each of them has an own approach, but both were very inspiring and communicated 
their - sometimes tough - critiques on my work in a pleasant way. They also helped me discover 
which area of the academic world suited me best. 
That a PhD process is complex and is influenced by a multitude of factors – just like the 
accounting choice process – was confirmed during my last year when there were a number of 
unforeseen circumstances. These led to a logical step of a transfer to Tilburg University, although 
I had taken all my (interesting) PhD courses at the Open University. This situation further 
enriched my knowledge of the academic world, in particular the administrative and financial 
side. I was pleased, however, that the Open University and Tilburg University agreed to continue 
with my PhD as a joint doctorate. The input of Michael Corbey, who was very kind to agree 
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being my second supervisor in this new arrangement, as well as the comments of the 
committee members were extremely valuable in the last stages of this PhD. Thanks to their 
critical comments, I also learned how to explain where in the academic world I had ‘settled’, and 
why I had settled there. 
My thanks also go to the organization which facilitated this research. The contribution of all 
those interviewed is greatly appreciated. Needless to say, without their participation there 
would be no thesis.  
Combining a PhD and a full-time job did not leave much time for my husband and my two 
daughters, Jennifer and Vivian. I thank them for never complaining about the lack of attention, 
although it makes me wonder if perhaps they enjoyed the peace and quiet! Being married to 
Jim proved to be of significant economic value; with his finance background he was a perfect 
sparring partner. With his new job as a Finance lecturer at the Hotelschool The Hague and his 
recently acquired interest in applied research, there are many opportunities to further increase 
the ‘economic value’ of our marriage. Finally, I would like to thank my mother who listened 
patiently to all my discoveries in this new academic world, which I shared with her during our 
evening telephone calls. Actually, if you want to know how the academic world works, and 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
Auditors state in an Auditor’s Report: “in our opinion, the consolidated financial statements of 
[organization] give a true and fair view of the financial position and of the results and of the 
cash flows for the period ended [audited period].” They also refer to the General Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) that are used as a basis for the preparation of the financial 
statements. GAAP provides instructions and guidelines that are used to ensure this ‘true and 
fair’ presentation. Controllers have to make accounting choices when preparing the financial 
reports of their organization or their organizational entity. They have to make judgments 
relating to valuation of assets, such as the collectability of receivables outstanding and the 
identification and valuation of obsolete inventory. They also have to make decisions on 
accounting for provisions in specific situations, for example when the organization is confronted 
with claims or is in a restructuring situation, and make an estimate of the amount of these 
provisions. How do they ensure that their choices are in line with GAAP, and how do they 
determine that the financial result presented is a ‘true and fair’ presentation of the financial 
situation of their organization or organizational entity? Little is known about this choice 
process. This study aims to provide insights into the accounting choice process of controllers. 
This introduction consists of two sections. The first section describes the general background, 
explaining why the research subject was chosen. The second section describes the ‘journey of 
discovery’ during the research, and provides further background information relating to the 
structure and content of this thesis. 
1.1 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
Within GAAP there is a range of accounting choices available to controllers, and those preparing 
financial statements can make conscious use of the choices available within this range. Some of 
these choices are labelled as ‘earnings management’ by academics and practitioners. Earnings 
management is currently one of the most popular topics in mainstream financial accounting 
research (Merchant, 2010) and is defined by Schipper (1989) as “a purposeful intervention in 
the external financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain (as 
opposed to, say, merely facilitating the neutral operation of the process)” (p. 92). Most 
empirical earnings management research projects focus on identifying determinants affecting 
earnings management and use archival analysis, based on published financial statements, as 
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research method. The accounting choice process itself is, however, seldom addressed in these 
studies and is a ‘black box’.  
Accounting choices are divided by Dechow and Skinner (2000) in two subcategories: ‘within 
GAAP’ and ‘violating GAAP’. The ’within GAAP’ accounting choices vary from conservative via 
neutral to aggressive choices, but there is a border. If accounting choices are too aggressive, 
then this border is crossed and they are considered to be ‘violating GAAP’ choices. Dechow and 
Skinner illustrate this as follows: 
 
Figure 1 Categories of accounting choices. Adapted from “Earnings Management: Reconciling the Views of Accounting 
Academics, Practitioners, and Regulators,” by P.M. Dechow and D.J. Skinner, 2000, Accounting Horizons, 14(2), p. 2391 
According to Schipper (1989), earnings management is a purposeful intervention in a ‘neutral 
reporting process’. But what does this ‘neutral reporting process’ look like? How do controllers 
value this ‘right’ neutral estimate or judgment when determining e.g., provisions for bad debts 
and obsolete inventory? Even the border between within GAAP choices and GAAP violating 
                                                            
1 This figure is excluding the ‘cash flow choices’ that Dechow and Skinner included in their figure, since cash flow choices do not 
fall within the subject of this study. 
Accounting Choices
Within GAAP




* Overvaluation of acquired in-process 
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* Overstatement of restructuring 
charges and asset write-offs
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Accounting
* Earnings that result from a neutral 
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* Drawing down provisions or reserves 
in overly aggressively manner
Violates GAAP
* Recording sales before they are 
"realizable"
"Fraudulent" * Recording fictitious sales
 Accounting * Backdating sales invoices





choices is not necessarily straightforward. Hines (1988) strikingly illustrates how accounting 
choices are neither black or white but grey. The words of Hines, “As I said, there is no truth as 
such, but there is such a thing as stretching it too far – that is when you get caught out” (p.256), 
reflect the grey and subjective area of accounting choices. Controllers take a position within this 
grey area and decide what choices they still consider as acceptable within GAAP choices.  
Dechow and Skinner (2000) discuss the difficulty of identifying earnings management with the 
commonly used research methods of statistical analysis of large samples in mainstream 
research. They stress the importance of the managerial intent of the accounting choices and 
state that accounting choices that are made in order to “obscure or mask true economic 
performance” are to be considered as earnings management (p. 236). The behavioral aspects of 
accounting choices are thus important. Studies into the behavioral aspects of earnings 
management are more difficult to find. Some studies are available, focusing on ethical 
orientation, professional commitment and personality characteristics in relation to earnings 
management choices (e.g., Greenfield, Norman, & Wier, 2008; Merchant & Rockness, 1994). 
These studies focus on the outcome of the decisions but not on how the participants come to 
these decisions. Moreover, they are confined to accounting choices with earnings management 
intent, and do not address accounting choices in general. Controllers do not necessarily make 
accounting choices with earnings management intent; they (hopefully) also make choices with 
the intention of presenting the aforementioned ‘true and fair’ view in their financial 
statements. 
Studies relating to the behavioral aspects of earnings management generally use experiments 
or questionnaires. These methods allow researchers to quantify their findings and test their 
hypotheses. But in ‘real life’, controllers face more complex situations than the simplified 
settings of an experiment or a survey. What decisions are made when combinations of the 
variables occur? Research relating to the role of the controller provides insights into the 
complex work setting of controllers (e.g., Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Järvenpää, 2007) and 
controller involvement in decision making (Zoni & Merchant, 2007). Moreover, De Loo, 
Nederlof and Verstegen (2006) provide insights into individual controller behavior by detecting 
behavioral patterns of controllers. These studies, however, focus on the controller and 
controller behavior in general and not on the controllers’ accounting decisions. This aim of this 
research is to study the latter: it aims at addressing accounting choice behavior. 
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The objective of this study is to gain insights into the accounting choices of controllers by 
studying the accounting choices that are available to controllers, the accounting choice decision 
process which leads to the accounting choices of the controllers, and the factors affecting these 
choices. The following research questions have been formulated: 
1. What accounting choices are available to controllers? 
2. How are accounting choices made by the controller? 
3. What factors affect the accounting choices of controllers? 
 
There are a number of recent trends that make this a valuable subject for research. Trends that 
are often referred to in academic literature are the recent major accounting scandals, often 
discovered long after the audited financial statements were published, and the financial crisis, 
together with the role of financial reporting in this process. Other trends are less well-publicised 
or are not referred to in the academic literature but, most likely, they have an impact on the 
financial statements. First, many organizations2 have recently accelerated their year-end closing 
process (Janvrin & Mascha, 2014). The shorter the time after year-end and before reporting, the 
more estimates and judgments have to be made for balance sheet items such as bad debt 
provision, claims and disputes, etc. Second, the budgets for auditors are increasingly under 
pressure (Ettredge, Fuerherm, & Li, 2014). Auditors are required to spend their resources 
carefully and are forced to only look at material items. Controllers of large organizations often 
deal with items that may not be material for audit purposes, and these are thus not reviewed 
by the auditors. Therefore they might not be challenged on the choices incurred which can 
result in a variety of behaviors relating to accounting choices within the organization.  
The above-mentioned trends, in combination with the ‘gap’ in the literature relating to the 
accounting choice process were the underlying reasons for choosing this subject for further 
research.  
This research contributes to accounting theory by providing insights into accounting choice 
behavior by not only studying the outcome of the accounting choices – the financial statements 
– but also the process leading to that outcome. Using an interpretive approach is also a 
                                                            
2 Conquaestor, a Dutch consulting firm, performs a yearly review of the timeliness of publication of financial results of Dutch 
listed companies. For the year 2013 more than half of the quoted companies accelerated their reporting time. Source: 
http://www.conquaestor.nl/publicatie/rapportagecyclus-van-nederlandse-beursfondsen-toont-verbetering-2014, dated 23-06-




response to the frequently signaled narrowness of mainstream accounting research (e.g., Lukka, 
2010; Merchant, 2010), with earnings management being a popular subject of this mainstream 
research. An interpretive approach offers a new perspective on accounting choices, which can 
also be used for further earnings management research. The use of this interpretive approach 
guided the researcher to take a different route than expected. This ‘journey of discovery’ is 
outlined in the next section. 
1.2 JOURNEY OF DISCOVERY 
The research approach relating to the data collection and initial data analysis was based on the 
background information and deliberations noted in Section 1.1. As outlined, the available 
studies that address accounting choices predominantly relate to the subject of earnings 
management, trying to identify its determinants. This type of research is part of mainstream 
accounting research which is based on an economic perspective (Jorissen & Otley, 2010; 
Merchant & Rockness, 1994). This economic perspective was an important basis for the first part 
of the journey of this research. The literature which formed the basis for the initial research 
approach is described in Chapter 2.  
During the data analysis phase it was found, however, that the accounting choice process is 
complex and influenced by the total setting of the choice rather than one, or a few, specific 
determinants. It appeared not to be possible to directly relate an accounting choice to specific 
determinants. In addition, the total setting of the accounting choices was analyzed rather than 
the individual determinants, providing a holistic approach of the factors and actors involved. 
Nevertheless, the description resulting from this analysis did not do justice to all the findings 
that emerged from the data. This conclusion led to the second phase in the journey of this 
research: using another perspective than the theoretical basis outlined in the literature, which 
formed the basis for the initial approach of the research. It was found that using the perspective 
of institutional logics enabled an explanation of the findings that emerged from the empirical 
research. Chapter 3 outlines the literature relating to the perspective used in this phase of the 
research. 
The research thus has been a journey of discovery, where the empirical findings led the 
researcher to take another route than the initial route of economic perspective. Controllers use 
an economic perspective in their daily work, using planning and control cycles, forecasting 
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outcomes on the basis of specific actions taken, etc. Being a practitioner, this was also the 
‘inherent thinking pattern’. During the research, it was found that this perspective did not fully 
explain the findings and therefore another perspective was needed. The ‘journey of discovery’ 
is further described in Chapter 4, the methodology chapter.  
The results of the journey are presented in Chapter 5, in which the findings of the empirical 
research are outlined. Finally, in Chapter 6 the discussion and conclusions are presented, 
including the limitations of this research. Figure 2 provides an overview of the research process 
and the structure of the thesis. 
 
Research process Structure of thesis
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter starts in Section 2.1 by explaining the key concepts used in this research. This is 
followed by Section 2.2 which provides an analysis of the accounting choices available to 
controllers identified in the literature, addressing the first research question. Section 2.3 
discusses research relating to accounting choice behavior in order to provide a theoretical basis 
for the second research question: how are accounting choices made? This section also discusses 
research relating to the role of the controller, as this may also provide insights into controller 
behavior that can be used for accounting choice behavior analysis. The third research question - 
identifying factors influencing accounting choices - is then discussed. Section 2.4 analyzes 
financial accounting literature relating to accounting choices, and the factors affecting these 
choices. Although not specifically oriented towards accounting choices, the literature relating to 
the role of the controller and controller involvement in decision making is also useful for this 
purpose. This literature is outlined in Section 2.5. Finally, the use of the available literature for 
the research objective in this study is summarized in Section 2.6. 
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF EARNINGS AND THE DEFINITION OF OTHER KEY CONCEPTS 
In their article “To tell the truth: A discussion of issues concerning truth and ethics in 
accounting” Bayou, Reinstein and Williams (2011) discuss the apparent discrepancy between 
the Auditor’s task - ensuring financial statements give a true and fair representation of the 
financial position of the organization - and the objective of the Accounting Standards. 
Accounting standards are used as a basis for financial statements to ensure the ‘true and fair’ 
representation of the financial position of the organization. Accounting-standard setters, 
however, concentrate on decision usefulness, not truth, as the ultimate objective for financial 
reporting. In this study, the Accounting Standards are used for the operationalization of the 
concept earnings, being defined as: net income according to GAAP3. Shapiro (1997) argues for a 
pragmatic view on objectivity in (financial) accounting and defines principles of rationalism as a 
                                                            
3 Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are documented in Accounting Standards: US GAAP and IFRS are examples of these 
standards. For the purpose of this study the Accounting Standards used by the researched organization is used as a basis.  
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condition for a rational and objective debate on financial reporting. 4 Accounting standards can 
then be seen as a socially constructed reality, and they form the agreed ‘rules of the game’ that 
organizations have to follow in their financial reporting procedures. There is, however, not ‘one 
right amount’ of earnings, but rather there is a ‘range of earnings that is acceptable’. As 
outlined in the introductory chapter, a number of choices, ranging from conservative to 
aggressive, are available, that fall in the within GAAP area (Figure 1). The range of earnings that 
is acceptable within GAAP will be referred to in this thesis as the boundaries of earnings, 
sometimes this is also referred to as the grey area. The question is, how are the accounting 
choices within this range made by controllers?  
Earnings consists of a cash component and an accrual component. An accrual refers to any 
individual entry recording revenue or expense in the absence of a cash transaction. For 
example, when goods are sold and invoiced but not yet paid, income is recognized for the 
period but – since the cash is not yet received – the amount is accounted for on the balance 
sheet as ‘debtors’, being an accrual. Dechow, Ge and Schrand (2010) note that earnings 
management research is often analyzed from an accrual perspective. Using the analysis of 
abnormal accruals is based on the assumption that accruals consist of a non-discretionary 
element and a discretionary element, the latter being possibly subject to earnings management 
manipulations. The discretionary component of an accrual is determined by management’s 
reporting and implementation decisions, whereas the nondiscretionary component is 
influenced by other factors such as economic conditions, operating environment, etc. For 
example, for the balance sheet item ‘debtors’ the non-discretionary element is the total 
amount of accounts receivable at the period end. This element is a result of the sales- and 
invoicing of goods or services for the period. The discretionary element is the provision for bad 
debt. This provision is based on a judgment of possible collection of the outstanding debts.  
                                                            
4 Shapiro lists three principles. First, participants in a debate must give justification or evidence for their assertions and respond 
to counterarguments. Second, participants only assert what they know not to be false and do not assert something that lacks 
evidence. Third, participants must, independent of their opinions and attitudes, be able to evaluate the extent to which a 
reporting practice may achieve an explicitly stated reporting objective. 
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Figure 3 Example of an accrual with its non-discretionary and discretionary component 
Financial statements consist of various reporting items; the reporting item ‘debtors’ in the 
above example being one of them. Any accounting choice affecting the amount of a balance 
sheet reporting item also affects earnings.5 This research focuses on accounting choices by 
analyzing the reported balance sheet items.  
The definition for accounting choices used in this study is based on that of Fields, Lys and 
Vincent (2001)6: a decision that influences the output of the accounting system, being the 
(published) financial statements. Accounting choices are, to a certain extent, defined at an 
organizational level. Scott (2003) identifies two categories of accounting choices: accounting 
policies and discretionary accruals. Accounting policies such as depreciation periods for the 
various categories of fixed assets, accounting for goodwill etc., are generally determined at an 
organizational level. Discretionary accruals, such as the above-mentioned provision for doubtful 
debt, often involve estimates and judgments made by the controller and the operational 
managers. This research does not focus on organizational choices, but on the choices of 
                                                            
5 Unless it is a reclassification from one balance sheet item to another balance sheet item. 
6 Fields et al. (2001 p.256) use the following definition “any decision whose primary purpose is to influence (either in form or 
substance) the output of the accounting system in a particular way, including not only financial statements published in 
accordance with GAAP, but also tax returns and regulatory filings.” For the purpose of this research the definition of accounting 
choice is slightly altered. The words ‘whose primary purpose is’ are not included into the definition. Even if the decision maker 
does not have such a purpose, choices that influence the financial statements are still considered to be accounting choices. The 
words ‘either in form or in substance’ are also not included because they relate more to the presentation in the financial 
statements and this study focuses on numbers, not on additional disclosures etc. And finally, since this research is limited to the 
financial statements and not on other regulatory filings, the reference to tax returns and regulatory filings Field et al. make in 







cash received = cash on 
balance sheet 500 500
accrued income
invoices outstanding 500
less: bad debt -100 -100
debtors on balance sheet 400 400
net income = equity on 
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controllers made within the framework set by the accounting standards and the organizational 
standards. It should be noted that earnings can also be influenced by other choices than 
accounting choices. The timing of transactions (such as delaying maintenance) or the type of 
transactions (such as a sale and lease-back transaction) also affect earnings. In earnings 
management literature, these choices or actions are referred to as ‘real earnings management’ 
(Schipper, 1989), ‘cash flow choices’ (Dechow & Skinner, 2000) or ‘transaction structuring’ 
(Healy & Wahlen, 1999). This research focuses on accounting choices, and not on this latter 
category of ‘other’ choices that affect earnings management. 
Since this study focuses on the accounting choices of controllers, it is also important to 
understand how ‘controller’7 is defined. The profession of controller has a long history, and the 
role of the controller has developed over time, also within the Netherlands (De Loo, Verstegen, 
& Swagerman, 2011; Maas, 2005; Van de Ven, 2014). The association of Dutch certified 
controllers (Vereniging van Register Controllers) describes the development of the role of the 
controller as follows on their website: “The certified controller is becoming increasingly 
important. Being previously mainly involved in controlling and describing and reviewing 
processes, controllers are now increasingly involved in the strategic development, consulting 
and management of organizations.”8 Besides this development over time, the implementation 
of the role of the controller can vary considerably, depending not only on the organizational 
setting but also on the individual characteristics of the controller (Byrne & Pierce, 2007; Van de 
Ven, 2014). For the purpose of this research, the following definition is used: “A controller 
supports and advises the management of an organization in achieving their economic, public 
and/or financial goals. Support is interpreted in terms of the design and maintenance of 
management control and accounting information systems and the procurement and 
distribution of information” (Verstegen, De Loo, Mol, Slagter, & Geerkens, 2007, p. 11). This 
definition is abstract enough to encompass the broadening scope of the controller’s role and 
the organizational and individual differences in role implementation. 
                                                            
7 Some studies use the word ‘management accountant’ others refer to ‘controller’. Within organizations the terminology 
‘finance manager’ or ‘chief financial officer’ is also used, often depending on the size and independency of the organizational 
entity. In this study the terminology ‘controller’ is used. 
8 The original text of the website (in Dutch) is as follows: De Registercontroller (RC) wordt steeds belangrijker. Hield hij zich 
eerder vooral bezig met controleren, beschrijven en beheersen van processen, steeds vaker wordt hij betrokken bij strategische 
ontwikkelingen, adviestrajecten en de besturing van organisaties.Source: http://www.vrc.nl/word-rc/De-Registercontroller-in-
opmars.html. Retrieval date April 19t, 2015. 
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Within an organization there are, depending on the organizational structure, controllers at 
various levels: corporate controllers at corporate headquarters, and business unit controllers at 
business unit level (Sathe, 1983). This research focuses on Business Unit controllers, hereafter 
referred to as the BU controller. The definition given by Indjejikian and Matĕjka (2006) for 
Business Unit is used: “an entity that (1) has its own general manager (hereafter, BU manager), 
(2) has a chief financial officer (hereafter, BU controller), and (3) is held responsible for a clearly 
defined part of the business by means of a periodic budget” (p. 856). One more condition has 
been added for the purpose of this study: (4) has its own financial statements consisting of a 
balance sheet and a profit and loss account. The latter condition is important since it is the 
accounting choices made by the BU controller that affect this balance sheet and the profit and 
loss account of the BU that are being studied. The BU controller is the financial expert of the 
Business Unit and is therefore responsible for making decisions relating to accounting choices of 
the Business Unit. 
Having elaborated on the key concepts used in this thesis, the next section discusses the 
literature relating to accounting choices. 
2.2 ACCOUNTING CHOICES OF CONTROLLERS 
In order to obtain insights into the accounting choices of controllers, the first question is: what 
accounting choices are available to them? In the previous section, an accounting choice was 
defined as: a decision that influences the output of the accounting system, being the 
(published) financial statements. Decisions that influence the output of the accounting system 
relate to the discretionary component of accruals. As explained in Section 2.1, the discretionary 
component of an accrual is determined by management’s reporting and implementation 
decisions, whereas the nondiscretionary component is influenced by other factors such as 
economic conditions, operating environment, etc. Hence, the discretionary part of an accrual 
involves an accounting choice where controllers have to decide on the valuation of the assets, 
have to determine a ‘best estimate’ of liabilities, and have to make decisions relating to the 
allocation of revenues and expenses for the reporting period. The accounting choices of 
controllers may vary from conservative to aggressive, but have to be made within the 
boundaries of GAAP. As the balance sheet of the financial statements mainly consists of 
accruals, controllers are confronted with a range of accounting choices relating to most of the 
reporting items in the financial statements.  
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Research into accounting choices can be divided into three main categories: archival analyses 
reviewing trends in financial statements, questionnaires/experiments studying specific 
accounting choices, and case studies analyzing accounting choices made in the setting of 
specific organizations or situations. Analyzing (trends in) financial statements is a frequently 
used approach in financial accounting research. Earnings management studies are, for example, 
often based on archival analysis of financial statements by trying to isolate the discretionary 
part of the accrual component and identifying ‘abnormal accruals’ (Dechow, Hutton, Kim, & 
Sloan, 2012). Analyzing accounting choices on the basis of trends in accruals is, however, a 
global way of approaching the accounting choices, and does not provide information on the 
specific accounting choices available. Only some studies analyze the trend of a specific reporting 
item, such as restructuring charges (Bens & Johnston, 2009) and research and development 
capitalization (Seybert, 2010). More specific accounting choices have been studied, using 
surveys and experiments. Accounting choices addressed in the studies discussed in this section 
are summarized in Table 1. 
Subject Reporting item Research 
Revenues   
Book revenues now rather than next quarter (if 
justified each quarter) 
Revenue accrual Graham et al. (2005) 
Expenses   
Postpone taking an accounting charge Expense accrual Graham et al. (2005) 
No recording of supplies received in December 
until following February (GAAP violating) 
Expense accrual  Merchant et al. (1994)/ Elias (2012) 
Not recording expenses of services received until 
following year (GAAP violating) 
Expense accrual  Merchant et al. (1994)/ Elias (2012) 
Prepay next year's expenses and record them as 
current expenses (GAAP violating) 
Expense accrual  Merchant et al. (1994)/ Elias (2012) 
Request supplier's invoice after year-end (GAAP 
violating) 
Expense accrual  Merchant et al. (1994)/ Elias (2012) 
Valuation of assets and liabilities   
Draw down on reserves previously set aside Provisions Graham et al. (2005) 
Write off inventory that is known to be sold at 
full price (GAAP violating) 
Inventory Merchant et al. (1994)/ Elias (2012) 
Reverse previous write off of inventory of goods Inventory Merchant et al. (1994)/ Elias (2012) 
Other (no category specified)   
Timing of booking transactions Accrual Maas et al. (2009) 
Alter accounting assumptions (allowances, 
pensions, etc.) 
Various Graham et al. (2005) 
Relabeling line items (GAAP violating) Various Maas et al. (2009) 
Table 1 Specific accounting choices studied using surveys and experiments 
In the studies noted in Table 1,  participants’ responses relating to specific accounting choices 
were analyzed, either to understand their underlying motivation (J. R. Graham, Harvey, & 
Rajgopal, 2005) or to relate the choices to specific factors, such as ethical orientation (Elias, 
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2002; Merchant & Rockness, 1994) or personal characteristics (Maas & Matějka, 2009). These 
specific choices related to the timing of revenues and expense, estimates of provisions, and 
classification of reporting items, and also included GAAP violating choices. In all these studies 
the choices were presented to the interviewees/participants, asking their opinion on a 
hypothetical choice. Hence, these were not the actual accounting choices that the participants 
had made in ‘real life’.  
The last category of studies into accounting choices, a case study relating to a specific 
organization or situation, explores the accounting choices that were actually made ‘in real life’. 
This type of research studies these choices within their specific context. Jorissen and Otley 
(2010) studied the underlying processes triggering misstatements in the financial reporting of 
two connected major European airlines that went bankrupt. They adopted a case study 
approach and used the investments in foreign airlines as an accounting item of their study. 
Jorissen and Otley identified four accounting choices that were used to influence the numbers; 
the accounting method choice (using either a cost method or equity method), write downs, 
provisions for future costs, and future commitments. Kepsu (2012) studied the process of 
preparing corporate financial reports within one organization from an earnings management 
perspective, and found that a wide range of accounting choices were under discussion within 
the organization. The choices related to various reporting items and the type of choices also 
varied, ranging from changing an accounting method to determining the amount for an 
impairment or a provision. The accounting choices identified in these case studies are 
summarized in Table 2. 
Subject Reporting item 
Focus on investments in airlines in the light of  financial misrepresentation, Jorissen et al. (2010) 
Accounting choice method for equity method  instead of consolidation Investments in associates 
Write down investments Investments in associates 
Creating a restructuring provision Provisions 
Creating a provision for future losses and commitments Provisions 
Focus on earnings management choices, Kepsu (2012)  
Adjust the stage of completion method for construction contracts Construction contracts 
Create a guarantee work provision and determine amount Provisions  
Determining the amount of the provision for employee bonuses Provisions 
Capitalize R&D expenses: what projects, timing, amount Intangible assets 
Write off intangible asset R&D: timing, amount Intangible assets 
Depreciation of intangible asset R&D: accelerate depreciation Intangible assets 
Allocation of acquisition costs Goodwill/various 
Impairment testing of goodwill Goodwill 
Classification choices of extraordinary costs Various 
Table 2 Accounting choices identified in two case studies 
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It should be noted that both the study by Jorissen and Otley and that of Kepsu, as well as the 
other above-mentioned research were performed from the perspective of earnings 
management. This refers to the intentional use of accounting discretion in order to obtain a 
private gain (Schipper, 1989) or to obscure or mask true economic performance (Dechow & 
Skinner, 2000). Within this earning management perspective, a broad range of choice was 
identified involving many reporting items. The objective of this research, however, is broader 
than accounting choices with an earnings management intention; it aims to study accounting 
choices in general. Choices of controllers are not always made with a specific intention of 
earnings management. These types of choices have not been addressed in previous studies and 
can involve other types of choices that have not been identified in the literature evaluated in 
this section. Using the reporting items within the financial statements as a first basis for analysis 
is a good starting point for identifying the accounting choices available to controllers. It enables 
a discussion on which items they made an accounting decision. 
The studies discussed in this section reveal that one reporting item can involve several choices 
such as changing an accounting method, timing choices, and determining the valuation of assets 
or liabilities. Therefore, this research requires an open approach in identifying the accounting 
choices available. Using semi-structured interviews as a research method facilitates this 
objective. After studying the financial statements and management reports of the BU as 
preparation for the interviews, the range of choices emerging from these documents can be 
identified and discussed with the interviewees. Systematically enquiring into these choices 
enables controllers to discuss choices that they consider as routine and/or those which may not 
even identify as being a choice. Additionally, using open questions and having controllers reflect 
on their choices, allows a discussion on choices that were not identified by the researcher when  
preparating the interview.  
The next section addresses literature relating to accounting choice decision behavior, 
addressing the second research question: how do controllers make their accounting choices?  
2.3 ACCOUNTING CHOICE BEHAVIOR 
In this section, research relating to accounting choice behavior is discussed. When controllers 
make an accounting choice, they make a decision. There is a vast amount of literature on 
decision theory. The purpose of this section is not to provide a literature review of decision 
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theory, but to analyze the literature relating to accounting choices in the context of accounting 
choice decision behavior of controllers, hereafter referred to as ‘accounting choice behavior’.  
There are different ways of analyzing the accounting choice behavior of controllers. From an 
economic perspective, controllers consider the available alternatives and decide which 
alternative is the best choice in light of their preferences. Simon (1955) addresses the 
constraints of this economic perspective.  These constraints are not only related to the 
environment - such as constraints relating to the information available - but also to cognitive 
limitations of individuals. When confronted with a complex situation, controllers need to 
simplify the situation and determine the alternatives available for their accounting choice. Due 
to the cognitive limitations, not all possible alternatives will be part of the alternatives 
considered by the controller. Accounting choices of controllers can also be based on routines. 
Routines are defined by Burns and Scapens (2000) as ”the way in which things are actually 
done”(p. 6). Burns and Scapens use an institutional approach and make a distinction between 
‘routines’ and ‘habits’. Routines refer to behavior patterns that are adopted by a group of 
individuals, whereas habits refer to behavior patterns of individuals. Behavior as a result of 
habits is hereafter referred to as ‘rule based behavior’. Rutherford (1994) states that there are 
many different type of rules, ranging from personal rules to social and legal rules. Hence, rules 
can be entirely personal: “certain habits and routines may be of this nature, as may certain rules 
of personal morality.” (pp. 52-53).  
 When analyzing accounting choice behavior, some researchers refer to the perspective they 
use as ‘a theoretical lense’ (Burns & Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Byrne & Pierce, 2007). The first part of 
this section outlines findings relating to accounting choice behavior from earnings management 
research, using an economic perspective. This is followed in Section 2.3.2, by describing the 
outcome of two case studies that enrich the above findings by using another perspective (the 
upper echelon theory) and by revealing the complexity of the economic perspective of agency 
theory when applied to ‘real life situations’. Then, in Section 2.3.3, research relating to the role 
of the controller is discussed. This research sheds another light on controller behavior which 
may also be applied to accounting choice behavior. In this section, research using an 
‘institutional lense’ is only briefly addressed; Chapter 3 further elaborates on literature using 
the institutional perspective. Finally, the implications of the analysis for the second research 
question – how do controllers make their accounting choices – are presented in Section 2.3.4.  
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2.3.1 Reporting behavior and the economic perspective 
Earnings management studies are predominantly based on an economic perspective (Jorissen & 
Otley, 2010; Merchant & Rockness, 1994). From this perspective, individuals are assumed to 
make accounting choices by considering the cost and the benefits of their decision. An 
individual may thus manage earnings if he/she thinks the benefit (e.g., the reputation of the 
organization or his/her personal interest) outweigh the cost of discovery of the earnings 
management which might affect his/her personal reputation. An illustration of this line of 
reasoning - cited from a study of the effect of financial regulation on earnings management by 
using the accounting choice for restructuring provision - is: “Another reason to think that 
restructuring charges may not be used to manage earnings is the cost incurred on detection.” 
(Bens & Johnston, 2009, p. 676). Earnings management studies based on archival research of 
published financial statements all seem to use this approach, although this underlying 
assumption is hardly ever explicitly stated in these studies.  
Another, not always explicitly expressed, underlying assumption of earnings management 
research is the agency theory. Agency theory is based on a situation where work is delegated. 
The individuals delegating the work are called ‘the principal’ and the individuals executing the 
work are called ‘the agent’. Examples of principal/agent are: shareholder/board of directors and 
board of directors/local management. The agent has more information than the principal and 
can decide what to do with this information. Using the economic perspective, the agent will 
make decisions that benefit his/her interest. If the interests of the principal and agent are not 
aligned, then there is a potential problem. This is referred to as ‘the agency problem’. One 
method of mitigating this problem is the alignment of the goals of principal and agents using 
contracts and incentives. The principal can also ensure that the agent is monitored. Audits of 
the financial statements of an organization and the corporate governance within organizations 
are examples of ensuring that agents work in the way intended by the principal. 
In a study by J.R. Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005), the authors provide insights into the 
underlying motivation of reporting behavior from the economic and agency perspectives in the 
playing field of the organization and ‘the market’. These authors performed a survey among 
more than 400 Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) and followed up the findings with 20 interviews 
with CFOs. They found that CFOs view earnings as the most important metric reported to 
outsiders and consider it important to meet earnings benchmarks. The reasons for trying to 
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avoid missing an earnings benchmark that CFOs agreed with, or even strongly agreed with, 
were the following: it creates uncertainty about our future prospects (80.7%); outsiders think 
there are previously unknown problems at our firm (60.0%); we have to spend a lot of time 
explaining why we missed the benchmark rather than focus on future prospects (58.2%).  This 
was further discussed in the subsequent interviews. The authors conclude: “In general, the 
interviewed CFOs feel that the market hates unpleasant surprises, and surprised investors or 
analysts become defensive” (p. 32). Also, virtually all CFOs (96.9%) were found to prefer smooth 
earnings rather than volatile earnings. In their survey, 78% of the CFOs indicated that they 
would sacrifice long-term value to smooth earnings. The main reasons for this preference for 
smooth earnings indicated in the survey were that smooth earnings (as opposed to volatile 
earnings) are thought to be perceived as less risky by investors, and they make it easier for 
analysts to predict future earnings. Moreover, the authors report that the most surprising 
finding of their study is that most earnings management is achieved via cash flow choices9 as 
opposed to accounting choices. “Surprisingly, executives are more reluctant to employ 
accounting discretion within GAAP such as accrual management to meet earnings targets, 
although accrual management is likely to be cheaper than giving up economic value” (p. 66). 
And yet ‘big bath accounting’ (Walsh, Craig, & Clarke, 1991) is a well-known phenomenon. ‘Big 
bath accounting’ refers to very conservative accounting behavior that often occurs within 
organizations that have substantial losses: since a loss is expected anyway, the thought is that 
one might as well be  conservative when estimating accruals and provisions in order to have 
some reserves for the year(s) after.  Does the outcome of the study by J.R. Graham et al. mean 
that the CFOs participating in their survey are reluctant to use this type of accounting choice? A 
possible explanation is that the use of accounting discretion is not considered as being socially 
accepted and therefore CFOs are less inclined to admit this kind of behavior. Another possible 
explanation is that the use of more conservative accrual estimates in loss-situations is not 
perceived by CFOs as the use of accounting discretion. Hence, analyzing the findings from 
another perspective, such as personal background and preferences, may provide another view 
as to the underlying motivation of reporting behavior. 
                                                            
9 Cash flow choices referred to were: decrease discretionary spending such as R&D, advertising and maintenance and delay 
starting a new project even if this entails a small sacrifice in value.  
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2.3.2 Additional insights into reporting behavior 
Analyzing findings from different perspectives is an approach used in a case study relating to 
financial misrepresentation by Jorissen and Otley (2010). They analyzed their findings from two 
perspectives: the economic perspective and the ‘upper echelons theory’. The latter theory 
suggests that “the organization becomes a reflection of its top executives, whereby the CEO 
functions as the central strategic decision-maker who is able to control the composition of the 
organization’s top strategy-making group” (p. 9). Furthermore, CEO behavior is, according to 
this theory, influenced by the CEO’s personality, values and experiences. In this case study, the 
authors revealed that the CEO chose a strategy for the organization that fitted with his prior 
pattern of strategic choices in other organizations. Furthermore, contracts and incentives were 
aligned with his strategic choice in order to present results that supported the success of the 
chosen strategy. These results did not represent the economic situation of the organization, and 
led to bankruptcy. In agency theory contracts are used by principals to align the interests of the 
agents with their own interests. In this case study the CEO – being the agent for the 
shareholder, but acting as principal for local management within the organization –influenced 
the contracts and incentives in order to present results that supported the success of his 
strategic choice. The underlying motivation was the CEO’s strong belief in the chosen strategy. 
This was influenced by his previous experience, where this strategy was successful. Hence, the 
underlying motivation of reporting decisions can be influenced by personal factors. An other 
case study by de Jong, DeJong, Mertens and Roosenboom  (2007) identifies the drive of an 
organization to demonstrate the success of a chosen strategy. They studied investor relations, a 
broader subject than earnings management. It provides a rich description of how the 
organization’s strategy - and the drive to prove that this chosen strategy is successful - plays a 
role in the presentation of the financial results. Moreover, it gives further insights into the 
complexity of actors in the principal-agent theory. Not only the shareholders and the 
organization are involved, but also the financial analysts and advisors play an important role in 
the setting. 
The above studies reveal the importance of the personal background in the decision making 
process as well as the influence of various actors, both actors within the organization as well as 
external actors. These studies still use the economic perspective as a ‘base case’ perspective to 
explain reporting behavior. Within the research area of the role of the controller, the economic 
perspective is not as dominant. Although this type of research does not focus on accounting 
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choice behavior, it may provide additional insights into controller behavior that can also be 
interesting for analyzing controller behavior relating to accounting choices. 
2.3.3 The role of the controller and controller behavior in general 
A number of studies focus on the role of the controller and the development of this role over 
time (De Loo et al., 2011; Ezzamel, Lilley, & Willmott, 1997). The change of the controller from 
‘bean counter’ to ‘business partner’ is a central theme  (Järvenpää, 2007). A study by A. 
Graham, Davey-Evans and Toon (2012) revealed that the controller’s role has not so much 
changed from the traditional reporting and control function to a business partner role, but 
rather broadened to include forward-looking aspects. The authors did a follow up of the 
outcome of their survey, holding 12 interviews with controllers about what they did in their 
work roles, what they would ideally like to be doing in their roles, and with which obstacles they 
were confronted. These interviews revealed that the controllers found it difficult to perform the 
business partner role due to time constraints and the limitations of the technical systems. Also, 
they referred to management lacking an appreciation of the costs and benefits related to 
obtaining better information. This means that not only technical and personnel resources play a 
role in the controller’s work situation, but also other organizational actors and the culture 
within the organization.  
Case studies that analyzed the change of the role of the controller in transforming from a 
central (financial) control function to a more decentralized business-oriented role also revealed 
these influences and show the complexity of this transformation process  (Burns & 
Baldvinsdottir, 2005; Järvenpää, 2007). Rather than being a technical process changing the tasks 
and responsibilities of the controller, it involves a change of culture and routines within the 
entire organization. Burns and Baldvinsdottir (2005) used old institutional theory as their 
theoretical perspective for their case study. An institution is defined by Burns and Scapens 
(2000) as “a way of thought or action of some prevalence and permanence, which is embedded 
in the habits of a group or the customs of people”(p. 5). In order to effectuate change, 
introducing new rules, structures and systems is not sufficient; the organizational culture and 
routines also have to be addressed. Järvenpää (2007) confirmed this and outlined the 
importance of the informal interventions which were used in the case company studied: 
attention paying, role modelling, and ‘story telling’. Hence behavior within organizations is 
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largely determined by routines. This also plays a role in the accounting choice behavior of 
controllers.  
In their case study, Ezzamel and Burns (2005) reveal how difficult it can be to change 
‘institutions’. The study relates to an unsuccessful management control change project within 
an organization. This was analyzed using a theoretical perspective of power relations. The case 
study showed that by implementing a new management control strategy the original 
boundaries of the finance professionals’ work field were broadened to part of the work field of 
buying & merchandising professionals. This was not accepted by the buying and merchandising 
professionals, who used their discourse to demonstrate their superior knowledge in their field. 
The perspective of power relations provides yet again another light on controller behavior.  
To summarize, controllers work in a complex setting where both organizational culture and 
power relation play a role. Moreover, the underlying motivation for accounting choices may not 
only be driven by economic behavior but also by (organizational) routines. 
2.3.4 Implications for analyzing the accounting choice behavior 
This section provides insights into deliberations relating to reporting decisions from an 
economic perspective. Yet, accounting choice behavior cannot be fully explained from an 
economic perspective alone; it is also influenced by previous experience or routine behavior. 
Moreover, organizations have their own ‘institutions’ which influence controller’s behavior and 
therefore are likely also to influence their accounting choices. Using the agency theory to 
explain underlying motivation for accounting choices is complicated because other actors may 
be involved than the regularly assumed principle/agent actors. Depending on the controller’s 
setting, different actors can influence the decision making process and power relations can play 
a role in this process as some actors may have more power than others.  
Depending on the chosen analysis perspective, different insights can be obtained. In order to 
answer the second research question - how are accounting choices made by controllers – it is 
therefore important to collect the data in such a way that it allows analysis from different 
perspectives. The use of open questions during the interviews to discover how controllers make 
their choices and by allowing controllers to elaborate on subjects they find important when 
explaining their choice process, facilitates this type of data collection. 
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Section 2.4 addresses the third research question: what factors affect the accounting choices of 
controllers? 
2.4 FACTORS AFFECTING ACCOUNTING CHOICES OF CONTROLLERS 
Earnings management research identifies a number of factors influencing reporting behavior. 
The factors influencing accounting choices identified in financial accounting research are 
grouped for the purpose of this study into two main categories: ‘individual controller related’ 
factors and ‘controller setting’ factors. The latter influence the setting in which the controller 
works. These factors can be external, organizational and/or situational. 
An important external factor is the financial and other regulation. Bens and Johnston (2009) 
found that reported restructuring charges significantly decreased after the introduction of EITF 
No.94-310 which provided guidance for accounting for restructuring charges. In addition to 
financial accounting regulation, other regulation also influence accounting choices, for example 
pricing regulation. Bowman and Navissi (2003) identified firms making income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals in order to increase the likelihood of price increase approval.  
The governance relating to the implementation of the regulation also affects accounting 
choices. Bens and Johnston (2009) also reported that behavior relating to restructuring charges 
was analyzed both during a period when the SEC11 closely monitored the implementation of the 
new guideline, and during a period without the SEC paying specific attention. They found that 
‘big bath behavior’ - overstating the restructuring charges in order to create some hidden 
reserves - was lower in the period of  specific SEC monitoring than in the period without specific 
SEC monitoring. Audits, also a means of governance, are another factor of influence. Chen, Kelly 
and Salterio (2012) found that the combination of audit actions and (severe) audit attitude 
influenced reporting behavior. 
Within the organization, the board of directors plays an important role in the corporate 
governance. There is general agreement that board independence decreases the manipulation 
of accruals, i.e. earnings management (Osma, 2008). Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen (2008) found, 
                                                            
10 EITF (Emerging Issues Task Force) publications provide guidance for the implementation of the accounting standards 
published by the FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board). 
11 SEC is the Securities and Exchange Commission, a government commission created by Congress to regulate the securities 
markets and protect investors. 
 
 
28 Accounting Choices of Controllers 
however, that board quality rather than board independence is associated with lower earnings 
management. Their study revealed that the percentage of independent directors in the board 
was not related to earnings management. They identified three factors that were positively 
related to earnings management: the presence of controlling shareholders in the board of 
directors, CEO duality (the CEO also holds a position as chairman of the board), and ‘busy’ 
independent directors (directors with a large number of multiple directorships). High ‘board 
diligence’, which was operationalized as the percentage of meetings attended by independent 
directors, was found to be negatively associated with earnings management.  
Another organizational factor influencing reporting behavior is ownership structure. Jiraporn 
and Dadalt (2009) found, for example, that financial statements of family controlled firms 
showed less ‘abnormal accruals’ than the financial statements of non-family owned firms. 
Comparing public equity firms and private equity firms, Givoly, Hayn and Katz (2010) identified 
lower accrual quality and more conservatism in the financial statements of public equity firms. 
For this purpose, they analyzed financial statements of publicly traded equity firms and 
privately held equity firms that were considered public because they had publicly traded debt 
and therefore had to publish their financial statements. The financing structure and debt 
convenances also affect reporting behavior (Jha, 2013; Wang & Lin, 2013). 
A frequently researched subject is the influence of incentive compensation on reporting 
decisions. Most studies are performed on an organizational level using published financial 
statements. Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999) analyzed Business Unit data of a large conglomerate 
and found that business unit managers use discretionary accruals in order to maximize their 
bonuses. 
Finally, specific situations have been studied that influence accounting decisions, such as 
reporting behavior of firms before and after initial public offering (Ball & Shivakumar, 2008; 
Xiong, Zhou, & Varshney, 2010) and reporting behavior before and after the introduction of 
specific financial or other regulatory aspects (Bens & Johnston, 2009; Jorissen & Otley, 2010). A 
study into the frequencies of reported small profits compared to small losses (Burgstahler & 
Dichev, 1997) indicates that firms with earnings around zero tend to manage their earnings to 
show a small profit, rather than show a small loss. 
The above-mentioned factors are interesting when analyzing the influence of the setting of the 
controller on the accounting choices. The second group of factors identified in previous 
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research relates to the influence of individual controller related factors on accounting choices. 
Greenfield, Norman and Wier (2008) studied the impact of an individual’s ethical ideology on 
earnings management decisions12. They note that an ethical orientation of an individual varies 
from ‘relativism’ to ‘idealism’: “Relativism describes an individual’s concern for a universal set 
of rules or standards; idealism focuses on human welfare” (p. 420). They found a positive 
relationship between earnings management behavior and individuals with a relativist ethical 
orientation, and a negative relationship between earnings management behavior and 
individuals with an idealist ethical orientation. Ethical perception of earnings management 
choices vary considerably. Merchant and Rockness (1994) performed a survey among 
managers, controllers and internal auditors on the ethical perception of various earnings 
management choices. They found significant disagreement among the respondents for most of 
the choices. Consistent with findings by J.R. Graham et al. (2005), their study also revealed that 
accounting choices were perceived to be less acceptable than cash flow choices, such as 
delaying maintenance, advertising expenditure, or investing in projects with a positive net 
present value. Merchant and Rockness (1994) found that the difference of within-GAAP or 
GAAP-violating choices did not seem to affect the perceived acceptability of the intervention. 
The authors give two possible explanations for this phenomenon. Either the respondents find 
the underlying ethical issue more important than GAAP compliance, or the respondents do not 
all have this specific GAAP knowledge. This lack of GAAP knowledge may also be the reason for  
findings by Elias (2002), who used the same earnings management choices as Merchant and 
Rockness (1994) for a survey among controllers, auditors, accounting faculty members and 
accounting students. Elias found that accounting students were more lenient in their judgment 
on accounting choice earnings management activities than practitioners and faculty; perhaps 
they did not identify the GAAP-violating choices. Controllers’ GAAP knowledge therefore is also 
likely to have an impact on their accounting choices.  
Not only ethical orientation plays a role in decision making, but also the weighing of the 
‘benefit’ related to the misreporting and the cost of ‘being caught’. It was found that reporters 
with prior experience as an auditor are more sensitive to large penalties for aggressive 
                                                            
12 Greenfield et al. used a cash flow decision in their study, giving the participants the option whether or not to postpone 
maintenance resulting in lower maintenance expenses for the reporting period. 
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reporting than those who did not have this prior experience (Bowlin, Hales, & Kachelmeier, 
2009)13. 
Finally, other personal characteristics have an impact on controller’s choices. Hartmann and 
Maas (2010) performed an experiment relating to organizational slack and found that the 
personality characteristic Machiavellianism14 has an impact on organizational slack. Since 
organizational slack relates to ‘managing budgets’, the results are also interesting for research 
relating to ‘managing earnings’ and accounting choices. Moreover, if controllers try to meet 
targets, they may manage both the budgets and the financial results. Maas and Matějka (2009) 
studied both type of intervention and found a positive relationship of role conflict and 
misreporting. The subject of role conflict is further discussed in the literature review section 
relating to the role of the controller. 
The factors influencing earnings management and reporting choices that were identified in the 
above-mentioned studies are summarized in Table 3. With respect to the individual controller 
related characteristics, it should be noted that the above-mentioned research has been 
performed among various groups of individuals. The type of population used in a study is likely 
to affect the outcome. A summary of the populations researched in the literature reviewed is 
provided in Table 4. Although the above analyses are partly based on research using other 
populations than BU controllers, they provide a number of factors that can influence accounting 
choices. These factors are either related to the setting in which the controller works or to 
individual controller specific characteristics. 
Another area of research that can provide insights into the factors influencing accounting 
choices, is research relating to the controller in general. Although these studies do not focus on 
the accounting choices of controllers, a number address the controller’s involvement in decision 
making and factors influencing this involvement. The factors identified in these studies may also 
influence the accounting choices of controllers. These studies are analyzed in Section 2.5. 
 
                                                            
13 Bowlin et al. used a game theoretic approach in their study. The participants had the option to choose either ‘cautious’ or 
‘aggressive’ reporting in a specific setting. 
14 A person's tendency to deceive and manipulate other people for their personal gain 
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Factors Study Research area Research method* 
   INT SURV EXP ARCH 
Controller setting       
External       
Accounting standards Bens et al. 2009 Earnings management    X 
Other regulation Bowman et al. 2003 Earnings management    X 
Governance and audit Bens et al. 2009,  Earnings management    X 
 Chen et al. 2012 Earnings management   X  
Organizational       
Board of directors Osma 2008, Sarkar et 
al. 2008 
Earnings management    X 
Ownership Jiraporn et al. 2009, 
Givoly et al. 2010 
Earnings management    X 
Financing structure and 
convenants 
Jha 2013, Wang et al. 
2013 
Earnings management    X 
Incentive compensation Guidry et al. 1999 Earnings management    X 
Role of controller within 
organization 
Maas et al. 2009 Role conflict and 
misreporting 
X X   
Situational       
Earnings around zero Burgstahler et al. 
1997 
Earnings management    X 
Initial public offering Ball et al. 2008 Earnings management    X 
Change in regulation Bens et al. 2009 Earnings management    X 
Individual controller related       
Ethical orientation Greenfield  et al. 2008 earnings management 
(cash flow choice) 
  X  
 Merchant 1994, Elias 
2002 
perception of earnings 
management activities 
 X   
Professional commitment Greenfield  et al. 2008 earnings management 
(cash flow choice) 
  X  
Personality Hartmann et al. 2010 budgettary slack 
(machiavalism) 
  X  
Experience as auditor Bowlin et al. 2009 reporting decisions   X  
Technical (GAAP) knowledge Merchant 1994, Elias 
2002 
perception of earnings 
management activities 
 X   
*INT=Interview, SURV=Survey, EXP=Experiment, ARCH=Archival 
Table 3 Factors influencing earnings management and reporting decisions 
 
Study Population researched 
Merchant 1994 200 MT members (managers, controllers) of 2 organizations and 108 
members of Institute Internal Auditors 
Elias 2002 763 CPA Auditor, CPA Controller, Accounting faculty members, Accounting 
Students 
Maas et al. 2009 Interviews: 48 BU controllers. survey 134 controllers of medium/large 
companies, members of Controllers Institute 
Hartmann et al. 2010 136 students of a two year parttime executive program in finance and 
control 
Greenfield  et al. 2008 376 senior-level business students 
Chen et al. 2012 171 senior corporate managers, MBA alumni 
Bowlin et al. 2009 96 upper division undergraduate accounting students 
Table 4 Population studied in reviewed literature 
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2.5 FACTORS IDENTIFIED IN RESEARCH RELATING TO THE ROLE OF THE 
CONTROLLER 
Research relating to the role of the controller does not focus on the accounting choices of 
controllers, but on controllers’ activities and the development of the role of the controller. 
Section 2.3.3 outlined literature related to this subject which provides insights into controllers’ 
behavior. This section further explores the literature in order to identify factors that may affect 
controller behavior relating to accounting choices.  
As referred to in Section 2.3.3, the development of the role of the controller from ‘bean 
counter’ to ‘business partner’ is a central theme in the literature relating to their role 
(Järvenpää, 2007). Controllers in a business partner role are likely to have more business 
knowledge which can affect accounting choices relating to estimates of reporting items such as 
(the valuation of) fixed assets, inventory and debtors. Hunton, Wier and Stone (2000) 
performed studies into rank-based differences in knowledge and ability of controllers. They 
found that technical knowledge decreased and was increasingly variable at higher rank levels of 
controllers, whereas industry knowledge increased and was decreasingly variable. These two 
types of knowledge therefore vary both on an individual basis and on a functional basis 
(depending on the role/rank of the controller within the organization).  
Controllers who are close to the business are likely to have more ‘local’ knowledge than 
corporate controllers who work at a central staff department. This is called ‘information 
asymmetry’. The controller decides how to use this information when making his/her 
accounting decisions. In this light, it is interesting to  consider the findings by De Loo, Nederlof 
and Verstegen (2006). They revealed different behavioral patterns of controllers relating to the 
sharing of information; controllers either fully shared (relevant) information with higher levels 
in the organization, or only partly shared this information. They also identified different 
patterns of assessing business unit performance: controllers either assumed an involved role or 
a detached role. An involved role of the controller, where he/she combines a business oriented 
role with a functional control role, can lead to role conflict for the controller. On one hand the 
controller is supposed to be business partner involved in the decision-making process, while on 
the other hand he/she is expected to perform a controlling role. If the controller is, for example, 
pressured to make very aggressive accounting choices in order to meet the organizations’ 
targets, then organizational and professional conflict (OPC) may occur. Maas and Matějka 
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(2009) found that the business oriented role and the control role are not complementary. An 
emphasis on the control role was negatively associated with local decision-making. Moreover, it 
was positively associated with role stress and ambiguity, which was in turn related with 
misreporting. This confirmed the findings of Indjejikian and Matejka (2006), who identified a 
relation between controller involvement in decision-making and organizational slack15. They 
also found that organizational slack is positively associated with information asymmetry; they 
used the term business growth as a proxy for information asymmetry.  
The level of controller involvement in management decision processes may also have an impact 
on the way they use their judgments and estimates when making accounting choices. Their 
accounting choices may be less conservative than choices made by controllers who are not 
involved in management decision processes. This might explain the findings by Zoni and 
Merchant (2007) that controller involvement is positively associated with performance. They 
noted that the direction of this causality was not identified. Either controller involvement 
increases performance or high performing organizations are more inclined to involve controllers 
in their decisions. They studied the variables that resulted in more or less involvement of 
controllers in management decision processes. They found a positive relation with some 
situational variables - such as capital intensity, operating independency - and controller 
involvement in management decision processes. They also found a relation between line 
managers’ financial competence and controller involvement in decision-making. Line managers 
are members of the organization who have expectations relating to the role of the controller, 
which leads us to Byrne and Pierce (2007), who performed a study in order to identify a 
comprehensive set of antecedents and characteristics with respect to the roles of controllers. 
Byrne and Pierce (2007) use role theory as one of their theoretical lenses. According to role 
theory, the organizational roles are determined by the role senders - the other members of the 
organization who have expectations relating to the role. The personal characteristics of the 
person who ‘occupies’ the role and his/her interpersonal relation with the role sender influence 
the role senders’ expectations. Byrne and Pierce found a strong influence of management 
                                                            
15 Indjejikian and Matejka used ‘perceived achievability of targets’ as an indicator of organizational slack with the underlying 
assumption that easily achievable targets do not motivate managers to make full use of their resources: by attaining their 
targets there is no longer an incentive for any further effort. Setting easy attainable targets in budgets is also called ‘budgetary 
slack’. As outlined in Section 2.4 it can be argued that since budgetary slack relates to ‘managing budgets’ the results are also 
interesting for research relating to ‘managing earnings’ and accounting choices. 
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expectations on the role of the controller. In this light, the study by Pierce and O’Dea (2003) is 
also interesting. They researched the perception-gap of controllers and managers relating to 
management information and related the outcome to the role of the controller. The 
combination of a strong manager (one who combines detailed knowledge of information 
requirements with an assertive management style) and a strong controller (one who achieves 
an effective balance between independence and involvement) minimizes the risk of a 
perception gap. Zoni and Merchant (2007) also found that line managers’ financial expertise is 
positively associated with controller involvement in decision-making, thereby confirming the 
impact of the characteristics of line managers on the role of controllers. Therefore, not only the 
individual characteristics of the controller but also characteristics of the line managers they 
work with may affect controller decision-making and influence their accounting choices. 
Byrne and Pierce (2007) also found that the capacity of controllers to influence their roles is 
associated with their attitude, personality and initiative. De Loo, Verstegen et al. (2011) 
identified a number of controller characteristics associated with the way they implemented 
their role: the number of years experience in a financial function, age, gender and whether 
someone considered him/herself as an ‘executor’ or a ‘thinker’. Finally, Byrne and Pierce also 
emphasize a number of difficulties for controllers relating to ‘interpreting’ the line managers 
expectations, adapting to different styles of line management, and possible role conflict 
between ‘business partner’ and ‘watchman’. In summary, the combination of the line manager 
and the controller, including their interpersonal relationship affects how the controller 
implements his/her role. This can affect whether the accounting choices made are more or less 
aggressive and/or the estimates of reporting items.  
Although the above-mentioned studies focus on factors influencing controllers’ involvement in 
decision-making and the role of the controller, these factors may also affect the accounting 
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Factors Study Research area Research Method* 
   INT SURV  EXP ARCH 
Controller setting       
Capital intensity Zoni et al. 2007 Involvement in decision making  X   
Operating 
interdependencies 
Zoni et al. 2007 Involvement in decision making  X   
Business growth Indjejikian et al. 
2006 
Organizational slack  X   
Line manager:       
• Financial competence Zoni et al. 2007 Involvement in decision making  X   
• Knowledge and 
management style 
Pierce et al. 2003 Perceptions of managers and 
controllers 
X X   
Individual controller related       
Personality De Loo et al. 2006 Behavioral patterns X    
 Byrne et al. 2007 Role of controller X    
 De Loo et al. 2011 Controller activities   X   
Nr. years in financial funtion De Loo et al. 2011 Controller activities   X   
Industry knowledge Hunton et al. 2000 Rank of controllers  X   
Technical (GAAP) knowledge Hunton et al. 2000 Rank of controllers  X   
Age De Loo et al. 2011 Controller activities   X   
Gender De Loo et al. 2011 Controller activities   X   
*INT= Interviews, SURV= Survey, EXP= Experiment, ARCH= Archival     
Table 5 Factors influencing controller involvement in decision making 
Most of the studies in Table 5 are based on surveys. The type of population participating in the 
survey may affect the outcome. A summary of the populations researched in the literature 
reviewed is provided in Table 6. 
Study Population researched 
Zoni et al. 2007 17 controllers, 14 CEO's 
Pierce et al. 2003 11 organizations: each 1 controller, 1 productmanager, 1 sales/marketing 
manager 
Indjejikan et al. 2006 6 firms: 104 Business Units: each 1 BU controller and 1 BU manager 
Hunton et al. 2000 2.941 Certified Management Accountants in junior, senior and 
manager-level positions 
de Loo et al. 2006 11 BU controllers, 5 controllers in various positions in organizations 
Byrne et al. 2007 18 controllers and 18 operating managers 
De Loo et al. 2011 251 graduates of controller's programs from 3 universities 
Table 6 Population studied in reviewed literature 
In this section, additional factors are identified that affect involvement of controllers in 
decision-making and therefore which may also influence accounting choices of controllers. 
Combining these with the factors identified in Section 2.4 provides a detailed theoretical basis 
for analysis in order to answer the third research question relating to the factors influencing the 
accounting choices of controllers. 
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2.6 SUMMARY FINDINGS TO BE USED FOR ACCOUNTING CHOICES OF 
CONTROLLERS  
No literature was found which was directly aimed at accounting choice behavior of controllers, 
studying what choices they are confronted with, what choices they make, and how they make 
these choices. Accounting choices made within an earnings management context has, however, 
been frequently studied. The role of the controller is also a standard research subject. These 
two different areas of research have been used to provide a theoretical basis for two of the 
three research questions.  
The findings can be used to answer the first research question: ‘what are the accounting choices 
that are available to controllers?’. The choices identified in Section 2.2.1 were predominantly 
those that were presented to the participants by the researchers. Analyzing the accounting 
choices of two case studies that focused on misreporting and earnings management revealed a 
broad range of accounting choices. These related to a number of reporting items. Moreover, 
deciding about one reporting item often involved more than one choice. It should be noted that 
these case studies were performed from the perspective of earnings management rather than 
from a general accounting choice perspective, and that the choices were analyzed on an 
organizational level, not on a business unit level.  Therefore, the literature review did not result 
in an exhausting list of accounting choices available to BU controllers when preparing their 
financial statements. Table 7 provides an overview of the accounting choices identified in the 
literature review, classified by reporting item.  
In order to identify accounting choices available to BU controllers which may be beyond the 
accounting choices identified above, a twofold research approach was taken. First, by using the 
BU financial statements and management reports as a basis for identifying accounting choices 
as a preparation for semi structured interviews, the accounting choices available to the BU 
controllers were discussed systematically. Second, using open questions and having controllers 
reflect on their choices facilitates identifying choices that were not identified in the preparation 
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Reporting item Accounting choice Study Research method* 





Accounting choice method for equity method  
instead of consolidation 
Jorissen et al. (2010) X   
 Write down investments Jorissen et al. (2010) X   
Intangible assets  R&D capitalization choices - generic Seybert (2010)   X 




X   
 Write off intangible asset R&D: timing, amount Kepsu (2012) 
 
X   




X   
Intangible assets Allocation of acquisition costs (and goodwill) Kepsu (2012) X   
Goodwill Impairment testing of goodwill Kepsu (2012) X   
Construction 
contracts 




X   
Inventory 
 
Write off inventory that is known to be sold at full 
price (GAAP violating) 
Merchant et al. 
(1994)/ Elias (2002) 
 X  
 Reverse previous write off of inventory of goods  Merchant et al. 
(1994)/ Elias (2002) 
 X  
Provisions -  Restructuring provision choices -generic Bens et al. (2009)   X 
Restructuring Creating a restructuring provision Jorissen et al. (2010) X   
Provisions -other 
 
Creating a provision for future losses and 
commitments 
Jorissen et al. (2010) 
 
X   




X   




X   
 Draw down on reserves previously set aside Graham et al.(2005)  X  
Accruals - revenue 
related 
Book revenues now rather than next quarter (if 
justified in each quarter) 
Graham et al.(2005) 
 
 X  
Accruals -  Postpone taking an accounting charge Graham et al.(2005)  X  
expense related No recording of supplies received in December 
until following February (GAAP violating) 
Merchant et al. 
(1994)/ Elias (2002) 
 
 X  
 Not recording expenses of services received until 
following year (GAAP violating) 
Merchant et al. 
(1994)/ Elias (2002) 
 X  
 Prepay next year's expenses and record them as 
current expenses (GAAP violating) 
Merchant et al. 
(1994)/ Elias (2002) 
 X  
 Request supplier's invoice after year-end (GAAP 
violating)  
Merchant et al. 
(1994)/ Elias (2002) 
 X  
Accruals - general Timing of booking transactions Maas et al. (2009)  X  
Various 
 
Alter accounting assumptions (allowances, 
pensions, etc.) 
Graham et al.(2005) 
 
 X  
 Classification choices of extraordinary costs Kepsu (2012) X   
 Relabeling line items (GAAP violating) Maas et al. (2009)  X  
* CASE= Case study, SURV/EXP= Survey/Experiment, ARCH= Archival     
Table 7 Accounting choices identified in the literature review, categorized by reporting item 
There is little research literature relating to the second research question: ‘how are accounting 
choices made by the controller?’. The literature review revealed that financial accounting 
research relating to accounting choices predominantly uses the economic perspective. Research 
relating to the role of the controller provides other insights that can be used as a basis for 
analyzing their accounting choice behavior. Behavior can, for example, be based on routines 
and habits influenced by past experience and organizational institutions. Analyzing the behavior 
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of various actors within the organization from a perspective of power relations again provides 
other insights into controllers’ behavior. The subject of how controllers make their accounting 
choices has not been addressed in previous research. Trying to answer this question therefore is 
exploratory research, ‘opening the black box of the accounting choice process’. 
Finally, ample literature is available as a theoretical basis for answering the third research 
question: ‘what factors affect the accounting choices of controllers?’ The factors identified can 
be divided in ‘controller setting’ factors and ‘individual controller-related’ factors and are 
summarized in Table 8.  The factors identified were used as an initial framework for analysis of 
the data collected. It should be noted that the theoretical basis to be used for the research 
questions is only tentative. This theory is derived from studies that focus on other subjects 
(earnings management and the role of the controller). Also, the population used in these 
studies varies considerably. The populations studied are listed in Table 9. 
Given these considerations, it may well be possible that other choices and factors emerge from 
the empirical data which focuses on accounting choices in general, and a research population of 
BU controllers (within the context of one organization).  
To conclude, the literature review findings provide a basis for using a systematic approach for 
identifying accounting choices on the basis of reporting items in the financial statements. It also 
provides a tentative framework for the factors influencing these choices. On the other hand, it 
reveals the broad range of accounting choices available to controllers and the complexity of 
individual behavior.  
The data collection and the initial analysis of the data was based on the findings of the literature 
review above. As outlined in Section 1.2 of the introduction, this was followed by an analysis of 
the data from another perspective: the institutional logics perspective. In Chapter 3, the 
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Factors Study Research area Research 
method* 
   INT SURV EXP ARCH 
Controller setting       
External       
Accounting standards Bens et al. 2009 Earnings management    X 
Other regulation Bowman et al. 2003 Earnings management    X 
Governance and audit Bens et al. 2009  Earnings management    X 
 Chen et al. 2012 Earnings management   X  
Organizational       
Board of directors Osma 2008  Earnings management    X 
 Sarkar et al. 2008 Earnings management    X 
Ownership Jiraporn et al. 2009 Earnings management    X 
 Givoly et al.2010 Earnings management    X 
Financing structure& 
convenants 
Jha 2013  Earnings management    X 
 Wang et al. 2013 Earnings management    X 
Incentive compensation Guidry et al. 1999 Earnings management    X 
Role of controller in 
organization 
Maas et al. 2009 Role conflict and misreporting X X   
Capital intensity Zoni et al. 2007 Involvement in decision making  X   
Operating interdependencies Zoni et al. 2007 Involvement in decision making  X   
Business growth Indjejikian et al. 2006 Organizational slack  X   
Line manager:       
 -Financial   competence Zoni et al. 2007 Involvement in decision making  X   
 -Knowledge&management 
style 
Pierce et al. 2003 Perceptions of managers and 
controllers 
X X   
Situational       
Earnings around zero Burgstahler et al. 
1997 
Earnings management    X 
Initial public offering Ball et al. 2008 Earnings management    X 
Change in regulation Bens et al. 2009 Earnings management    X 
Individual controller related       
Ethical orientation Greenfield  et al. 
2008 
Earnings management (cash 
flow choice) 
  X  
 Merchant 1994, Elias 
2002 
Perception of earnings 
management activities 
 X   
Professional commitment Greenfield  et al. 
2008 
Earnings management (cash 
flow choice) 
  X  
Personality Hartmann et al. 2010 Budgettary slack 
(machiavalism) 
  X  
 De Loo et al. 2006 Behavioral patterns X    
 Byrne et al. 2007 Role of controller X    
 De Loo et al. 2011 Controller activities   X   
Experience as auditor Bowlin et al. 2009 reporting decisions   X  
Nr. years in financial funtion De Loo et al. 2011 Controller activities   X   
Industry knowledge Hunton et al. 2000 Rank of controllers  X   
Technical (GAAP) knowledge Merchant 1994, Elias 
2002 
Perception of earnings 
management activities 
 X   
 Hunton et al. 2000 Rank of controllers  X   
Age De Loo et al. 2011 Controller activities   X   
Gender De Loo et al. 2011 Controller activities   X   
*INT= Interview, SURV= Survey, EXP= Experiment, ARCH= Archival      
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Study Population researched 
Merchant 1994 200 MT members (managers, controllers) of 2 organizations and 108 members 
of Institute Internal Auditors 
Elias 2002 763 CPA Auditor, CPA Controller, Accounting faculty members, Accounting 
Students 
Maas et al. 2009 Interviews: 48 BU controllers. survey 134 controllers of medium/large 
companies, members of Controllers Institute 
Hartmann et al. 2010 136 students of a two year parttime executive program in finance and control 
Greenfield  et al. 2008 376 senior-level business students 
Chen et al. 2012 171 senior corporate managers, MBA alumni 
Bowlin et al. 2009 96 upper division undergraduate accounting students 
Zoni et al. 2007 17 controllers, 14 CEO's 
Pierce et al. 2003 11 organizations: each 1 controller, 1 productmanager, 1 sales/marketing 
manager 
Indjejikan et al. 2006 6 firms: 104 Business Units: each 1 BU controller and 1 BU manager 
Hunton et al. 2000 2.941 Certified Management Accountants in junior, senior and 
manager-level positions 
De Loo et al. 2006 11 BU controllers, 5 controllers in various positions in organizations 
Byrne et al. 2007 18 controllers and 18 operating managers 
De Loo et al. 2011 251 graduates of controller's programs from 3 universities 
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3 THE PERSPECTIVE OF INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
During the interviews with the BU controllers, one element consistently emerged; this related 
to ‘firm behavior and setting boundaries‘. When analyzing the empirical findings, it was difficult 
to place this theme in the context of the accounting choices made by the BU controllers. Chua 
and Mahama (2012) outline three ways of using ‘informing’ theory in qualitative research: to 
provide stimulus into the research problem; to understand the field; and retrospectively, to 
explain field data that looks surprising, unusual or discrepant. This chapter addresses the last of 
these. This led to the second phase of the analysis referred to in Section 1.2: using the 
theoretical lense of ‘institutional logics’ provided a better understanding of this element of the 
findings. 
The concept of institutional logics emerged from the broad domain of institutional theory. The 
purpose of this chapter is to outline the theoretical basis used for the analysis of the empirical 
data, and not to provide a literature review of institutional theory. Section 3.1 therefore 
addresses institutional theory on a global basis. This is followed by Section 3.2 which focuses on 
institutional logics. Finally, Section 3.3 provides a summary and outlines the use of this 
perspective for the analysis of the empirical findings.  
3.1 INSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
In his article “Never mind the gap: towards an institutional perspective on management 
accounting practice” Scapens (1994) signaled the difference between actual management 
accounting practices and theoretical ‘ideals’. He introduced an institutional framework for 
analyzing management accounting practices. Instead of the neoclassical economic theory 
assuming an organization to consist of individuals behaving in an economic way, Scapens 
proposed “a picture of an organization comprising routine behaviors which provide a way of 
coping in a complex and uncertain world, and which enable individual actors to make sense of 
their own actions and the actions of others” (p. 312) 16   
                                                            
16 It should be noted that Scapens refers to the old-institutional theory. The term institution is used either as ‘rationalized myths 
within a cultural context’ or as ‘a framework of regulatory agencies and policies’. The latter is the focus of the new institutional 
theory  (Greenwood, Oliver, Sahlin, & Suddaby, 2008) 
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The concepts of habits, routines and rule based behavior, which were explained in the 
introduction of Section 2.3 of the previous chapter, play an important part in this institutional 
perspective of analysis. Scapens refers to actions of individuals that may be taken because 
individuals behave in a way that ‘proved to be effective in the past’. Redmond (2004), 
developed a ‘concept of (old institutional) rationality’ that is consistent with the institutional 
approach and also addressed habitual and routine behavior. He outlines a dual mode rationality 
explaining that institutional rationality requires two types of thinking: rule following and 
purpose seeking. Habitual or rule following behavior ‘conserves mental efforts’ which is 
important given the limited cognitive efforts of individuals. Rule based behavior can be a result 
of individual experience “if a routinized response is adequate, then habit or rule following is 
appropriate” (Redmond, 2004, p. 180). It  can also be learned from others, “in the case of social 
learning, habits are acquired with mental effort but without a problem-solving type of mental 
activity.” (Redmond, 2004, p. 182). Accounting choices can thus be the result of rule based 
behavior, with the origin of this rule based behavior being in previous experiences and/or in 
social learning. When new situations emerge or previous behavior proves not to be appropriate, 
this behavior needs to be reformulated and the second mode of rationality is then applied: the 
purpose seeking mode involving active cognitive effort. Verstegen (2006, 2011) places 
management accounting in the context of dual mode rationality. He argues that the two modes 
have a sequential order, “in the first stage a decision room is shaped, making purpose-seeking 
behavior attainable in the second stage” (2011, p. 115). Reporting requirements such as GAAP 
and an organization’s accounting manual can be seen as determinants that shape the decision 
room in the first stage, the rule following mode, of the accounting choice decisions. 
Returning to Scapens’ article, he explains that, “Institutions can be regarded as imposing form 
and social  coherence upon human activity, partly through the continuing production and 
reproduction of habits and thought of action” (Scapens, 1994, p. 306). Scapens stresses the 
importance of recognizing that not only institutions influence actions, but that institutions are 
also the outcome of actions. Hence, institutions affect individual behavior but individual 
behavior can also affect institutions, and institutions can change over time. Thornton and 
Occasio (2008) explain that the concept ‘institutional logics’ provides a link between institutions 
and action. Section 3.2 discusses the institutional logics approach. 
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3.2 INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS 
Institutional logics are defined by Thornton and Occasio (2008) as “the socially constructed, 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and 
provide meaning to their social reality” (p. 101). Ezzamel, Robson and Stapleton (2012) explain 
that this concept is a way of understanding how actors’ selections are conditioned by specific 
frames of reference.  Using the concept of dual mode rationality of Redmond (2004) and 
Verstegen (2011), institutional logics allow us to understand how the decision room of 
controllers is shaped in the first stage: the rule following mode. 
According to Lambert and Sponem (2012), an organization’s institutional logic influences the 
positioning and role of controllers. Lambert and Sponem identified four styles of management 
accounting function, each being influenced by a different dominant institutional logic. The first 
style identified is the discrete style, relating to organizations with a dominant marketing logic. 
The focus within this type of organization is on innovation, differentiation and promotion. 
Second, the safeguard style relates to organizations with dominant engineers’ logic. The focus 
in this type of organization is then on design and research and development. Controllers in 
organizations with a discrete style and a safeguard style do not have much authority due to the 
focus of the organizations on other areas than finance. Organizations with more focus on 
finance revealed two other types of management accounting style; either the partner style or 
the omnipotent style. The partner style relates to organizations with both a marketing and a 
finance logic, whereas the omnipotent style relates to organizations with a short-term financial 
logic. Controllers in organizations with the partner style and omnipotent style have authority 
due to the strong focus on finance within these organizations. The dominant logic within an 
organization not only influences the authority of the finance function, but also the main ‘client’ 
of the controller. In organizations with a partner style, controllers focus on supporting the 
decision-making process of operational management; thus, local management is their main 
client. In organizations with an omnipotent style, controllers focus on global organizational 
control, with reporting and budgeting as important instruments, and corporate control as their 
main client. The different styles, the relating dominant logics, the characteristics with respect to 
the authority of the finance function, and the main client of the controller as identified by 
Lambert and Sponem are summarized in Table 10. 
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Style Dominant logic in organization Authority  
Finance function 
Main client of 
controller 
Discrete Marketing logic  Weak Local 
Safeguard Engineers & Marketing logic Weak Corporate 
Partner Marketing & Finance logic  Strong Local 
Omnipotent Short-term financial logic Strong Corporate 
Table 10 Controller role-style and the position within the organization based on Lambert and Sponem (2012) 
Lambert and Sponem thus identified the dominant logic of the organizations they studied. 
Within organizations there are, however, multiple logics that can be identified which can 
comprise competing logics. Competing logics result in ambiguity and can create diversity in 
practice, as actors develop different answers to these ambiguities (Ezzamel et al., 2012; 
Lounsbury, 2008). Ezzamel et al. (2012) studied the effect of competing logics on budgeting 
practices of primary and secondary schools in the United Kingdom in a longitudinal study. Their 
study is interesting for the purpose of this research as it provides an analysis of practice 
variation based on the use of (new) logics which may also be used to explain practice variation 
in accounting choices. The longitudinal study was conducted between 1993 and 1999, with 
follow-up interviews in 2011. During that period a new logic had emerged in the educational 
field: the business logic. Budgets were allocated to schools on the basis of the age-profile and 
numbers of pupils attending a school instead of allocation on the basis of historic spending; 
budgeting responsibilities of the schools had also increased. The goal was to promote parental 
choice and competition between schools. Schools were expected to behave like enterprises. 
This new business logic competed with the old dominant professional and governance logic of 
the primary and secondary schools. Ezzamel et al. revealed that the symbolic logic of the 
budgeting, being business logic, was not necessarily reflected in the material practices of 
budgeting in the field. They describe how the budgeting practice variation between the schools 
they studied was shaped by the differences in meaning that the organizational actors attributed 
to the ambiguities resulting from the multiple and competing logics within the field. Whereas 
schools with a local conservative political background adopted the business logics, schools with 
a local labor political background were more critical and maintained a dominant 
governance/political logic. Thornton & Ocasio, (2008) note that institutional logics determine 
the allocation of attention within organizations, deciding which problems are attended to and 
which solutions are considered. For the subject of accounting choices, identifying the 
institutional logics within an organization, including competing logics and the meaning that 
organizational actors attribute to these competing logics, is therefore important. 
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Apart from the use of the concept of institutional logics in an analysis of practice variances on 
an organizational level, institutional logics also play a role in analyzing practice variances on an 
individual level. Ezzamel et al. describe this as follows, “The concept of institutional logics is a 
way of understanding how actors selections are conditioned by specific frames of reference 
that inform the sensemaking, the vocabulary of motivation, and the identities that actors bring 
to situations” (Ezzamel et al., 2012, pp. 283-284). Institutional logics therefore help to 
understand which problems get attended to and which solutions are considered both on an 
organizational level and on an individual level. Following this line of reasoning, the logics of the 
individual BU controllers is an important element in understanding the accounting choices of 
these BU controllers.  
The prevailing institutional logics of BU controllers within one organization may vary, depending 
on their personal and educational background and their previous work experience. Controllers 
with an auditor background and the professional qualification of chartered accountant may for 
example have a more dominant professional accounting logic compared to controllers who 
started their career in a business control function after graduating with a business studies 
degree. The latter type of controller may have a more dominant business oriented logic.  
Not only the prevailing logics of individuals can vary, also the interpretation of a (new) 
institutional logic within an organization or field can vary for individual actors. Lok (2010) 
analyzed behavior at an individual level by studying institutional investors’ reaction to the new 
institutional logic of ‘shareholder value’ in their professional field. He identified three different 
ways that investors gave meaning to this new logic, which resulted in different practices. Lok 
used the concept of identity in his analysis because “identity is thought to form an important 
link between institutional logics and the behavior of individuals and organizations” (Lok, 2010, 
p. 1305). Morales and Lambert (2013) also use the concept of identity in a study analyzing the 
practices of management accountants within one organization. They found that, although the 
management accountants all agreed on the dominant business oriented logic of the 
organization, they behaved in different ways in specific situations. One example was the 
difference in behavior of the management accountants when financial reports were revealed to 
be unreliable due to administrative errors. One management accountant refused to correct the 
data, feeling responsible for making the unreliable financial procedures transparent within the 
organization. Others corrected the data, feeling responsible for delivering reliable data. One 
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corrected only what he considered to be material amounts being important for the decision-
making process of operational managers.  
To summarize, the perspective of institutional logics can provide insights into both the 
organizational setting and professional field of BU controllers, as well as their individual 
behavior.  
3.3 SUMMARY: THE USE OF AN INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS PERSPECTIVE 
Some empirical findings were difficult to place in the context of the accounting choices made by 
the BU controllers. The institutional logics perspective was introduced retrospectively to explain 
these findings. 
Institutional theory provides additional insights into accounting choice behavior of controllers 
as it provides a theoretical basis for analyzing how the decision room of controller is shaped and 
how controllers identify accounting choices. Due to rule based behavior, some controllers may, 
for example, not identify an accounting choice where other controllers do identify a choice. 
The use of an institutional logics perspective provides additional insights into the setting of BU 
controllers by identifying which logics play a role in the organizational setting. Moreover, at an 
individual level, the prevailing logics of the BU controller and their interpretation of dominant 
logics within their organization and professional field can provide insights into their accounting 
choice behavior. 
Using the institutional logics perspective enabled an explanation of the empirical findings. The 






This chapter outlines the research methodology used. The first section reflects on the 
philosophical assumptions and the implications for this study. The second section describes the 
research domain and the data collection process. The third section explains how the data were 
analyzed. In the last section, the issue of translation is discussed since the data were collected 
in Dutch, and this thesis is written in English. 
4.1 PHILOSOPHICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH 
4.1.1 Reflection on philosophical assumptions 
The use of philosophical approaches in accounting has been subject of discussion for many 
years. Chua (1986), in her article ‘Radical Developments in Accounting Thought’, concluded that 
mainstream accounting research uses the positivist perspective and that research using the 
interpretive and critical perspective enriches the knowledge of accounting. Almost twenty-five 
years later, mainstream accounting still appears to be based on the positivist perspective and 
an increasing narrowness of accounting research is signaled (Knoops, 2010; Lukka, 2010; Malmi, 
2010). Researchers with a positivist perspective believe that there is a ‘reality’ external to social 
actors which can be researched by observing this reality. This view on reality is called 
objectivism. Research based on this approach focuses on the formation of theories. Saunders, 
Lewis and Thornhill (2009) refer to this as the focus on ‘law-like generalizations’. 
Besides the abovementioned mainstream accounting research there is, however, a growing 
body of research with another philosophical approach: the interpretive approach. This type of 
accounting research is often characterized as ‘non-mainstream’ or ‘alternative’ (Ahrens et al., 
2008). In contrast to the objectivist view on reality of researchers of the positivist perspective, 
the underlying view on reality of researchers with an interpretive approach is subjective. No 
external reality independent of the social actors is thought to exist, but phenomena are created 
from the perceptions and actions of the social actors. In interpretive research, the ‘lived 
experience of the reality’ of individuals or groups of individuals is the object of research 
(Sandberg, 2005).  
This study is based on an interpretive approach. When using an interpretive approach, the 
criteria for assessing validity and reliability of research used in a positivist perspective are not 
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applicable due to the above-mentioned differences in assumptions. The question is, therefore, 
how can knowledge be justified when using an interpretive approach? Siti-Nabiha (2009) 
reflects on this in her article “Sensemaking in interpretive management accounting research: 
constructing a credible account”. She provides a rich and recognizable description of her data-
analysis process of a 5-year longitudinal study. Sandberg (2005) addresses the same subject and 
proposes criteria that can be applied to justify the knowledge produced within interpretive 
research. In this research ‘measures of justification’ have been taken. This is further outlined in 
Section 4.1.3. 
The second section of Chapter 1 is titled ‘a journey of discovery’. This reflects the process that 
the researcher went through during this research process. In this context, it should be noted 
that Shapiro’s (1997) line of reasoning as referred to in Section 2.1 has a strong appeal to the 
researcher. Accounting standards can be seen as a commonly agreed upon socially constructed 
reality. During the data analysis phase, the researcher became aware that the initial approach 
was based on accounting choice behavior from an economic perspective. This led to an initial 
theoretical basis and analysis that did not fully explain the findings. Therefore, the itinerary of 
the original research route was changed to include an institutional perspective. This process is 
further described in Section 4.3.4. 
In Section 4.1.2 this study is positioned in the field of financial accounting research and the 
chosen research method is explained. 
4.1.2 Positioning of research in the field 
Within accounting research, earnings management research is one of the most popular 
mainstream research topics (Merchant, 2010). This type of research predominantly focuses on 
identifying the relation between factors of influence and the final accounting choice, rather 
than on the accounting choice process itself.  
The objective of this research is not only to obtain insights into the final accounting choices of 
controllers and the factors influencing these choices, but foremostly to understand how these 
choices are made. Therefore, the accounting choice process itself is an important element of 
this study. Research methods such as archival research or questionnaires, which are 
predominantly used in mainstream financial accounting research, are not suited to addressing 
this subject. In order to obtain insights into how controllers make their choices, and to gain an 




are believed to work in a complex setting and in a world where phenomena are created from 
the perceptions and actions of the social actors. The research method chosen - using different 
types of information sources for the preparation of the interviews and interviewing controllers 
individually as well as in a group session - enabled the collection of rich data that describes the 
perceptions and actions of the controllers within their complex setting. The purpose of this 
study is not only to understand the accounting choice process but also to make an 
interpretation of these findings in the light of the outcomes of previous research. In their article 
“Straddling between paradigms” Kakkuri, Lukka and Kuorikoski (2008) address the use of both 
the ‘understanding’ and ‘interpretation’ concept within one study, and conclude that these 
concepts can co-exist within one study.  
As outlined in Section 4.1, the underlying philosophy of this study is interpretive. Transparency 
of the data collection method and the analysis phase is of great importance, since research is 
not believed to be value-free. This chapter, therefore, takes the reader along with the 
researcher’s considerations throughout the process of data collection and analysis in order to 
make the process as transparent as possible. Section 4.1.3 describes the ‘measures of 
justification’ and the critical reflection of the findings.  
4.1.3 Justification of research results 
Sandberg (2005) proposed criteria for justifying research results with an interpretive approach: 
communicative validity, pragmatic validity, transgressive validity, and ‘reliability as interpretive 
awareness’. Communicative validity relates to the understanding of the lived experience of the 
participants of the research. Pragmatic validity relates to ensuring that participants describe 
their lived experience accurately. In other words: does their behavior reflect their account of 
their lived experience? Transgressive validity addresses the risk that the researcher – in search 
of communicative and pragmatic validity – will overlook ambiguities and complexities in the 
lived experiences. Finally, reliability as interpretive awareness relates to how the researcher 
addresses his/her awareness of the subjectivity in the research. The general measures 
addressing these criteria are discussed below. 
First, the two supervisors involved in the research and analysis phase each assumed a different 
role. One supervisor performed the role of ‘critical reflector’. The supervisor, hereafter referred 
to as ‘Supervisor 1’, listened to all the interviews and  performed an independent analysis of the 
data, which was used to critically reflect on the findings of the researcher. The role of 
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Supervisor 1 addresses the criteria communicative validity as well as the reliability as 
interpretive awareness. The role of Supervisor 1 is outlined in the individual sections of this 
chapter. The other supervisor, hereafter referred to as ‘Supervisor 2’, was not involved in the 
research details, but reviewed the overall process and analysis. During the last phase of the 
research - the writing of the thesis - Supervisor 2 was no longer involved due to specific 
circumstances. A new supervisor, hereafter referred to as Supervisor 3, was involved in the final 
stage. Supervisor 3 performed an overall review of the thesis and the research material 
documented by the researcher. The roles of Supervisor 2 and 3 address the transgressive 
validity as well as the reliability as interpretive awareness, by analyzing and critically reflecting 
on the overall process. 
Second, gathering information from different sources and probing interviewees on why they 
had not made alternative accounting choices was used to address the criteria of pragmatic 
validity. The final outcome of the accounting choice and (parts of) the context could be verified 
using this approach. The controller deliberations which proved to be an important aspect in the 
process are, however, difficult to verify. Details about the measures taken in this context are 
further addressed in Section 4.2 with respect to the data collection process, and at the end of 
Section 4.3.4, outlining the limitations of ensuring the pragmatic validity. 
Third, the data were analyzed using an iterative approach. A ‘community of interpretation’ was 
created by the participants of the group discussions. The outcomes of these discussions were 
used as input for further analysis and functioned as a means to ensure the communicative 
validity. After the first analysis – based on the individual interviews – the findings were 
presented to a group of controllers who had been interviewed. On the basis of the outcome of 
this group session, the analysis was further refined and presented on a more general level to 
corporate finance staff within the organization. This analysis also addressed the transgressive 
validity since ‘all the empirical data had to fit’. The data analysis process is described in detail in 
Section 4.3. 
Finally, the researcher was, throughout the process, focused on what Sandberg (2005)17 refers 
to as the ‘perspectival subjectivity’. He explains that researchers who exercise perspectival 
subjectivity are aware of the influence of their perspective on the interpretation and he 
                                                            




contrasts this with ‘biased subjectivity’ where the researcher selectively uses statements that 
support their own conclusions. Siti-Nabiha (2009) strikingly describes the continuous 
questioning of interpretation of findings in her article. Both Sandberg and Siti-Nabiha conclude 
that, when using this awareness, interpretation is a strength rather than a weakness in 
presenting reliable results. In a way, the journey of this research and the change of itinerary 
reflect Sandberg’s criteria reliability as interpretive awareness. 
The research material was documented ensuring a ‘research trail’ from the beginning of data 
collection until the final thesis. Not only the research data gathered – audio recordings of 
interviews, management reports and other material - were documented, but also a record was 
kept of the meetings with the supervisors. After each meeting, a short memo was written with 
the items discussed and the follow-up actions agreed upon. In the final stage of analysis, these 
meetings were audio recorded. The documentation of these meetings form part of the research 
trail. 
In Section 4.2, the data collection process is further discussed. 
4.2 DOMAIN OF RESEARCH AND DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
As outlined in Section 2.1, the unit of analysis of this study is the BU controller. For this research 
it was important to involve BU controllers who were interested in cooperating and willing to 
openly communicate about the subject. Insights into the financial statements and management 
reports of the Business Units, enabling the identification of accounting choices to be discussed 
with the BU controller, would also enrich the research. Based on these considerations it was 
decided to conduct the research within an organization where the researcher was employed at 
the time of the research, and was therefore allowed to access the financial statements and 
management reports, and where finance staff and controllers were enthusiastic about 
participating in the research. The organization involved is a Dutch company in the service 
industry offering a wide range of (mainly) consumer products and services. The organization 
consists of various legal entities, encompassing an association (for the non-profit activities), 
limited companies (for the insurance activities), and private companies (for other commercial 
activities). The organization involved is not a quoted company, where financial analysts and 
investors are important stakeholders that influence reporting behavior. Instead, the 
organization involved is confronted with a variety of stakeholders; this is further described in 
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Chapter 5, Section 5.1.1. At the time of research, 21 controllers worked in a function that 
matched the above definition of BU controller. The planned period for data collection was 
spring and summer 2012. Therefore it was decided to analyze accounting choices made for the 
year-end 2011. Since this study has an explorative character and the purpose of the research is 
to understand how controllers make their accounting decisions, the main data collection 
method used was in-depth interviews with the controllers. The two steps performed in order to 
prepare the interviews are described below.  
First, the financial statements specified per Business Unit (BU) and the BU management reports 
of the year-end 2011 were collected by the researcher to analyze the available accounting 
choices for the controller. A corporate staff report listing the issues mentioned in the ‘Letter of 
Representation’ of the individual BUs was analyzed to identify any additional specific issues to 
be discussed during the interview. Every year-end, the BU controller and the BU manager have 
to sign a ‘Letter of Representation’ in which they confirm that the BU financial statements are in 
accordance with GAAP and the organization’s accounting instructions, that internal controls are 
functioning, and that the board of directors is fully informed of outstanding issues that could 
affect the financial statements. This action can be viewed as the BU controller taking 
responsibility for the accounting decisions incurred. The management reports of the first 
quarter of 2012 were also collected and used to identify any follow-up issues that resulted from 
the accounting choices at the year-end. Second, a pre-questionnaire (Appendix 1) was sent to 
each controller with the request to return this before the interview. This provided additional 
information on the controller’s background and BU setting, but it also triggered the controller 
to think about the subject before the interview. The pre-questionnaire was sent to 17 BU 
controllers and returned by 14. Due to the short period before making the appointment and the 
actual interview, one BU controller was not asked to fill out the pre-questionnaire. 
The data collected from the two steps described above was used to customize the interview 
guide for the BU controller. The standard interview guide is included in Appendix 2. After two 
interviews, a ‘natural flow’ of questions emerged that worked well in generating the discussion 
about the accounting choices. In general the interview started with the BU controller explaining 
the setting; talking about the BU manager and others involved in the reporting process. Then 
the accounting choices as indicated by the BU controller in the pre-questionnaire were 




those brought up by the interviewee. At the end of the interview, a number of specific 
questions were asked relating to factors of influence identified in the literature. Controllers 
were asked how, in their opinion, these factors influenced their accounting choices. They were 
also asked if other factors influenced their accounting choices. In total, 18 BU controllers were 
interviewed. After these 18 interviews it was felt that additional interviews with BU controllers 
would not provide any new insights.  
After the interview, a ‘post-questionnaire’ was sent to the interviewees. This post-questionnaire 
consisted of 39 questions relating to professional commitment, ethical orientation, and 
personal characteristics. The purpose of this questionnaire was not for statistical analysis, but to 
obtain additional information that might be useful for further discussion in the group sessions. 
Appendix 3 provides further details of the post-questionnaire. 
In addition to interviews with the BU controllers, 3 interviews were held with corporate finance 
staff. These were also involved in accounting choices, albeit at a corporate level and in a 
position of reviewing rather than making the accounting decisions. Reviewing accounting 
choices and providing feedback to the controllers can also be viewed as a decision relating to 
accounting choices. Therefore this was also considered to be valuable research input. These 
interviews were held after the interviews of the BU Controllers had taken place. In preparation 
for these interviews, the same pre-questionnaire used for the BU controllers was sent to these 
interviewees, as the returned pre-questionnaire had proved to be a good facilitator for 
conducting the BU controller interviews. All 3 corporate finance staff interviewees returned the 
pre-questionnaire. The structure of the interview held with the corporate finance staff was the 
same as the interviews with the BU controllers. The accounting choices discussed consisted of 
the material accounting choices that were reviewed at corporate level.  
Most interviews with BU controllers and corporate finance staff took approximately one hour, 
with a recording time of approximately 55 minutes following the introduction. The shortest 
interview was 40 minutes (33 minutes recording time) and the longest interview 1 hour and 50 
minutes (1 hour and 40 minutes recording time). All interviews were audio recorded. It was felt 
that video recording the interviews might prevent the interviewees from openly discussing the 
subject, and that an audio recorder would be ‘less dominantly present’. The audio recordings 
were imported in NVIVO and fully transcribed. All interviews were held by the researcher. 
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In order to ensure a critical reflection on the researcher’s data gathering, Supervisor 1 listened 
to all the audio recordings of the interviews. The supervisor provided feedback on the interview 
process. The supervisor noted for example that, during the first two interviews, some choices 
were implicitly agreed as being ‘obvious’ between researcher and interviewee and no 
background information or underlying details were provided. Suggestions made by the 
supervisor were followed-up in the following interviews. The data gathered for the first phase 
of analysis are summarized in Table 11. 
Period of data 
collection 
Source of information 
phase 1 






First half year 2012 Financial Statements 
specified per BU 
 Preparation for 
interview  
 
 BU Management Reports 
Year-end 2011  
 Preparation for 
interview  
 
 Summary of BU  LOR 
issues reported 2011 
 Preparation for 
interview  
 
 BU Management Report 
Q1 2012 
 Preparation for 
interview  
 
March-July 2012 Prequestionnaires 20 sent, 17 returned Preparation for 
interview  
 
March-July 2012 Interviews BU Controllers 18 interviews - 16 hrs 22 
min 
Interviewer Listen to full 
audio recording 
March-July 2012 Postquestionnaires 18 sent, 16 returned Additional info  
July-August 2012 Interviews Corporate 
Staff 
3  interviews - 2 hrs 23 
min 
Interviewer Listen to full 
audio recording 
Table 11 Data collected phase 1 
 A second important source of data for this study was the data gathered from presenting the 
overall findings at group sessions with a number of interviewees. This material was presented at 
two sessions. Unlike the first phase, where the outcome of previous interviews did not 
(consciously) affect the subsequent interviews, the data generated by the first presentation 
session was analyzed immediately and used as input for the next session. The sessions were 
planned in the following order:  
- BU controllers – group discussion with 6 BU controllers;  
- corporate finance staff – group discussion with 3 corporate finance staff members. 
This was done in order to be able to present an increasingly abstract view of the findings and to 
enable contextualizing the findings from BU controller level to an organizational level. 
The BU controllers and corporate finance staff group discussions were attended by the 
researcher as well as Supervisor 1 and Supervisor 2. The researcher was the discussion leader, 
one supervisor helped the researcher manage the process of the discussion, and the other 




was going to participate in a group session, but had to cancel at the last moment. The 
supervisors did not attend this session. The group discussion with the BU controllers and 
corporate finance staff were video recorded. All sessions were fully transcribed. 
Silverman (2011) discusses the usefulness of respondent validation and argues that it can be 
valuable as  another source of data rather than being used as validation. The group sessions and 
individual follow-up interviews were used for both purposes. Participants were asked if they 
recognized their findings and what their perspective was on the findings. Apart from using the 
group sessions for validation purposes, the data generated from these sessions were also used 
to contextualize the findings. The data gathered for the second phase of analysis are 
summarized in Table 12. 
Date Source of 









2-Sept-13 Group Session BU 
Controllers 
6 participants –  





1-Oct-13 Group Session 
Corporate Staff 
3 participants –  






25-Oct-13 Individual session 
BU Controller 
57 min Interviewer  Listen to full 
audio recording 
 
Table 12 Data collected phase 2 
The analysis of the data is further outlined in Section 4.3. 
4.3 DATA ANALYSIS 
4.3.1 Introduction 
The data analysis of the first phase was performed in a number of stages: 
- Analysis of factors of influence on accounting decisions; 
- Analysis of the accounting choices incurred; 
- Analysis of the relation between factors of influence and the accounting choices; 
- Constructing the overall findings from the analysis above. 
Supervisor 1, who listened to all the audio recordings, also independently analyzed the data. 
The outcome of this independent analysis was used to critically reflect on the analysis of the 
researcher. This process is further discussed in Section 4.3.2.  
The second phase of data gathering consisted of presenting the overall findings in sessions with 
BU controllers and corporate finance staff. The process of data analyses of these sessions is 
described in Section 4.3.3. The findings could not be fully explained by previous research 
relating to earnings management and the role of the controller. A new or more global 
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perspective was used to come to an overall analysis. This process is described in Section 4.3.4. 
Finally, Section 4.3.5 addresses the translation of the data, since the data collected consisted of 
written and audio material in Dutch, and the findings are reported in English.  
4.3.2 Data analysis of the individual interviews  
The initial analysis of the interview data was a content analysis identifying factors of influence 
on accounting choices. A coding list of the factors identified in the literature review (Table 8, 
Section 2.6) was the starting point for the codes used and any factors/concepts that emerged 
from the interviews were added as new codes. This resulted in a first overview of factors that 
affect accounting choices of controllers. The overview was critically reviewed and adjusted by 
comparing the outcome of the researcher to the notes of Supervisor 1. The coding was 
recorded in NVIVO. The researcher then prepared, on the basis of the factors identified, a first 
draft of an ‘overall analysis of factors of influence’. After this analysis researcher recoded the 
content, as she felt that the initial coding process was not structured enough. The differences 
between the two coding efforts were analyzed and the results were discussed with both 
supervisors. Based on this new database, the ‘overall analysis of factors of influence’ was 
further elaborated and refined. 
The next step was to identify and analyze the accounting choices incurred. Initially the 
accounting choices were stored on an MS-Excel spreadsheet, noting the BU controller, the type 
of choice and the comments relating to that choice. An accounting choice process consisting of 
different categories of activities emerged from this analysis. The accounting choice activities 
were also coded in NVIVO, and the accounting choice process was added to the analysis and 
discussed with the supervisors.  
The last step was to relate the identified factors of influence to the identified accounting 
choices and analyze the deliberations of the controller when making the accounting choices.   
The full data details in NVIVO and MS-Excel were provided to Supervisor 1. Both the researcher 
and Supervisor 1 analyzed the data for patterns in the identified factors and the accounting 
choices incurred. However, both the researcher and Supervisor 1 found no resulting patterns. 




patterns when analyzed in combination with the accounting choices of the controllers.18 Each 
accounting choice seemed to be unique with its own setting. Moreover, there was one 
factor/phenomenon which was labeled ‘firm behavior and setting boundaries’ that recurred in 
almost every interview. Both researcher and Supervisor 1 could not place this phenomenon in 
the overall analysis that resulted from studying the individual accounting choices. 
The available findings of this first phase were documented in a detailed ‘memorandum of 
findings’ which formed the basis for a presentation prepared for a group discussion with the BU 
controllers. It was hoped that feedback from the participants of the group discussion would 
provide a new perspective on this phenomenon. The group sessions are further discussed in 
Section 4.3.3. 
4.3.3 Group feedback sessions and data analysis of feed back 
A presentation was prepared for the first group discussion with the controllers in September 
2013. The set-up of the discussion was as follows:  
1. Factors of influence – a proposition was made and feedback asked;  
2. Accounting choice process – a proposition was made and feedback asked;  
3. The relation factors of influence and accounting choice - an open discussion. 
During the group discussion, one supervisor helped the researcher with the group discussion 
process and one supervisor functioned as observer. The latter provided the researcher with the 
observation notes. After the group discussion, the researcher talked with the participants 
individually and informally, and inquired what they thought of the discussion. This was done in 
order to establish if there were specific issues that had not been mentioned due to the group 
process. The discussion was recorded on video and fully transcribed. A short note of the 
findings of the individual informal talks after the discussion was also documented. Both the 
researcher and the observer-supervisor independently analyzed the video. After analyzing the 
new data, both the researcher and the supervisor concluded that these data could be used to 
further refine the findings, but that they did not offer a new perspective on the phenomenon 
‘firm behavior and setting boundaries’ and related accounting choices. Most of the findings 
presented in the group discussion were recognized and confirmed by the BU Controllers. 
                                                            
18 Although the outcome of the post questionnaire was for this reason not used as a basis for further discussion in the group 
sessions it was decided to include this in the appendix since it was part of the total data collected.  
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The outcome of the group discussion was included in the overall findings, and served as a basis 
for the group interview with the three corporate finance staff members held in October 2013. A 
sheet with the identified accounting choice process was first handed out and discussed. 
Subsequently, the factors of influence and accounting choices were discussed while going 
through the activities of the accounting choice process. The set-up of this group discussion was 
the same as the previous session, with one supervisor acting as process-facilitator and the other 
as observer. The observer provided the researcher with the observation notes and 
independently analyzed the data. The discussion was recorded on video and fully transcribed. 
At the end of October 2013, a follow-up interview with one other controller was performed on 
the same basis as the corporate finance staff interview. This controller was initially included in 
the staff member group interview, but had to leave after five minutes to join a board of 
directors meeting. The reason not to include this controller in the controller group discussion 
was that 3 of 6 BU controllers in the group discussion reported directly or indirectly to this 
controller. This interview was audio-recorded and fully transcribed. 
The data resulting from the session with the corporate finance staff provided a new perspective 
on the findings: it revealed a tension between corporate expectations relating to the role of 
controller and the actual role implementation by BU controllers, which is affected by the 
complex setting that controllers work in. This new perspective was used in the last phase of the 
analysis, described in section 4.3.4.  
4.3.4 Analyzing the findings from a broader perspective 
With the above-mentioned new perspective, it was decided that using a broader theoretical 
perspective might allow a better understanding of the findings, rather than trying to 
immediately place them in the context of extant research relating to earnings management and 
the role of the controller as outlined in the literature review in Chapter 2 which had served as a 
basis for gathering data and the initial analysis. The perspective of institutional logics (hereafter 
referred to as ‘logics’), addressed in Chapter 3, was used to further analyze the findings.  
After rewriting the findings several times, including the ‘logics’ perspective and analyzing the 
findings from a broader perspective, the aim was to design an overall framework which could 
be used for representing the findings and would do justice to the complexity of real life 
accounting choices. Designing this overall framework was a long iterative process with 




When discussing developing a pattern model, she explains that a pattern can be considered as 
being “correct” when the evidence easily falls into place, new evidence can be fitted into that 
pattern, and it is difficult to imagine an alternative explanation that manages to include the 
same themes. These ‘criteria’ can also be applied to the overall explanatory framework of this 
research. The final version of the overall framework, which is included in the thesis, meets 
these criteria. In Section 5.5, illustrations are provided with accounting choices derived from the 
empirical data, using the explanatory overall framework as a basis for analysis. 
The overall framework includes the accounting choice process, the final accounting choices and 
the components influencing the accounting choices. These components are not all at the same 
level. First, it comprises the actors involved, where behavioral aspects influence the accounting 
decisions. Second it comprises the other characteristics of the BU-controller’s working field that 
influence the accounting decisions, such as the size of the BU and the situational circumstances. 
Finally the different ‘logics’ used within the organization also influence accounting choices. It 
should be noted that the analysis from the ‘logics’ perspective is performed on a high-level 
basis and therefore only provides a global overview since the method for analyzing the data has 
been a thematic analysis and not a discourse analysis. Using discourse analysis on the data for 
an intensive analysis of this aspect would be an interesting follow-up study.  
Central to the overall framework are the controller’s deliberations in making their accounting 
choices. By analyzing these deliberations, controller’s characteristics were identified that 
influence the accounting choices they made. It should be noted that it was not possible to 
follow-up or check that the controllers also really made their choice on the basis of these 
deliberations as the researcher had to rely on their explanation of their choice based on 
hindsight. Using an observer method would have been better for this purpose, since the data 
gathered would then be ‘closer’ to the controller’s real behavior. This method, however, is not 
easy to operationalize as decisions take place at various stages. This involves various moments 
in time which are mostly not specifically planned. Trying to identify specific choices where the 
observer method could be applied and then using this method to analyze these choices would 
be an interesting area for further research. By using different sources of information such as 
management reports and letters of representation, and because the researcher could follow up 
the effects of the choices after year-end and had substantial knowledge of the available 
accounting choices within the organization, the data gathered was nevertheless very rich. 
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4.4 TRANSLATION OF DATA 
The data were collected by performing the interviews and the group sessions in Dutch; the 
reporting, however, is in English. Interviewees and the interviewer (researcher) did not always 
use straightforward sentences; sometimes they did not finish their sentence, etc. In translating 
the text, it was aimed to reflect the interviewees’ original statements as much as possible. The 
translations of the quotes were reviewed by a native English speaker with a finance 
background. 
Translating the data into English introduces another subjective element, as words cannot 
always be literally translated but have to be translated within their context. Decisions relating 
to this context are subjective. As it was felt that it was important to be transparent about the 
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5 FINDINGS 
The general setting in which the BU controllers work is described in the first section. The 
structure of the next sections follows the order of the research questions that were identified 
earlier; ‘to obtain insights into the accounting choices of controllers by studying the accounting 
choices available to them, the accounting choice decision process which leads to the accounting 
choices of the controllers, and the factors affecting these choices’: 
1. What accounting choices are available to controllers? 
2. How are accounting choices made by the controller? 
3. What factors affect the accounting choices of controllers? 
The research findings reveal that the process of making accounting choices is not 
straightforward. The setting in which controllers work is complex and is different for every BU 
controller, with different actors and factors affecting their choices. Therefore, this chapter first 
provides an introductory overview to enable the reader to place the separate sections in an 
overall context. One interviewee strikingly formulated the complexity of the accounting choice 
process during a group session: 
“Your diary does’nt tell you on Monday 
morning at 9 o’clock: make a choice now 
relating to this or that eh… external 
reporting issue. That’s something that… 
especially for major decisions, starts and 
develops and then you or someone else 
thinks of three options and then you think 
of a fourth one or someone else thinks of a 
fourth one. And then you think: Ah, that’s 
also a way of looking at it. And in that 
process you have to realize that at a 
certain moment that you are involved in it 
and identify which different interests are 
involved … and you have to define your 
own boundary.” 
“Op maandagochtend om 9 uur staat niet in 
je agenda: maak nu een keuze om die en die 
eh… verslagleggingsding. Dat is iets wat... 
zeker de wat grotere dingen, dat begint en 
dat speelt dan en dat ontwikkelt zich en dan 
heb je zelf of iemand anders heeft drie opties 
bedacht en jij bedenkt er de vierde bij of 
iemand anders bedenkt die vierde erbij. En 
dan denk je: O zo kan ik er ook tegenaan 
kijken. En in dat proces moet je op een 
gegeven moment onderkennen dat je daar in 
zit en welke belangen er van verschillende 
dingen... en je eigen grens trekken.” 
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Accounting choices are the result of BU controllers’ deliberations which evolve over time. The 
accounting choice process is not a straightforward sequential process with different phases but 
rather a ‘chaotic’ process with the BU controllers’ deliberations playing an important role.  In 
this process, various review and analysis activities are performed by the BU controller and 
administrative staff in order to support the accounting choice decision. Four categories of 
activities were identified, each with specific characteristics relating to the type of data used and 
the level of analysis. Although these activities are not necessarily sequential, there is a logical 
flow. The categories of activities identified are: the operational review, financial review, 
valuation review and overall review. Although the accounting choice process is complicated, the 
final accounting choice is basically very straightforward: the BU controller can decide either to 
do nothing or to make an adjustment. It was noted that BU controllers not only make 
accounting choices, but also other choices that affect the financial outcome. These choices not 
only involve the timing of purchases/sales and hedging transactions, but also the change of 
operating systems and/or processes and the change of customer payment conditions. 
There was no relation found between individual factors of influence and the accounting choices 
incurred. The mix of corporate- and BU specific factors, as well as the situational factors 
identified, were different for each BU Controller. Due to different business activities, BU 
controllers were confronted with different types of accounting choices, and sometimes 
different stakeholders were also involved. In some cases, specific BU situations, such as a 
restructuring program, also had an impact on the type of the accounting choices and the 
accounting choices incurred. Moreover, BU management characteristics also affected the 
accounting choice process. It was this unique setting for each BU controller that influenced the 
accounting choices rather than one specific factor. The individual BU controller-related factors 
also play an important role. Two controller styles emerged from the analysis:  the financial 
accounting style and the management control style. These different controller styles result in 
different accounting choices. Additionally, technical knowledge, interpretation of the 
accounting rules, as well as personal characteristics affect the accounting choices. Finally, the 
accounting choices are also influenced by the ‘professional logic’ of BU controllers. This 
professional logic emerged from the analysis as a recurring theme addressed by the BU 
controllers in their individual interviews. BU controllers made their accounting choices at BU 
level, and had to be firm and determined at BU level to guard the boundaries. Furthermore, the 
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findings revealed that the logic used by corporate finance staff partially competed with their 
professional logic. Corporate finance staff expected BU controllers to be independent and 
professional, but also to communicate their accounting choices to corporate finance staff, and 
to be transparent about  the decision making process. This competing logic was labelled 
‘corporate staff logic’. The professional logic was dominant. 

















The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.1, the general setting of the BU 
controllers is presented. This includes a description of the organization involved, the reporting 
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characteristics and controller styles identified. Section 5.4 analyzes the other actors and factors 
that impact the accounting choices of controllers. Finally, in Section 5.5 the complexity of the 
accounting choice process and the combinations of factors affecting the accounting choices are 
illustrated by describing BU controller deliberations relating to three subjects: the provision for 
doubtful debtors, the timing of revenues and expenses, and the deliberations relating to a 
provision for obsolete inventory. 
5.1 THE GENERAL SETTING 
5.1.1 The organization, the stakeholders and the reporting procedures 
As outlined in the methodology chapter, the organization where the research was conducted is 
a Dutch company in the service industry offering a wide range of (mainly) consumer products 
and services. The data were collected in 2012, with follow up group discussions in 2013. The 
general setting is described according to the situation at the time of data collection. The 
organizational structure consists of a number of divisions, each encompassing various Business 
Units. Each organizational entity is supported by a controller. The job title of these controllers 
varies from Business Controller to Finance Director, depending on the size of the organizational 
entity and its position within the organization. All these job titles do, however, meet the 
criterion of Business Unit controller as defined in Chapter 2. They support an entity that has its 
own general manager who is responsible for the business activities of this entity. Periodic 
budgets and monthly financial statements are prepared for these entities. All controllers are 
hereafter referred to as ‘BU Controller’. The BU controllers have a hierarchal relation with their 
Finance superior and a functional relation with the Business Unit manager. 
The financial statements of the organization are prepared according to the Dutch GAAP. Besides 
the publication of the annual statutory financial accounts, the organization also has to comply 
with other external reporting requirements. For its insurance activities, it has to comply with 
the financial regulatory requirements and report on a quarterly basis to the Dutch central bank 
(De Nederlandsche Bank). For its travel activities, the organization is a member of transport and 
travel associations that require, on a yearly basis, specific audited financial reports of the legal 
entities in charge of these travel activities. For its association activities, the budget is approved 
at a general meeting with delegates of members of the association held at the beginning of the 
year. After year end, the financial statements are presented to this delegation for their 
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approval. The annual accounts and other external reports are prepared by corporate reporting 
staff. Business Units have to report on a monthly basis to corporate control, using a standard 
report format, on the tenth working day after month-end. Journal entries can be processed 
until the fifth working day after the month-end. A corporate accounting manual provides 
additional guidance for the GAAP standards, such as categories of fixed assets and their 
depreciation periods and guidelines relating to goodwill. For specific accounting issues such as 
intercompany accounting and accounting for software development, additional instructions 
have been prepared by corporate reporting staff. 
For the month-end October and December, more information is requested from the BU 
Controllers. Besides the monthly management report, supporting documents have to be 
provided to corporate reporting staff for the preparation of the external audit. These 
supporting documents consist of accounting memos prepared by the BU controller explaining 
the calculation of provisions (such as provisions for obsolete inventory) or other material 
accounting adjustments. Moreover, a ‘Letter of Representation’ - as referred to in the 
Methodology section - has to be signed by the BU controller and the BU manager, confirming 
that the BU financial statements are in accordance with GAAP and the organization’s accounting 
instructions, that internal controls are functioning, and that the board of directors has been 
fully informed of outstanding issues that could affect the financial statements. The BU 
administration also provides details such as subledger reconciliations and specifications of 
general ledger accounts. Corporate reporting staff perform a preliminary review of the 
documentation, and then provide this to the external auditors.19 Based on the October close, 
the auditor performs a so-called ‘hard close’ which serves as a basis for the year-end close. 
Important issues and potential weaknesses can be identified that require extra attention in the 
last months of the year in order to ensure a fast year-end close. In the February following the 
year-end, the audit is completed and the financial statements are finalized.  
Finally it should be noted that the organization is made up of various legal entities and has 
specific characteristics relating to ownership. The overall organization is an association. This 
association provides nonprofit services relating to travel and mobility to its members. The 
nonprofit activities for the association are carried out by a private limited company which 
                                                            
19 The BU Letter of representation is only used for internal purposes. 
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receives a management fee from the association for these activities. This private limited 
company also provides commercial services and products in the areas of recreation, tourism 
and mobility to customers, who are not necessarily association members. The commercial 
activities related to insurance are carried out by a public limited company as insurance is 
subject to special regulatory requirements. Therefore, depending on the activities performed, 
the business units have different stakeholders, resulting in different external and internal 
dynamics. The influence of these different stakeholders on the accounting choices is discussed 
in Chapter 5.4. 
5.1.2 Dominant logics in the accounting choice process 
The findings revealed that the deliberations of BU controllers in the accounting choice process 
are not only affected by various actors and factors, but also that the underlying ‘logics’ of BU 
controllers influence their choices. BU controllers legitimated their accounting choices by using 
a ‘logic’ relating to their professional role. When discussing the accounting choices of BU 
controllers, corporate finance staff expressed specific expectations relating to their accounting 
choice process. These expectations partly diverged from the logic used by the BU controllers. 
Corporate staff expectations are further discussed in Section 5.1.3. This section discusses the 
dominant logic within the organization relating to the professional role of BU controllers. 
During the interviews with the BU controllers, there was one element that consistently 
emerged; this related to ‘firm behavior and setting boundaries‘. BU controllers felt that they 
had to have a strong character and had to be firm and determined in setting boundaries. Some 
controllers mentioned this explicitly when they were asked how their personality affected the 
decision-making: 
[BUC2] “Well, I think you have to be strong 
and confident and sometimes you have to 
put your foot down. Especially given the 
pressure from the business: we want to 
present good results. Of course that’s 
desirable, however the desirable results 
are not always those that I present.”   
[BUC2] “Nou, ik vind dat je soms sterk in je 
schoenen moet staan, dat je ook je poot stijf 
moet houden, zeker ook de druk vanuit de 
business, we willen goede resultaten laten 
zien. Dat is natuurlijk altijd wenselijk, maar 
de gewenste resultaten zijn niet altijd de 
resultaten die ik presenteer.” 
 
 
67               Findings    
[BUC4] “I think, in that respect, that you 
have to be firm. Because if you say, well 
may be we can do this in a specific eh….. if 
you give some leeway then….. you have to 
say,: “No I won’t do it that way.”  
[BUC4] “Ik denk inderdaad in die zin dat je 
wel standvastig moet zijn. Want als je dan 
zegt goh, nou misschien eh…. kunnen we 
het op een bepaalde manier… Als je de deur 
een beetje half open zet dan eh.... Je moet 
wel zeggen: “Nee dat doe ik niet.” 
This determination and firmness also emerged from the way that some accounting choices 
were described by BU controllers. Below, two BU controllers talk about refusing a request from 
their BU manager to accelerate the accounting for expenses for goods/services that would be 
delivered/rendered the next year:  
[BUC9] “By doing so, I initially didn’t make 
friends with BU Manager X. I said, But BU 
Manager X, this relates to the next 
financial year, this is really not possible. 
And BU Manager X said, so to 
speak: ”That’s not true, because now I can 
absorb these expenses and next year I 
can’t.” I said, Well, tough. This is the 
position I’ve taken, and  BU Manager X was 
not amused.” 
[BUC4] “This year, BU Manager Y discussed 
something with Corporate Staff Z about 
expenses that had to be charged to 2011. 
Then I thought, that’s strange, because BU 
Manager Y referred in the mail to having it 
agreed with Corporate Staff Z. But I 
opposed that. Then the manager called me 
and I said, that’s just not allowed, and then 
they withdrew that request.“ 
[BUC9] “En daar heb ik in het begin geen 
vrienden gemaakt met BU Manager X. Dat 
ik echt zei: Maar BU Manager X dit is 
volgend boekjaar, dit kan niet. En dat BU 
Manager X bij wijze van spreken zei: dat is 
niet waar, want ik kan die kosten nu nog 
hebben en volgend jaar niet. Ik zeg ja, pech. 
Ik sta daar zo in en daar was BU Manager X 
not amused.” 
 
[BUC4] “Dit jaar toen heeft BU Manager Y, 
iets met Corporate Staf Z besproken over 
kosten die per sé in 2011 in de boeken 
moest. Toen dacht ik bij mezelf, dat is ook 
raar omdat BU Manager Y in het mailtje had 
gezegd dat het met Corporate Staff Z was 
afgestemd. Maar toen ben ik daar toch wel 
tegenin gegaan. Toen belde de manager mij 
op en toen zei ik 'dat hoort gewoon niet' en 
toen hebben ze dat teruggetrokken.” 
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The recurring theme tells us something about the norms and beliefs of the BU controllers and 
can be referred to as an institutional logic as described in Chapter 3. The identified logic of the 
BU controllers relates, not so much to the organization in general, but more specifically to their 
professional behavior. This logic provides them with a basis to legitimate their accounting 
choices. Therefore, this logic will be labeled hereafter as the ‘professional logic’. Using this logic, 
however, does not necessarily result in the same accounting choices by controllers; they can 
make different accounting choices whilst using the same logic. The BU controllers all seemed to 
be strict, but the point at which they were strict varied between them. One BU controller 
remarked during the interview that he/she had noticed that within the organization not many 
BU controllers were as strict as he/she was. Interestingly, BU controllers also talked differently 
about ‘the boundaries’. Some of them referred to the boundaries within the context of ‘setting 
the rules’, whereas others referred to the boundaries within the context of trying to identify the 
‘grey area’ of the accounting rules: 
[BUC15] [Explaining that it is all about 
‘management control’] “And management 
control consists of a number of things; 
your performance dashboard, your belief 
systems, and you have your boundaries: 
here you are and you don’t cross these 
boundaries.”  
 
[Participants of the group discussion, 
discussing the subject of risk attitude of 
controllers] [GDC4] “I find that a challenge. 
To consider with the manager, within the 
boundaries – I would like to emphasize 
that [refers to the boundaries] - to 
somehow…, yes…”[GDC6] “But you have 
to dare to set these boundaries, so to 
speak. For everyone.” 
[BUC14] [Geeft aan dat het allemaal gaat 
om ‘management control’] “En manage-
ment control bestaat uit een aantal dingen, 
dat is je performance dashboard, dat is je 
geloof visie die ga je uitdragen, je belief 
system en je hebt de boundaries, de 
grenzen; hier ben jij van en je gaat er niet 
overheen.” 
[Deelnemers aan de groepsdiscussie, 
pratend over de risicohouding van 
controllers]. [GDC4] “Dat vind ik wel de 
uitdaging om met die bestuurder te kijken, 
binnen grenzen – dat zeg ik er nadrukkelijk 
bij – om toch ja…”[GDC6] “Maar die grenzen 
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This subject is further discussed in Chapter 5.3 where different BU controller styles and the 
other controller related factors identified are discussed. Corporate finance staff used the same 
professional logic as the BU controllers. In both the individual and  in the group discussion 
where the findings were presented, the corporate finance staff participants recognized the 
recurrent theme of firm behavior and setting boundaries, and stated that they considered this 
as ‘part of the job’. 
Another aspect of the professional logic that emerged from the research was the importance of 
having an ‘overall view and a consistent presentation’. When presenting the research findings 
relating to the identified accounting choice process in the corporate finance staff group session, 
the participants focused on the importance of BU controllers having an overall view when 
analyzing the financial outcome. Approximately a quarter of the total time of the group 
discussion with corporate finance staff was spent on this subject. One participant summarized it 
as follows: 
[GDS2] “I always say that if the numbers 
aren’t  what you expected them to be, 
then something is wrong. It’s probably in 
the numbers, or you don’t understand 
your business at all: it’s one or the other.” 
[GDS2] “Ik zeg altijd dat als de cijfers niet 
aansluiten met wat jij denkt dat het zou 
moeten zijn dan zit er iets verkeerd, 
waarschijnlijk in de cijfers of je begrijpt je 
business totaal niet. Een van de twee.” 
Corporate finance staff expect a consistent presentation of the BU financial outcome, and that 
the BU controller is able to explain any variance with the expected outcome. The individual 
interviews with the BU controllers revealed that this is something that BU controllers also 
aimed to achieve. During the interviews, some BU controllers referred to the fact that they do 
not like ‘surprises’, i.e., major variances from the expected outcome. This was also discussed in 
the BU controllers’ group session when the researcher addressed the subject of the accounting 
choices being influenced by the BU overall financial result, suggesting that BU controllers might 
manage their earnings at around zero in order to present a small positive result, rather than a 
small negative result: 
[GDC1] “Yes and no. I think more in a way 
like [GDC2] just referred to, saying, You 
don’t want to have surprises. So, the 
[GDC1]: “Ja en Nee. Ik heb meer zoiets van 
precies zoals [GDC2] net al zei: verrassingen 
moet je niet willen hebben. Hè, dus 
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financial result is the result that you 
manage during the whole year. And then 
you should not come with a surprise in 
mid-December.” [GDC4] “But if you have a 
surprise, no matter when this occurs 
during the year, you have to just announce 
it don’t you?” [GDC1]”Eh…” [GDC4] 
[laughing] “You hesitated there for a long 
time.” [GDC5] “Yes.” [GDC1] “Yes…to the 
extent eh …at the moment that you at the 
year-end together decide: guys, this will 
approximately be it, yes? With all the 
knowledge you have at that moment, you 
say ‘now it is going to be ‘x’ and eh…then 
10 minutes later a strange adjustment 
suddenly emerges from an unexpected 
corner, then I first want to properly 
investigate it.” 
Later in the discussion [GDC2] “You know, 
you have to adhere to the accounting 
standards. But now and again you can 
manage it. Let’s think, I don’t want any 
strange fluctuations as these cause 
extreme reactions within the company. 
Does it make sense to put energy into 
that? Acting within the accounting rules 
you can say: I’m going to recognize the 
financial result of [amount] in one month, 
whereas you can also say: I’ll spread it, 
allocating it over three months. And then 
financiële resultaat daar stuur je het hele 
jaar op. En dan moet je niet half december 
nog eens met een verrassing komen. [GDC4] 
“Maar als je gewoon een verrassing hebt, 
maakt niet uit wanneer gedurende het jaar 
dan wel gewoon melden toch?” [GDC1] 
“Eh…” [GDC4] [lacht] “Je twijfelt wel lang.” 
[GDC5] “Ja.” [GDC1] “Ja….in de omvang eh… 
op het moment dat je aan het einde van het 
jaar met elkaar zegt: jongens dit gaat ‘m 
ongeveer nou wel zijn ja? Met alle kennis 
die je op dat moment hebt zeg je van ‘nou 
het wordt ‘x’ enne 10 minuten later lijkt uit 
een hele gekke hoek ineens een hele gekke 
post te komen dan wil ik daar eerst wel even 
goed onderzoek naar doen.” 
 
 
Later in de discussie [GDC2] “Weet je, je 
moet je wel aan de verslaggevingsregels 
houden. Maar je kunt af en toe wel al 
sturen. Even nadenken van, ik wil geen 
gekke schommelingen hebben want dan 
krijg je extreme reacties in het bedrijf, he. Is 
het zinvol om daar energie aan te besteden. 
Terwijl je wel binnen de regels blijft. En je 
kunt ook zeggen: ik ga nu het resultaat van 
[bedrag] in 1 maand pakken, terwijl je ook 
kunt zeggen: ik kan het over 3 maanden 
uitspreiden. En dan is het nog gebaseerd op 
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this is still based on a business case, based 
on decision making.” 
basis van een business case op basis van 
besluitvorming.” 
The BU controllers identify the boundaries of what accounting choices are allowed within the 
accounting standards and make their choice within these boundaries, in order to present the 
‘overall view’ they have in mind. These accounting choices are made at BU level without 
involvement of corporate finance staff.  
Section 3.2 of the literature review outlined a study by Lambert and Sponem (2012) who refer 
to the different ‘clients’ that controllers serve and the impact of the main client on the role of 
the controller. The controllers interviewed were oriented towards the business; accounting 
choices were made at BU level without involvement of corporate finance staff. In the group 
discussion, controllers stressed the importance of the combination of BU manager and BU 
controller, but did not refer to the importance of teamwork with their finance superior. This is 
illustrated by the following citation from two participants of the group interview: 
[GDC4] “I compare it to a motor cross 
combination with a sidecar. You have a co-
driver who knows when to lean in the 
curves; that can be really dangerous - 
recently one died who wasn’t performing 
very well. Anyway, if you don’t have 
enough confidence to get in because you 
think the driver…., then you shouldn’t 
participate. That’s my view. That’s how 
important I think it is.”[GDC1] “I don’t 
really agree with you.” [GDC4] “Good, I 
was hoping for that.” [GDC1] “I don’t really 
agree, because as a controller you can also 
say... even if it doesn’t work the way you’d 
like it to work. Even if you realize that the 
like-mindedness within the team isn’t at its 
best. Then you can still say,  well, then I’m 
going to manage it. So you inform and 
 [GDC4] “Ik vergelijk het met motor cross 
daar heb je een zijspan. Dan heb je een 
bakkenist en die moet weten wanneer die 
moet overhangen in de bocht. Dat kan echt 
heel gevaarlijk zijn want pas is er eentje 
overleden, die deed dat niet helemaal goed. 
Maar goed, als je niet het vertrouwen hebt 
om in dat zijspan te stappen omdat je die 
bestuurder niet…. Dan moet je er niet aan 
beginnen. Dat is mijn stelling. Zo ver zou ik 
willen gaan.” [GDC1] “Dat ben ik toch niet 
helemaal met je eens.” [GDC4] “Mooi zo, 
daar hoopte ik al op.” [GDC1] “Dat ben ik 
niet helemaal met je eens omdat je ook als 
controller kan zeggen... nou ook al werkt 
dat niet zoals je dat graag zou willen 
hebben. Ook al zie je dat zo’n affiniteit 
binnen zo’n team niet helemaal optimaal is. 
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educate the people in order to improve 
their understanding of the financial 
process.” [GDC4] “Maybe, yes. I’m not 
saying it’s impossible…, but if the 
interaction is right, then you win the game. 
Otherwise it takes far too much energy to 
let the driver realize how fast he can take 
the curves.”  
Dat je dan zegt nou ja en nou zal ik dat eens 
even gaan regelen. Dus dat je de mensen 
een stuk voeding en opvoeding geeft zodat 
ze veel meer het financiële proces ook… 
“[GDC4] “Zou kunnen, ja. Ik zeg ook niet dat 
het niet kan. Kijk als die wisselwerking goed 
is, dan win je de wedstrijd, want anders kost 
het je veel meer moeite om die bestuurder 
te laten merken hoe hard ie door die bocht 
kan.” 
Another indication of the importance of the BU controllers’ business orientation was the 
outcome of the prequestionnaire, where controllers were asked to rate their knowledge on 
financial reporting and their business knowledge on a scale from 1-10. All controllers rated their 
business knowledge higher (15 of the 17 BU controllers) or the same (2 of the 17 BU controllers) 
as their financial accounting knowledge. Finally, it was also noted that the BU controllers 
seemed to identify with their BU financial statements, talking about ‘their’ figures:  
 [GDC6] “I had for example that…that 
suddenly all sorts of expenses were 
charged to me by [BUx]” 
[GDC1] “A very good example; at the end 
of the year or actually at the end of each 
month I have to determine my provision of 
course.” 
[GDC6] “Ik had bijvoorbeeld dat door [BUx] 
kreeg ik ineens allerlei kosten naar mij 
toegeschoven.” 
[GDC1] “Een heel goed voorbeeld: aan het 
einde van het jaar of eigenlijk iedere maand 
moet ik natuurlijk mijn voorziening 
bepalen.” 
Referring again to Lambert and Sponem’s 2012 study outlined in Section 3.2, the controller style 
within the organization can be labelled as a ‘partner style’, with strong authority for the finance 
function and local management as the main client. BU controllers showed a high involvement in 
the business and used a professional logic which included the setting of boundaries, identifying 
accounting choices, and making use of these available choices in order to present a financial 
result which was in line with their overall view of the business’ financial situation. Corporate 
staff, however, have specific expectations of BU controllers. These expectations are discussed in 
the following section.  
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5.1.3 Corporate finance staff expectations 
As outlined in the previous section, corporate finance staff used the same professional logics as 
the BU controllers. BU controllers were expected by corporate finance staff to be professionals, 
setting boundaries and presenting a financial outcome consistent with their overall view. The 
organizational structure of the Finance department - with the BU controllers having a hierarchal 
relation with their Finance superior and a functional relation with their BU manager - was 
perceived by the BU controllers as a means to ensure the BU controller’s independent position. 
During the group discussion, the BU controllers commented on the importance of being able to 
‘fall back’ on the finance superior when needed: 
 [GDC4] “But that’s why I agree with [GDC2] 
who says, you have to be firm.” [GDC2] 
“That’s of course why within [the 
organization], a conscious choice is made to 
place the controllers within the Finance 
hierarchy, unlike in my previous job. There I 
was reporting to the business in the 
hierarchy. And here you always have the 
escape option of going to your superior.” 
[GDC6] “Yes, I agree” [GDC4] “Can I say 
something? That’s what I meant at the 
beginning with the organizational 
structure.” [GDC2]“Yes that’s a good thing.” 
[GDC6] “I agree.” 
[GDC4] “Maar daarom ben ik het wel met 
[GDC2] eens. Die zegt: je moet stevig in je 
schoenen staan. Een stukje lef hebben.” 
[GDC2] “Maar dat is wel natuurlijk waarom 
binnen [de organisatie] een hele bewuste 
keuze gemaakt is, dat alle controllers die 
zitten binnen de financiële kolom. En, in 
tegenstelling tot bij mijn vorige werkgever. 
Daar zat ik binnen de lijnkolom en hier heb 
je altijd de escape om naar je baas te 
stappen.” [GDC6] “Ja, nee dat is eens.” 
[GDC4] “Mag ik nog even? Dat is wat ik in 
het begin zei: de ophanging.” [GDC2] “Dat is 
wel goed hoor. Dat is wel fijn.” [GDC6] “Ja 
dat vind ik ook wel.” 
Interestingly, a finance superior to whom a number of controllers report mentioned that BU 
controllers seldom referred to him/her with these type of dilemmas:  
[interviewee] [discussing the importance of 
organizational structure for the role of the 
controller] “No, that’s not the way I look at 
it at all. I have experience with both a 
hierarchical line as well as a functional line 
[interviewee] [met betrekking tot de invloed 
van de organisatie structuur op de rol van de 
controller] “Nee daar zit ik totaal anders in. 
Ik heb zelf zowel ervaring bij in het verleden 
met zowel hiërarchisch als functioneel van 
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to finance. And actually I’m convinced that 
it makes no difference.” [researcher] 
“That’s something I meant to ask you: Do 
controllers come to you with a problem and 
ask you to ‘put your foot down’? Because 
that would mean…” [interviewee] “The only 
controllers who have done that no longer 
work here. Of course there’s something like 
a ‘healthy tension’; a controller has to be 
able to cope with that. That’s part of a 
controller’s core-competence.” 
financiën en omgekeerd en ik ben er 
eigenlijk van overtuigd dat er geen verschil 
is.” [researcher] “Want dat wilde ik je ook 
nog vragen: Komen er dan ook mensen bij 
jou met: ik zit met een probleem en je moet 
met de vuist op tafel? Want dat zou…” 
[interviewee] “De enige die dat hebben 
gedaan die werken inmiddels niet meer bij 
ons. Tuurlijk is er zoiets als een gezonde 
spagaat, bij uitstek als controller moet je in 
staat zijn hier mee om te gaan. Het hoort tot 
de kerncompetentie.” 
The interviewee thus implied that setting boundaries and making sure these boundaries are 
respected are part of the controller’s job and that BU controllers should not need the 
involvement of finance superiors to enforce  acting within these boundaries. 
During the individual interviews and the group discussion with corporate finance staff, other 
expectations of corporate finance staff emerged. They expected BU controllers to be able to 
identify accounting choices and to be transparent in their accounting choices. In an individual 
interview, a corporate finance staff interviewee commented on the differences between 
controllers in identifying and communicating accounting choices: 
[researcher] “Are there differences 
between controllers?” [CS2] “Yes. I think 
that some controllers, for example BUCx 
and BUCy consider how they can use the 
range of choices and they can do that; I 
think most of all BUCx. BUCx knows 
exactly, well if I account for my provision in 
this or that way, then my result will be like 
this. And in the case of BUCz I think, BUCz 
hasn’t even considered that. I can’t really 
judge the underlying reason but eh… there 
[researcher] “Zijn er verschillen in 
controllers?” [CS2] “Ja, ik denk dat eh 
sommigen, bijvoorbeeld BUCx en BUCy, hoe 
ze zelf gebruik kunnen maken van 
speelruimte he, dus die kunnen wel. BUCx 
het allerbeste denk ik, die weet heel goed 
van nou ja, als ik mijn voorziening een 
beetje zus doe dan komt mijn resultaat er zo 
uit. Eh.in het geval van BUCz denk ik: die 
heeft er niet eens bij stil gestaan. Ik kan niet 
helemaal inschatten wat er achter zit maar 
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are differences.” [researcher] “What do 
you think?” [CS2] “Knowledge, norms and 
values, eh… well I mean being afraid for 
transparency. Not wanting to be 
transparent.” 
eh… nee er zit verschil in.” [researcher] 
“Waarom denk je?” [CS2] “Kennis, normen 
en waarden, eh... de angst om transparantie 
bedoel ik dan. Niet willen geven van 
transparantie.”  
Corporate finance staff expected BU controllers to have an overview and present financial 
results consistent with this overview, explaining deviations from expected results, but they also 
expected transparency by the BU controllers relating to the accounting choices made. 
Interestingly, the aspects ‘transparency in the decision-making process’ and ‘communicating of 
the available accounting choices to the corporate level’ were hardly mentioned during the 
interviews with the BU controller. Only two controllers referred to regularly communicating 
accounting choices at a corporate level. The accounting choices were predominantly incurred at 
BU level without involving corporate finance staff. This also explains why some findings relating 
to accounting choice behavior by BU controllers were not recognized by corporate finance staff. 
The tendency of some BU controllers to sometimes smooth expenses and revenues in order to 
influence behavior and avoid having to explain temporary variances from budget, as referred to 
in the previous section, was, for example, thought to be peculiar by corporate finance staff. In 
their opinion, the accounting rules for recognizing revenue and expenses were not a grey area 
but quite ‘black and white’. Also the finding that some BU controllers consulted their business 
administrator/financial administrator rather than corporate control as a sparring partner in 
deciding on the available accounting choices, surprised corporate finance staff: 
[GDS1] “I think it’s difficult to confirm that 
because I don’t know if all these issues eh 
pass us. Because eh… it doesn’t often 
happen that someone comes up to me and 
asks, hey, I have a small issue that can go 
one way or another, what do you think? It’s 
not often that the business comes up with 
that.” [GDS2] “Peculiar.” [GDS1] “In 
principle, the culture is one where you can 
do this openly.”  
[GDS1] “Ja, ik vind het moeilijk om te zeggen 
of het herkenbaar is omdat ik niet weet of 
al die dingen ook eh helemaal voorbij 
komen zeg maar. Want ik… het gebeurt niet 
veel dat iemand bij mij komt die vraagt: joh, 
van ik heb even een dingetje zeg maar. Het 
kan deze kant op en het kan deze kant op, 
wat vindt jij? Dat gebeurt niet veel vanuit de 
business.” [GDS2] “Bijzonder.” [GDS1] “Op 
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zich is de cultuur er toch ook wel naar om 
het gewoon open te doen hoor.” 
The latter interviewee thus specifically referred to an open culture, implying that there were no 
barriers for controllers to openly discuss the possible accounting choices. In practice, however, 
the accounting choice decisions were predominately made and communicated within the BU 
with the involvement of BU actors such as the BU manager and BU administrator. 
The findings thus reveal that corporate finance staff, besides expecting professional behavior, 
also focused on transparency in the decision-making process. This is hereafter labeled as the 
‘corporate staff logic’. 
5.1.4 Competing logics 
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to provide a full analysis of the logics identified, 
the relation between the two abovementioned logics are discussed briefly. 
The two logics identified in the previous section are competing logics. Both BU controllers and 
corporate finance staff emphasized the importance of professionalism and both referred, to a 
great extent, to the same elements of this professionalism. However, corporate staff expected 
transparency in the decision-making process. BU controllers, on the other hand, stressed the 
importance of their professionalism and responsibility within the BU. Since only two BU 
controllers mentioned that they communicated available accounting choices to corporate 
finance staff, this means that the other BU controllers either did not communicate their choices 
or that they did not identify accounting choices. The latter reason is unlikely, as BU controllers 
commented on the available freedom of accounting choices, which was also confirmed in the 
BU controllers’ group discussion. One BU controller worded this freedom as follows:  
[BUC2] “In my opinion they [Corporate] do 
not communicate, at least it doesn’t end up 
with me, instructions how you should apply 
the accounting standards. I think there’s a 
lot of freedom.” [Researcher] “Conservative 
or aggressive?” [BUC2] “No, on the 
contrary, it’s unclear, resulting in it 
remaining a grey area. In my opinion, the 
[BUC2] “Ik vind niet dat zij [Corporate] 
duidelijk naar de organisatie toe, tenminste 
het komt niet bij mij terecht, instructies 
geven hoe je accounting principes moet 
toepassen. Ik vind dat daarin behoorlijk wat 
ruimte ligt.” [Researcher] “Ook niet 
conservatief of agressief?” [BUC2] “Nee, juist 
onduidelijk waardoor het een 
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guidelines are too general and too vague to 
serve as an accounting instruction. They 
don’t provide enough support.” 
schemergebied blijft. Ik vind dat de 
richtlijnen te algemeen of te vaag om 
taakstellend te werken. Je hebt niet 
voldoende houvast.” 
The BU controllers’ group discussion revealed that not communicating accounting choices 
related to uncertain situations. BU controllers felt they are expected to be professional and deal 
with possible dilemmas. They therefore have to make a decision relating to the issues they are 
still able to solve themselves, without ‘bothering’ corporate finance staff as well as decisions 
about  the issues that should be communicated to Corporate. The ‘surprises’ referred to by BU 
controllers in Section 5.1.2, when reflecting on whether or not to make an adjustment if the 
financial outcome could not be explained by their overall view, are examples of these issues. BU 
controllers sometimes made a conscious decision not to communicate something, because they 
first wanted to understand the problem. By not communicating this to corporate finance staff, 
the BU controller is therefore not transparent in his/her accounting choice process, which is not 
in accordance with the ‘corporate staff logic’. This corporate staff logic, expecting transparency 
in the decision-making process, in these situations is a logic that competes with the professional 
logic. In the professional logic, BU controllers are expected to solve their problems within the 
business without ‘bothering’ corporate finance staff. This is in line with the BU controllers 
identifying the business as their main ‘client’ (Lambert & Sponem, 2012), since those 
interviewed work in the setting of an organization with a business oriented approach.  
Corporate finance staff have to decide to what extent they rely on the professional behavior of 
the BU controller. One BU controller felt that corporate finance staff did interfere in what 
he/she considered his/her own responsibility: 
[Researcher] “With respect to accounting 
choices do you have a lot of freedom in your 
opinion, or not?” [BUC14] “Yes, there are 
few guidelines, so ehmmm. Well let me 
phrase it as follows: sometimes I wonder if 
the issues that are addressed are the right 
ones.” [Researcher] “For example?” 
[BUC14] “Well eh….for example… eh… 
[Researcher] “Met verslaggevingskeuzes heb 
je veel vrijheid hier of juist niet?” [BUC14] 
“Ja, er is weinig kader dus ehmm. nou laat ik 
zeggen. er wordt soms gekaderd op dingen 
waarvan ik denk: is dit nou de juiste 
kadering.” [Researcher] “Bijvoorbeeld?” 
[BUC14] “Nou eh... wat ik bijvoorbeeld…eh... 
er is een centrale druk om accounting dingen 
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there is a centralized pressure to organize 
accounting issues, that is your basis of 
control. However, I think it’s exaggerated. 
You know, it’s clearly a business 
responsibility to ensure that this happens.” 
te organiseren, dat je je basis op orde hebt. 
Alleen daar vind ik dat het overdreven 
wordt. Hè, de verantwoordelijkheid ligt 
duidelijk bij de business om te zorgen dat het 
gebeurt.” 
Another BU controller reflected on the type of corporate control within the organization and 
related this to whether or not corporate finance staff trust the Business Unit: 
[BUC18] “Well you see, I think that  there 
are 2 forms of reporting: accountability 
and management. I see this as 
‘accountability’. So, yes, then I think it’s 
very important -  what do they want to see, 
accountability - to what extent, how 
intensive. What do they want exactly? 
What’s the philosophy within your 
company? Is that …Eh…tight or loose 
control it’s called I think…that’s crucial;  
what philosophy do you have as an 
organization and what trust do you have in 
the business?” [Researcher] “What do you 
think?” [BUC18] “Here? Mmm ... I… it gives 
the impression, if you consider everything, 
that it’s tight control. But...in fact that’s 
not what it is. It’s also not very loose but… 
well, it’s more on the loose side than on 
the tight side, despite that you expect, you 
have the feeling… if you see the piles of 
reports, that it is tight control.”  
[BUC18] “Nou kijk ik vind die rapportage: je 
hebt 2 vormen van rapportage: 
verantwoording en sturing. Ik zie dit als 
verantwoording. Dus ja, dan vind ik heel 
belangrijk: wat willen ze zien, hoe ver gaat 
die verantwoording, hoe diep gaat dat. Wat 
willen ze precies. Wat is je filosofie binnen je 
bedrijf. Is dat eh… tight of loose control is dat 
geloof ik... dat is heel bepalend: wat voor 
filosofie heb je als concern en wat voor 
vertrouwen heb je in de business.” 
[Researcher] ”Wat is jou gevoel daarbij?” 
[BUC18] “Hier? Mmm... ik… het geeft de 
indruk hier, als je kijkt naar de staven dat het 
'tight' control is. Maar...dat is het in feite 
niet. Het is ook niet heel 'loose' maar… nou 
het zit eerder aan de loose kant dan de tight 
kant, ondanks dat je de verwachting hebt, 
het gevoel… als je de stapels rapportages 
ziet, dat het tight control is.” 
Interestingly, this BU controller remarked that the elaborate corporate reporting requirements 
suggested that corporate control was very tight, but that he/she perceived that this actually 
was not the case. Two other controllers also complained about the elaborate reporting 
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procedures and being gradually squeezed into a ‘straight jacket’ over time. Similar to  findings 
by Ezzamel et al. (2012) in their field study, the symbolic logic of the reporting technique, being 
a corporate staff logic, was not reflected by the material practices of reporting in the 
organization where a professional logic was used by BU controllers, with local management 
being their ‘main client’. Corporate finance staff thus allowed the BU controllers freedom in the 
available accounting choices and expected BU controllers to make these choices using their 
professional judgment. On the other hand, corporate finance staff want to make sure that BU 
controllers have ‘their business in control’ by monitoring BU controller’s actions and imposing 
elaborate reporting formats. 
5.1.5 Summary  
The general setting consists of business units with a range of activities and differing 
stakeholders. Each BU controller therefore works in a ‘unique setting’. The BU controller’s role 
in this organization is very business oriented and in the terminology op Lambert and Sponem 
(2012), labeled a business partner style. Furthermore, BU controllers perceived that they, to a 
great extent, had freedom when making their accounting choices. The analysis revealed a 
‘professional logic’ which influences the accounting choice process: controllers are expected to 
have a high level of professional judgment in order to provide a consistent presentation of the 
BU financial outcome, as well as to identify the available accounting choices within the 
boundaries of the accounting standards and be determined in setting these boundaries. Using 
this professional logic, controllers’ accounting choices are, however, not necessarily the same as 
different BU controllers identify different boundaries. 
Furthermore, another logic has been identified within the organization; this is labeled ‘the 
corporate staff logic’. This relates to the transparency of the decision-making process and the 
communication of the available accounting choices. The ‘corporate staff logic’ assumes full 
transparency, including the communication of the available accounting choices at a corporate 
level. This logic competes with the expected professional behavior of BU controllers. On the one 
hand, BU controllers are expected to solve their own professional problems within the Business 
Unit and on the other, they are expected to show full transparency. The ‘professional logic’ 
implies full decision-making at a business unit level. Controllers using this logic do not like to see 
‘surprises’, these being major variances between the expected and definite financial result. 
Using professional BU control logic also implies that the available accounting choices are 
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discussed at a Business Unit level rather than corporate level, in order to keep optimal flexibility 
in the presentation of the financial results at BU level. The dominant logic used by the BU 
controllers interviewed was the professional logic. 
5.2 CONTROLLERS’ ACCOUNTING CHOICES 
5.2.1 BU controllers’ accounting choices 
In total, 98 accounting decisions were discussed. These accounting choices related to a range of 
reporting items. When analyzing the choices, three main reporting item categories emerged: 
fixed assets, other assets & liabilities and accruals. The category ‘fixed assets’ and ‘other assets 
and liabilities’ mainly involved valuation decisions. BU controllers considered whether the 
reported items needed to be impaired or if a provision should be incurred or 
increased/decreased. For the category ‘fixed assets’, BU controllers also discussed capitalization 
decisions. The category ‘accruals’ mainly involved timing decisions relating to the recognition of 
income and expenses. There was also a small remaining category ‘others’ which involved 
accounting choices relating to classification and intercompany transactions, and affected 
various reporting items in the balance sheet or profit and loss statement. Depending on the 
BU’s activities, different reporting items were applicable and the amounts involved for these 
reporting items could also be more or less material for the individual BU. Therefore, not all 
reporting items were discussed at every BU controller interview. Also BU situational 
circumstances affected the reporting issues discussed. BU controllers supporting a BU in a 
restructuring process had to make decisions relating to the restructuring provision, but also to 
reconsider whether additional provisions or impairments relating to other reporting items had 
to be accounted for. 
There are basically two accounting choices available; to do nothing or to make an adjustment. 
The adjustments discussed related to valuation of assets and liabilities: impairment decisions, 
making additional provisions/impairments, and changing methods of estimates. They also 
related to the timing of accounting for expenses and revenues and to classification adjustments. 
It should be noted that accounting choices were labeled as ‘do nothing’ or ‘adjustment’ choices 
based on the BU controller’s final accounting choice. In some instances, BU controllers’ 
deliberated an adjustment but then consciously decided not to intervene. An overview of the 
accounting choices discussed, using the abovementioned categorization is provided in Table 13. 
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financial fixed assets 2 1 1 1 1 1 
material fixed assets 10 3 6 4 2 8 
immaterial fixed assets 3 3 2 1   3 
fixed assets 15 6 9 6 3 12 
debtors provision 14 13 10 4 2 12 
receivables provision 2 2   2   2 
inventory provision 8 6 6 2 1 7 
work in progress 2 1 1 1   2 
onerous contracts provision 2 2   2 1 1 
other provision 6 5 3 3 1 5 
restructuring provision 2 2   2   2 
other assets & liabilities 36 16 20 16 5 31 
expense accrued 17 12 11 6 4 13 
expense prepaid 10 8 5 5 2 8 
income accrued 9 7 7 2 2 7 
income deferred 6 4 4 2 3 3 
suspense account 1 1 1   1   
accrual 43 16 28 15 12 31 
classification 2 2 1 1 1 1 
intercompany 2 2   2   2 
other    4 4 1 3 1 3 
total 98 n/a 58 40 21 77 
1) This refers to the Business Units where the item was discussed. Eg., the category fixed assets was discussed in 6 
BUs: 3 BUs material fixed assets; 2 BUs immaterial fixed assets; 1 BU immaterial fixed assets & financial fixed assets 
Table 13 Accounting choices discussed 
Accounting choices are heavily influenced by a BU controller’s deliberations. The process of 
accounting choices is either based on a routine process or is case specific. Accounting choices 
based on a routine process do not necessarily mean that all BU controllers followed the same 
routine; these routines are BU dependent or BU controller dependent. It should be noted that 
BU controllers also make decisions based on habits, hereafter referred to as rule based 
behavior. The deliberations in making the accounting choices and the final accounting choices 
are discussed in Section 5.2.3 and 5.2.4. The accounting choice process is described in the next 
section. An accounting choice process emerged from the interviews, consisting of different 
categories of activities which are described in Section 5.2.2. In this accounting choice process, 
BU controllers make choices that are broader than deciding ‘which number to report’. Decisions 
relating to initiating changes of operational processes/systems or changes to customer products 
or conditions are also dealt with in this context. 
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5.2.2 Categories of activities in the accounting choice process 
The categories of activities identified are: Operational review, Financial review, Valuation 
review, and Overall review. The categories described are strongly interrelated and not 
necessarily sequential. There is, however, a logic flow in the process as data are first produced 
by the operational system, translated and transferred to the financial system, and periodically 
reviewed for valuation. The type of analysis of the various categories of activities is also 
different: the operational and part of the financial review are mainly basic reviews which are 
performed on a routine detailed basis, whereas the valuation review and the overall review are 
on a more global basis, involving reflection. The overall review relates to the final review when 
considering major accounting decisions to be taken, but also relates to the review during the 
whole accounting choice process of analyzing the operational and financial data with the 
expected overall outcome in mind. The categories of activities are summarized below:  
-  Operational review: Assessing quality of operational information used as a basis for 
financial information and deciding whether to rely on operational systems and processes 
as a basis for financial information and/or making best estimates if the information 
provided by these systems/processes is inaccurate or incomplete. 
- Financial review: Ensuring the financial accounts are in line with the financial accounting 
rules and represent the financial translation of actions and transactions incurred.  
- Valuation review: Based on business developments, determining whether items in the 
financial statements resulting from standard transactions/accounting need to be 
adjusted to better reflect the financial situation of the Business Unit. 
- Overall review: Determining the expected BU financial outcome and reflecting on the 
accounting choices in the light of this expectation.  
When the findings relating to the categories of activities within the process were presented in 
the group discussion, the controllers emphasized the interrelationship of the operational review 
and the financial review, and the concurrence of these reviews. Figure 5 shows an overview of 
the accounting choice process. It should be noted that the controller makes the accounting 
choices based on his/her deliberations, and that this is not a straightforward process. The 
















The activities are not equally important for every BU controller. The accounting choices 
available are dependent on the BU activities and situational circumstances. Some businesses 
are not complicated and do not require material valuation decisions unlike other businesses 
which are, for example, capital intensive or which are in a restructuring situation. 
The specific activities and the accounting choices involved are described in more detail in the 
next section. 
 Operational Review 
Operational processes and systems record the underlying transactions that form the basis for 
the financial information. One of the steps in controllers’ accounting choice processes is 
reviewing the operational data resulting from these systems for completeness and accuracy and 
determining the accruals to be processed, if any. Examples of operational data mentioned are: 
hours to be invoiced, services rendered to be invoiced, purchase orders or services received to 
be accrued for. 
The extent to which estimates for accruals are necessary depends on the design, use and 
function of the operational processes. Some controllers seemed to work with well-functioning 
operating processes:  
[researcher] “How do you determine 
accrued income” (sales to be invoiced)? 
[researcher] “Hoe bepaal je de te factureren 











Figure 5 Activities within the accounting choice process 
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[BUC1] “Based on the system, which 
records the hours. So based on the reports 
generated by the system, which is prepared 
by [administrator]”. [researcher] “Are the 
hours up to date?” [BUC1] “Previously this 
wasn’t the case, but now it’s strictly 
monitored, so everyone is up to date with 
their hours.”  
waarin de uren worden geschreven. Dus op 
basis van de rapportage uit [naam systeem] 
en dat wordt verzorgd door 
[administrator].” [researcher] “De uren zijn 
gewoon bij tot de laatste dag?” [BUC1] “Dat 
was voorheen niet zo maar nu wordt er 
strak op gestuurd dat iedereen zijn uren 
geschreven heeft.” 
Other controllers indicated that the operational processes and systems have limitations which 
result in less accurate information. This was caused for example by new product/service 
introductions that are not fully embedded in the operational and financial operational 
information process, or by inflexible operational systems: 
[BUC11 about a new pricing system] “That 
process was designed quite ‘creatively’ 
[explains the new pricing system] Normally 
this would be accounted for via the balance 
sheet. Here, they account for it in the profit 
& loss.” 
[BUC12] “Now we have a kind of ‘standard 
accrual’ [still to be invoiced]. Well, that is 
one method but this needs to be stopped 
this year. However, then I first need reliable 
Management Information.” 
[BUC11 over een nieuwe pricing 
systematiek] “Ze hebben het proces vrij 
creatief ingericht. [legt de systematiek uit] 
Dat doe je dan normaliter via de balans. Dat 
hebben ze hier via de p&l gedaan.” 
[BUC12] “Ja daar is nu zeg maar een soort 
‘standaard’ voor opgenomen [nog te 
factureren]. Dus dat is een methode en daar 
moeten we in de loop van het jaar vanaf. Ik 
vind dat we er vanaf moeten, maar dan wil 
ik wel eerst dat mijn MI betrouwbaar 
hebben.” 
In cases where information from the operational systems was found to be inaccurate or 
incomplete, then BU controllers made an estimate based on past experience and/or on the 
basis of input of operational management if available. Sometimes the shortcomings of the 
system were accepted ‘as is’, and the BU controller did nothing. One BU controller explained 
how the system affected the timing of revenue recognition throughout the year. 
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“We’re working with a very special system 
landscape, with a lot of different systems 
linked together, where the moment of 
recognizing revenue sometimes is an issue 
for discussion. An example is [type of 
revenue]… we deliver and also recognize 
revenue at that moment, although the 
customer still has a right to return the 
goods. And they also have the right to 
compensation for discounts. So if you…  you 
see in your result… at the moment of 
delivery you get a huge result, because 
that’s revenue. However, part of it can 
bereturned at the end of the season and, in 
addition, a compensation for discounts. It is 
very tricky to plan that properly and that 
leads to major fluctuations in the month. 
And that’s yes, that’s a choice made within 
the business but  does impact the financial 
reporting, as well as  also reducing the 
predictability of the result.” 
“We werken toch wel met een heel 
bijzonder systeemlandschap met allerlei 
aan elkaar geknoopte systemen, waarbij het 
moment van omzet nemen ook nog wel 
eens een discussie is. Een voorbeeld 
daarvan is [omzet categorie]… wij leveren 
en op dat moment wordt ook de omzet 
genomen, terwijl de klant nog wel recht van 
retour heeft voor zijn handel. En ze ook nog 
recht hebben om een… op een marge 
compensatie voor afprijzingen. Dus als je… 
je ziet in je resultaat… op het moment van 
uitleveren zie je een enorm resultaat, want 
dat is… dat is omzet. Maar daarvan komt 
nog wel een stukje terug straks aan het eind 
van het seizoen plus nog een compensatie 
voor kortingen. Dat is een hele lastige om 
dat goed in te plannen en dat leidt wel tot 
grote fluctuaties in de maand. En dat is 
een…ja dat is een keuze die vanuit de 
business eh... gemaakt is maar die wel 
invloed heeft op de financiële 
verantwoording maar waardoor de 
voorspelbaarheid van het resultaat wel 
wordt bemoeilijkt.” 
The key element of this part of the accounting choice process is:  
Assessing the quality of the output of operational systems and processes to be used as a basis 
for financial information, and making best estimates if the information provided by these 
systems/processes is inaccurate or incomplete 
It should be noted that these types of data are also analyzed in the part of the process which is 
separately identified as ‘valuation review’. 
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 Financial Review 
The financial information resulting from standard processes and other actions and transactions 
is reviewed by the BU controllers on a monthly basis. The profit and loss amounts are compared 
to budget and trends in the past. This review leads to identifying unusual items to be followed 
up in order to ensure that transactions are properly accounted for, in line with the accounting 
standards. The balance sheet items are also reviewed for supporting documentation and for the 
accurate processing of the corrections to be made resulting from the review or improvement of 
operating systems. 
The review of the profit and loss and balance sheet leads to the identification of accounting 
choices, for example identifying items which should be capitalized and identification of timing 
decisions relating to revenue or expenses: 
[Researcher] “I read in your Q1 
management report: other expenditure 
decreased because of transferring 
expenditure relating to [asset] from 
expenses to assets for [amount]. What was 
the issue there?” [BUC9] “Yes well, that is 
eh… the business does not always realize 
when something has to be capitalized. And 
this was an example. These expenses were 
eh… the amount of a [asset] at 
[department] was expensed whereas it 
should have been capitalized.” [Researcher] 
“You discovered this by analyzing the 
expenses?” [BUC9] “Yes, in this case I just 
took a close look at the expenses.”  
[Researcher] “Ik had uit jouw management 
rapportage wel gehaald van Q1: overige 
bedrijfslasten zijn lager vanwege 
overboeking kosten [activa item] naar 
activa van [bedrag]. Wat was dat voor iets?” 
[BUC9] “Ja, dat is eh… de business heeft niet 
altijd helemaal door of iets geactiveerd 
moet worden. En dit was dus inderdaad zo'n 
voorbeeld. De kosten die zijn eh. Er waren 
kosten genomen voor een [activa] bij 
[afdeling] terwijl dat gewoon geactiveerd 
moest worden.” [Researcher] “En daar ben 
je dan achter gekomen door naar de kosten 
te kijken of zo?” [BUC9] “Ja daar ben ik 
gewoon inderdaad de kosten ingedoken.” 
The key element of this part of the accounting choice process is:  
Making sure the financial accounts are in line with the financial accounting rules and represent 
the financial translation of actions and transactions incurred. 
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 Valuation Review 
Apart from reviewing the basic financial information, controllers also decide if the valuation of 
the balance sheet items - such as fixed assets, inventory and debtors – is appropriate. 
Moreover, they identify events which lead to either an impairment of assets or a provision on 
the balance sheet, such as a restructuring provision. Identifying these events and their effects 
on valuation of assets and liabilities is a more global analysis and at a higher level than the 
previously mentioned operational review and financial review. 
In order to determine the provisions for obsolete inventory or bad debts, often a systematic 
calculation is used. This systematic calculation is either based on the corporate accounting 
instructions or the BU controller uses BU tailor-made instructions. For some items there are no 
corporate instruction available, and the BU controller has set up and use his/her own BU 
specific method. The use and availability of operational information is an important element in 
this category of accounting choices: 
 [BUC14] “For the provision for obsolete 
inventory, there are business rules. So we 
made a table with percentages, for 
eh….these percentages are applied to 
articles from a particular season and then 
you get an amount. That’s just a standard 
procedure:  a table is used, applying a 
percentage and that generates an amount. 
And that’s reported because it’s a fact. 
Now, that’s, by the way, not the method I 
would like to use. What you really should do 
is to make two categories: seasonal and 
‘never-out-of-stock’ articles… Never-out- 
of-stock articles you want to analyze by 
using the stock turnover rate.” 
[BUC14] “De voorziening incourantie, daar 
zijn de business rules voor. Dus hebben we 
een staffeltje gemaakt, voor als de eh, 
artikelen van een bepaald seizoen zijn dan 
krijgen ze een bepaald percentage. Dat is 
gewoon een vaste regel; wordt over de 
tabel heen gehaald. Er wordt een tabel 
neergezet, wordt een percentage over 
gehaald en dan komt er een bedrag uit. En 
dat, wordt gewoon gerapporteerd omdat 
het een feit is. Dat is overigens niet de 
methode die ik zou willen. Wat je eigenlijk 
moet doen is, je moet eigenlijk de 
voorziening voorraad splitsen in 2 dingen: 
seizoensartikelen en 'never out of stock' 
artikelen.… Never out of stock artikelen die 
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Apart from the systematic calculation, there is also professional judgment involved in the 
review for valuation. Controllers referred to trends in the past and input from the business for 
making this professional judgment. The available knowledge in the business is particularly 
important for estimating future cash-generating capacity of assets and/or expected business 
developments that have an impact on provisions to be taken into account, e.g., claims or other 
liabilities: 
[BUC12] “In the first year there was a lot of 
fuss when determining the provision. Then 
I had to be very firm, together with 
Operational manager X who is not really 
eh… has no real affinity with numbers. 
However, Operational manager X knows if 
it’s right or if it’s wrong, and knows what is 
going on. Gut feeling is very important. We 
defended our opinion and stuck to it. And 
the next year we were proved right.” 
 [BUC12] “En het eerste jaar met de 
vaststelling van de voorziening hebben we 
heel veel gesteggel gehad. En daar ben ik 
toen heel erg stellig in geweest, samen met 
Operational manager X die is echt eh… die 
heeft geen, zijn cijfergevoel is niet echt 
super, maar Operational manager X weet 
wel of het klopt of niet klopt, en wat er 
gebeurt. Onderbuik gevoel is heel belangrijk 
en we hebben ons standpunt verdedigd en 
vastgehouden en dat is het jaar daarna 
uitgekomen.” 
Controllers also regularly indicated that they often used their own judgment, by using the word 
‘gut feeling’. When discussing this in the group session, one controller referred to this as ‘using 
common sense’: 
[Researcher] “I would like to discuss 
valuation. That’s very interesting. 
Controllers often refer to ‘their gut feeling’ 
you know, so eh… there are systems and 
also items are individually analyzed. 
However, ‘gut feeling’ is also eh…yes is 
mentioned regularly. [silence] Do you think 
that is related to experience? Or…” [GDC4] 
“No, that is related to your estimates. If you 
have to make a valuation, then this often 
[Researcher] “Nog even de waardering wat 
mij betreft eh. Dat is wel een hele leuke. Er 
wordt veel gesproken op basis van gevoel, 
he dus eh… er worden systemen er wordt 
ook wel per post wordt er gekeken. Maar er 
wordt ook op basis van gevoel wordt er eh… 
ja wordt vaak genoemd. [Stilte] heeft dat 
met ervaring te maken denk je? Of….” 
[GDC4] “Nee dat heeft te maken met je 
inschattingen. Als je een waardering moet 
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involves a vision of the future that you are 
discounting. So then there’s... you can call 
it… ‘gut feeling’. Maybe that’s  not the right 
word. Your expectation, your…” 
[researcher] “Well, that word is being 
used.” [GDC4] “Yes, but ‘gut feeling’ sounds 
very subjective. You have to base it on 
something, in my opinion.” [GDC6] “Yes, 
but it’s also always, yes I always think -  just 
use your common sense, so to speak.” 
[GDC4] “That as well.” [GDC6] “Don’t you 
think so? When you see that the trend 
develops like this [points downwards] and 
that’s not reflected in the numbers, well 
then something is wrong isn’t it?”  
maken dan is dat toch veelal een visie op de 
toekomst die je contant maakt. Dus dan 
komen er….je kunt wel zeggen, ja gevoel. 
Misschien is dat niet het goede woord. Je 
verwachting, je…” [researcher] “Het wordt 
wel gebruikt.” [GDC4] “Ja maar gevoel klinkt 
heel erg subjectief. Je moet het natuurlijk 
wel ergens op kunnen baseren mijns 
inziens.” [GDC6] “Ja maar het is ook altijd, ja 
ik heb dan zoiets, een beetje logisch 
nadenken zeg maar.” [GDC4] “Ook.” [GDC6] 
“Toch? Als je die aantallen zo [wijst naar 
beneden] ziet gaan en je ziet dat in je cijfers 
niet terug komen ja dan is daar toch iets, 
he?” 
The dilemma of relying on the business estimates was also referred to in other interviews. One 
controller phrased this as follows: 
[BUC9 regarding a possible impairment of 
an asset] “Yes, that’s something I’ve 
learned. This is something that you know 
now and what it’ll be like in 2 years. This is 
what I know now, and that’s how I 
considered this [the asset]. I have to trust 
what the business says. They say to me -  it’s 
not true, we can use it for a long time. Who 
am I, as a finance professional to question 
this? I can ask critical questions, but it’s up 
to the business to make a decision.” 
[BUC9 over een mogelijke impairment] “Ja 
dat is iets wat ik ook wel geleerd heb. Dit is 
wat je nu weet en hoe het over 2 jaar. Dit is 
wat ik nu weet en dat heb ik ook bij [de 
geactiveerde post] zo gehad. Ik moet 
vertrouwen op hetgeen de business zegt; zij 
zeggen tegen mij, het is niet waar. Wij 
kunnen daar nog lang mee vooruit. Wie ben 
ik als financial. Ik kan kritische vragen 
stellen maar het is aan de business om 
besluit over te nemen.” 
For some businesses, the valuation review is more important than for others. This is partly 
dependent on the business activities e.g., having material amounts of assets on the balance 
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sheet such as fixed assets and inventory, and partly on the situational circumstances such as 
restructuring, or a new business proposal with capital expenditure. 
The key element of this part of the accounting process is:  
Based on business developments, determine whether items in the financial statements resulting 
from standard transactions/accounting need to be adjusted to better reflect the financial 
situation of the Business Unit. 
 Overall Review 
The overall review is not necessarily a separate part of the process, but works in the 
background of all the other accounting choice activities. Controllers have, consciously or 
unconsciously, an expectation relating to the financial outcome: 
[BUC 2 discussing the difficulty about 
predicting the timing of the revenues and 
expenses] “And we often discussed this and 
I noticed that BUCy [finance supervisor] 
didn’t like that much. BUCy was a little 
confused if the results didn’t match the 
expected results due to timing differences 
between the months.” 
[BUC16] “Around the year end, from the 
third week of December onwards, we’re 
busy working on it: what’s the expected 
outcome and we do that as much as 
possible in cooperation with the group so 
the CFO also knows which subjects we still 
have to decide on”. 
[BUC 2 over de onvoorspelbaarheid van de 
timing van omzet en kosten] “En daar 
hadden wij wel vaak discussies over en ik 
merkte dat BUCy [finance leidinggevende] 
niet zo goed daar tegen kon, dan was BUCy 
weer een beetje in de war als het resultaat 
niet uitkwam zoals we verwacht hadden 
door zulk soort maandverschuivingen.” 
[BUC16] “Rondom de jaarafsluiting zijn we 
vanaf de derde week van december wel 
bezig van: waar komen we uit en dat doen 
we dan ook in overleg zo veel mogelijk met 
de groep zodat de CFO het ook weet wat de 
dossiers waar we nog op moeten kiezen.” 
This overall view of controllers was also discussed in Section 5.1.2 
The key element of this process is:  
Determining the expected BU financial outcome and reflecting upon the accounting choices in 
the light of this expectation. 
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5.2.3 Controller deliberations and rule based behavior 
Controllers make their accounting choices based on deliberations. When analyzing the 
controller deliberations, patterns emerged in the accounting choice process. These patterns 
were clustered in two main categories, which – for the purpose of this study – are labeled as 
‘routines’ and ‘case specific’ deliberations. The BU controller routines were either based on 
Corporate accounting instructions or on BU specific determined methods or instructions. In 
some instances, however, the BU controller made decisions based on habit. This behavior is 
hereafter referred to as ‘rule based behavior’. Rule based behavior relates to the first stage – 
the rule following mode - of the dual mode rationality discussed in Section 3.1. This stage 
shapes the decision room of controllers. One BU controller explained how he/she became 
aware of his/her rule based behavior on one occasion:  
[BUC9 about capitalizing expenses for a 
marketing stand] “And I properly disclosed 
it in my report, that I had made the choice 
to capitalize. Director A [Division Director] 
said then,  why did you capitalize it? And 
then indeed I thought -  yes, that could have 
been a grey area; and it is a grey area. Of 
course it lasts more than one year. But on 
the other hand, marketing expense… I could 
have expensed it immediately…I will never 
forget that. I also went bright red and 
thought -  actually you do have a point.” 
[BUC9 over een activering van een 
marketing stand] “En ik had het netjes in 
mijn toelichting geschreven, ik heb die 
activeringskeuze gemaakt. Directielid A 
[Divisie directeur] zei toen: waarom heb je 
die geactiveerd? En dat ik toen inderdaad 
dacht. Ja, dit had een grijs gebied kunnen 
zijn. En het is een grijs gebied. Tuurlijk gaat 
hij langer mee, maar aan de andere kant: 
marketing kosten... had ik het ook in één 
keer… Ik vergeet het nooit meer. Kreeg ook 
een rode biet van hier tot Tokio en dacht 
daar heb je eigenlijk wel een punt.” 
The two categories of controller deliberations are discussed below. There were two types of 
routine choices. First, BU controllers indicated they made their accounting choice by following 
the accounting instructions: 
[BUC16 answering a question on 
capitalizing software development 
expenses] “There we just followed the 
Corporate accounting instructions and 
[BUC16 antwoordend op een vraag naar 
activering van software ontwikkelings-
kosten] “Daar hebben we gewoon de 
richtlijn van Corporate gevolgd en tot op 
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reviewed the expenses by working our way 
through the invoices.”  
factuur niveau zijn hier de kosten 
doorgespit.”  
Second, routines were based on the experience within the business. Some BU controllers who 
had worked at a BU for several years referred to how they gradually improved the past situation 
and established a routine: 
[BUC15 about determining the balance 
sheet item ‘accrued income’] “Well, we did 
have a learning curve in that respect. Eh… 
initially, we’d been doing this for years, but 
initially we sometimes had it wrong. And 
then you refine the method, do things more 
in detail. Now we have a method of which I 
would say, I fully support it.”  
[BUC15 over het bepalen van de post ‘nog te 
factureren’] “Nou goed daar hebben we ook 
een leerperiode gekend. Eh... de eerste tijd, 
we doen dat al jaren maar in het begin zit je 
nog wel eens mis. En dan ga je de methode 
wat aanscherpen. Wat meer in detail doen. 
We hebben nu een methode waarvan ik 
zeg: nou daar durf ik mijn hand wel voor in 
het vuur te steken.” 
In some situations, it is not possible for the BU controllers to follow a routine. For example, 
when a BU is in a restructuring situation, the BU controller has to make estimates based on that 
specific situation. The BU controllers who discussed the accounting choices relating to the 
reporting items ‘restructuring provisions’ and ‘onerous contracts’ did not refer to routine 
processes since these reporting items relate to specific non-routine circumstances. The two 
accounting choices relating to ‘other receivables’ were also both not based on a routine 
process. They both related to the accounting for fees from agents, where it was not clear if the 
full amount could be collected. These fees were not part of the core-business and therefore 
determining the valuation of these receivables was not based on routine-procedures. Finally, 
the accounting choices discussed that related to intercompany were also both not based on 
routine procedures, because both related to transactions that were not recorded as 
intercompany transactions, and were solved pragmatically, thus deviating from standard 
procedures/routines. In their deliberations relating to accounting choices of all other reporting 
items, some BU controllers followed routines and others did not.  
The difference in patterns identified is further discussed in Section 5.3 ‘Controller style and 
other controller characteristics’. 
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5.2.4 Accounting choices incurred 
The actual accounting choices available to controllers are straightforward: either the controller 
does nothing or the controller makes an adjustment. The BU controller did nothing in 21 out of 
the 98 accounting choices discussed.  Most accounting choices where the BU controller decided 
to do nothing related to the reporting item ‘accruals’. BU controllers explained when discussing 
these choices, either that they had been considering the timing of the expenses/revenues or 
that they were pressured by others to change the timing, but that they decided not to adjust 
the amount. Other choices discussed during the interviews where BU controllers indicated that 
they had decided not to adjust the amounts mainly related to the valuation of assets and 
provisions. These involved routine process decisions such as the review of the provision for bad 
debts as well as case-specific situations. For example, one BU controller involved was asked by 
corporate finance staff to consider making a provision for onerous contracts but the BU 
controller decided that this was not applicable for this specific situation. 
Below is an interesting deliberation about a BU controller deciding whether to change the 
revenue recognition of a service or to follow the routine of previous years. Although the BU 
controller decided to consistently account for the revenues, following the method of previous 
years, he/she perceived this as earnings management:  
“And there I definitely chose to eh… I am 
convinced that there are two ways to look 
at it. And both methods can be justified. I 
can argue that I recognize them [revenues 
relating to services] directly when I receive 
them. I can also argue: I have a system that 
I have been using for years. I connect them 
with the main product and recognize it with 
the revenue recognition of that product. 
And that is 100% true. I consciously 
postponed it to next year because I did not 
want to have even more revenues in the 
last year. That is definitely an example of 
“En daar heb ik absoluut ervoor gekozen om 
de eh...Ik ben er van overtuigd dat er twee 
manieren zijn om er naar te kijken. En beide 
manieren zijn verdedigbaar. Ik kan stellen 
dat ik ze [omzet met betrekking tot 
diensten], op het moment dat ze 
binnenkomen als direct vrij te vallen 
beschouw. Ik kan ook zeggen: ik heb hier 
een systematiek die ik al jaren volg. Ik 
koppel ze aan het hoofdproduct en laat ze 
met het ritme van het hoofdproduct 
vrijvallen. En dat is 100% waar. Ik heb ze 
bewust doorgeschoven naar volgend jaar 
omdat ik niet nog meer omzet in het vorige 
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earnings management, I completely admit 
that.”   
wilde hebben. Dat is absoluut een 
voorbeeld van resultaatsturing dat geef ik 
helemaal toe.” 
Doing nothing therefore generally also involves an active choice, based on the deliberations of 
the BU controller. 













expense accrued 4 11 2   13 17 
expense prepaid 2 8     8 10 
income accrued 2 6 1   7 9 
income deferred 3 1 2   3 6 
suspense account 1       0 1 
Accrual 12 26 5 0 31 43 
financial fixed assets 1   1   1 2 
material fixed assets 2 1 7   8 10 
immaterial fixed assets     3   3 3 
fixed assets 3 1 11 0 12 15 
debtors provision 2   12   12 14 
receivables provision     2   2 2 
inventory provision 1   7   7 8 
work in progress     2   2 2 
onerous contracts provision 1   1   1 2 
other provision 1   5   5 6 
restructuring provision     2   2 2 
other assets & liabilities 5 0 31 0 31 36 
Classification 1     1 1 2 
Intercompany   1 1   2 2 
other    1 1 1 1 3 4 
Total 21 28 48 1 77 98 
Table 14 Summary of accounting choices 
After analyzing the adjustments, three types of adjustments were identified. These related to 
the timing of expenses and revenues, the valuation of assets and liabilities, and the 
classification of the amounts in the financial statement. 
The first category of adjustments identified relates to the timing of expenses and revenues. 
These accounting choices were mainly incurred for the reporting items ‘prepaid/accrued 
expenses and accrued/deferred income’. These reporting items are labeled in this study as 
‘accruals’. With respect to the timing decisions, different choice patterns emerged from the 
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interviews. Some controllers did not refer to timing decisions at all, whereas others seemed to 
carefully consider their timing of, for example, adjustments of estimates during the year, 
whereas others ‘take it as it comes’: 
[BUC11] “I’ll probably make that correction 
in July, than it doesn’t affect anyone.” 
[BUC3] “It was possible [to make the 
correction] in September/October. Then I 
consciously decided to wait until the year-
end, otherwise I’d keep on having to explain 
it in the monthly reports.” 
[BUC8] “Do we have to smooth this? I 
discussed the advantages and 
disadvantages; Business administrator X is a 
good sparring partner and Business 
administrator X also tells me about these 
issues and then, well… the principle is ‘we 
account for it’ and discuss afterwards. I find 
it really tricky to ‘keep things in the air’, and 
then suddenly a loss incurs or I’m afraid that 
I’ll forget.”  
[BUC11] “Die ga ik waarschijnlijk in juli 
corrigeren want dan heeft niemand er last 
van.” 
[BUC3] “Van september/oktober mogelijk 
[om de correctie te maken], toen heb ik het 
bewust niet gedaan en gewacht tot 
jaareinde, anders moet je het telkens 
uitleggen in je maandrapportage.” 
[BUC8] Moeten we dat gaan nivelleren? 
Voor en nadelen besproken, daar kan ik met 
Business administrator X goed over sparren 
en Business administrator X  informeert mij 
er ook over en dan goed… in principe is het 
altijd zo 'we nemen hem' later gaan we dan 
wel discussiëren. Dat vind ik zo link 'dan 
houd ik alles in de lucht' dan komt er een 
strop aan of ik vergeet het daar ben ik ook 
altijd bang voor.” 
This difference in behavior relating to the timing of expenses and revenues was also confirmed 
during the controllers’ group discussion, where it was illustrated by an example of an expense 
that was allocated to the wrong BU entity: 
[GDC6] “If I know for sure what it is and I 
can analyze what the impact is, then I 
account for it. However, if I’m not sure 
eh…then I just leave it. I had, for example 
that… that… BUx [of GDC2] suddenly 
charged various expenses to me, but I 
[GDC6] Als ik zeker weet wat het is en de 
impact kan ik gewoon exact beoordelen, 
dan boek ik dat gewoon. Maar inderdaad als 
ik nog niet zeker weet of het wel of niet he, 
dan laat ik het staan. Ik had bijvoorbeeld 
dat… dat…door BUx [van GDC2] “kreeg ik 
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wasn’t sure, so I just left it for that month. 
However, I did make a comment on it [in the 
management report]. I noted -  hey, in my 
opinion this isn’t right.” [GDC2] “My 
expenses were too low, so I accrued for it.” 
[researcher] “Do you think there are 
differences in behavior? I really had the 
feeling that there is controller behavior 
involved, but now you all seem to think 
about it in the same way.” [GDC2] “No, 
[points at GDC6] we do, for example, 
behave differently. [looks at GDC6] You 
accounted for it when it was incurred and I 
provided for it. Slightly conservative! So, 
indeed the amount of xxx euro was charged 
twice  in one month” [GDC6] “Yes.” 
ineens allerlei kosten naar mij 
toegeschoven, maar ik wist het niet zeker 
dus toen heb ik het die maand heb ik het 
laten staan. Maar dan zet ik wel een 
opmerking erbij. Van hee volgens mij hoort 
het hier niet.” [GDC2] “Ik had te weinig dus 
ik had het voorzien” [researcher] “Denk je 
dat daar nou gedrag in zit? Want ik had dus 
echt het gevoel dat er gedrag in controllers 
zit. Want nu lijken jullie allemaal op 
dezelfde lijn te zitten.”[GDC2] “Nee, [wijst 
naar GDC6] wij zitten bijvoorbeeld niet op 
dezelfde lijn. Jij nam het als het kwam en ik 
nam het in mijn kosten als voorziening. Wat 
voorzichtig van het zal wel komen. Dus toen 
hadden we inderdaad xxx euro 
dubbeltelling voor een maand.” [GDC6] 
“Ja.” 
The second category, valuation of assets and liabilities actually also includes timing decisions. 
For example, with respect to the fixed assets reporting items, BU controllers decide what to 
capitalize and they make a choice relating to the depreciation period of the item capitalized. 
This is either a routine decision based on the standard procedures and the available accounting 
instruction or it involves new items. In total six of the fifteen accounting choices relating to fixed 
assets involved decisions related to capitalizing assets, including determining periods of 
depreciaton. One of these six capitalization decisions involved the purchase of a completely 
new type of asset. This choice was not routine because, for accounting purposes, the BU 
controller could not refer to existing standards. The other capitalization choices were all 
routine. The other nine choices of the fifteen for the fixed assets reporting items involved other 
choices relating to the valuation. The accounting choices for the valuation of assets and 
liabilities category were mainly incurred for the fixed assets reporting items and the debtors, 
inventories/work in progress and provisions reporting items. These reporting items are labeled 
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in this research as ‘other assets and liabilities’. With respect to the valuation decisions, BU 
controllers explained how they decided on the best estimate for the valuation. Some BU 
controllers explicitly referred to considering a more or less conservative estimate. BUC13, who 
was newly appointed, was very conservative in the estimates. Asking BUC13 what his/her 
professional dilemmas were, the answer was as follows: 
[BUC13] “It’s more about -  what buffer do 
you want to retain. So last year, because I 
was new, I created a reasonable buffer, of 
course.” [researcher] “So your professional 
dilemma is: how conservative can you be?” 
[BUC13] Yes, and when I’m less familiar 
then I’m more conservative than when I’ve 
more feeling with the material. So I think 
I’m quite prudent in my estimates.” 
[BUC13] “Het is meer, hoeveel ruimte wil je 
erin houden. Dus ik heb vorig jaar, omdat ik 
er pas net zat best wel redelijk wat ruimte 
in gehouden natuurlijk.” [researcher] “Dus 
professioneel dilemma: hoe conservatief 
kun je zijn?” [BUC13] “Ja, en als ik er minder 
goed inzit dan ben ik conservatiever dan als 
ik er een beetje meer gevoel bij heb. Dus ik 
denk dat ik wel redelijk voorzichtig ben in 
schattingen.” 
Other BU controllers indicated that their estimates tended to be more conservative when the 
BU results were on or above target.  
The last category of adjustments relates to classification adjustments. Only one classification 
adjustment was discussed. One BU controller explained how he/she tried to influence the 
behavior of a sales manager by debiting revenues instead of debiting expenses in order to 
increase the provision for bad debts: 
“That was an item that should really have 
been charged as an expense to the 
provision for customer x. However, since 
our sales manager is focused on sales, I 
didn’t charge it to expenses but to 
revenue.” [researcher] “Oh yes, but we 
decided not to do that in the end, didn’t 
we?” [BUC] “Yes, I did account for it that 
way and it is still accounted for it in that 
“Dat was een post die eigenlijk een dotatie 
van de voorziening moest zijn voor klant x. 
Maar omdat onze sales manager op omzet 
stuurt, heb ik hem niet als kosten 
gedoteerd, maar als omzet.” [researcher] 
“O ja, dat hebben we uiteindelijk niet 
gedaan toch?” [BUC] “Jawel, dat heb ik wel 
gedaan, zo staat het nu nog steeds maar ik 
moet het in ieder geval voor oktober of 
 
 
98 Accounting Choices of Controllers 
way, but I had to do something before 
October. I have to see how I do that 
because I’d rather not have it in his P&L - 
because he is so focused on sales.” 
iets… moet ik het eh...Ik moet even kijken 
hoe ik dat doe, want ik wil eigenlijk niet dat 
hij het bij zijn P&L krijgt. Want hij is zo 
gefocust op omzet.“ 
As outlined in Section 2.1, this study focuses on accounting choices and not on other choices 
that affect earnings. During the interviews, however, some of these ‘other choices’ were 
referred to by the BU controllers. Although these choices are not included in the analysis of the 
98 accounting choices, it is interesting to reflect on the type of choices that were discussed. 
One BU controller explained that their business could have achieved more sales that year, but 
because they already were on target, they had decided to focus their attention on other 
activities: 
“With a little effort, we could have finished 
them [the projects] in December. But, 
because I had already met my target, we 
decided to focus on [other BU activities] and 
we finished these projects after the year-
end.” 
“Als je eventjes je best had gedaan had je 
ze in december nog kunnen nemen. Maar 
omdat ik eigenlijk mijn resultaat al behaald 
had hebben we de focus op de [andere BU 
activiteiten] gelegd en hebben we die 
projecten even over het jaar heen getild.” 
Another BU controller had been involved in changing the customer payment conditions and 
commented enthusiastically on the effect of the stricter payments conditions for calculating the 
provision for bad debts. With the new payment conditions, the valuation of the debtors 
outstanding can be determined more accurately: 
“I review the provision for bad debts once 
per quarter because we have half-yearly 
deliveries, so that’s not very frequent. From 
now onwards this will happen on a two 
monthly basis because we have changed 
the term to 60 days. So I can recalculate it 
more frequently, based on ageing. But until 
now, it’s really based on judgment: who’s 
doing well or not, because once a season 
“De voorziening debiteuren bekijk ik één 
keer in het kwartaal, omdat we halfjaarlijkse 
leveringen hebben dus het gaat niet heel 
snel. Vanaf nu zal het twee maandelijks 
gaan, omdat we de termijn op 60 dagen 
hebben staan. Dus kan ik hem veel vaker 
herijken op basis van ouderdom. Maar tot 
op heden is het echt op basis van judgment 
van wie staat er goed voor, slecht voor 
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‘it’s business’ ….The payment conditions 
used to be 180 days. Now you see…that’s 
quite cool, you don’t see it in the reports 
because we only report EBIT. The working 
capital decreased considerably because 
debtors were on average [amount] and 
they are now [amount]. So that’s really 
great. The provision we’ve accounted for 
now will also decrease, at the year-end it 
should be gone.” 
omdat het 1x per seizoen pas kassa is…De 
betalingstermijn was 180 dagen, maar je 
ziet nu. Dat is wel gaaf, dat zie je niet in de 
rapportage terug omdat we alleen maar 
EBIT rapporteren. Het werkkapitaal is echt 
navenant gedaald omdat de debiteuren 
waren gemiddeld [bedrag] en die staan nu 
op [bedrag]. Dus dat is hartstikke leuk. Maar 
die voorziening die er nu staat gaat dus ook 
aflopen, einde jaar moet ie ook weg zijn.” 
Moreover, some BU controllers supported businesses with foreign exchange exposure as a 
result of purchases of goods and services in other countries. There were corporate guidelines 
with respect to hedging these exposures. Two BU controllers commented on the constraint of 
the corporate guidelines, because competitors might not hedge their positions and might 
therefore be able to offer better selling prices. One controller noted that he/she had tried to 
make use of the flexibility that was still available to optimize the BU financial results: 
“BUCa [referring to another BU controller] 
gave an order: at the moment it [the dollar] 
hits 1.40 then you can buy. But Treasury 
said: But that’s not the way it works; that’s 
not in the corporate guidelines, because 
then you’re speculating. That is actually… 
but then again, if we don’t say anything and 
do nothing but just say, well today you can 
buy, then it’s OK. So that’s…that’svery 
difficult but that…and that’s of course what 
will always happen, is that we eh… will keep 
looking for the boundaries of flexibility, 
while corporate tells us: guys, the rules are: 
no foreign exchange exposure.”  
“Dat BUCa [refererend naar een andere BU 
controller] een opdracht neergelegd had 
van nou op het moment dat hij [de dollar] 
de 1.40 aantikt mag je van me kopen. Maar 
dat Treasury ook zegt: Maar dat is niet de 
afspraak. Dat past niet binnen protocol, 
want dan ben je aan het speculeren. Dat is 
eigenlijk wel... maar ja op het moment dat 
we het niet zeggen en niks doen en zeggen 
van: nou vandaag mag je kopen dan mag 
het wel. Dus dat is... dat is heel moeilijk 
maar dat… en dat is natuurlijk wat je altijd 
zult krijgen is dat wij eh… de grenzen van de 
flexibiliteit op zullen blijven zoeken terwijl 
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er van hogeraf gezegd wordt van jongens de 
regels zijn: geen valutarisico.” 
Finally, BU controllers also made choices relating to the operating systems. In a routine 
accounting choice process, BU controllers mostly relied on the operating systems and 
processes. But sometimes controllers indicated that they were not satisfied with the 
operational systems and information available. In these situations, different patterns of 
behavior emerged from the interviews. Some controllers accepted the shortcomings of the 
systems and the lower quality of the reported numbers. As outlined in Section 5.2.2, when 
performing the operational review activity, one controller stated that he/she accepted the 
effect of the operating system on the timing of revenue recognition throughout the year due to 
the limitations of the system. 
“It’s  a monstrous system. It does what it is 
supposed to do, but it’s extremely 
inflexible. And….well, all changes in that 
system are very difficult to make; it’s very 
rigid. And yes, it also causes a lot of 
problems in communicating with other 
systems. [continues about the 
shortcomings] However, there is no budget 
to replace the complete system. That will be 
a major investment, so we have to work 
with the available sources.” 
 
“Het is ook draak van systeem. Het doet wel 
wat het moet doen maar het is zo inflexibel 
als maar kan. Enne… ja alle veranderingen 
daarin zijn heel moeizaam tot stand te 
brengen. Het is heel star ingeregeld. En ja, 
het zorgt ook veel problemen in 
communicatie met andere systemen. [gaat 
door over tekortkomingen] Maar ja, er is 
ook geen budget om in een keer het hele 
systeem te vervangen. Dat gaat wel een 
hele grote investering worden, dus je moet 
een beetje roeien met de riemen die je 
hebt.” 
Another controller explained that revenue recognition relating to the work in progress of the 
BU should be critically reviewed and consequently the operating system changed, but that 
these adjustments were not planned because of the corporate decision to discontinue the BUs’ 
activities. 
“In principle we use a system, of course, 
that we’ve been using for years and years. 
“In principe gebruiken wij natuurlijk een 
systematiek die we al sinds jaar en dag 
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We only finish and account for it [the 
project] in the profit and loss when it  is 
completely finished. Possibly, if we weren’t 
in the situation of discontinuing this 
activity, you’d look more critically into it 
[continues about the system of revenue 
recognition]. If you would want to do that, 
then you also have to make technical 
system adjustments et cetera. So, in that 
respect I think we’re less critical than if we’d 
have continued the activities. Eh…so we’re 
continuing with the system that we’re using 
now.” 
 
eigenlijk op die manier zo gebruiken. We 
ronden pas af en boeken het pas in de 
exploitatie als het [project] helemaal is 
afgerond. Wellicht, als we niet in de situatie 
zouden zitten dat we stoppen met die 
activiteit, zou je daar wat kritischer naar 
kijken. [ gaat door over de systematiek] Als 
je dat zou willen doen dan moet je ook 
systeemtechnisch laten aanpassen enzo. 
Dus in die zin zijn we daar denk ik minder 
kritisch op dan als je er langer mee door zou 
gaan. Eh, dus die systematiek die we nu 
hanteren die houden we dan in stand.” 
Other controllers changed processes or intended to make improvements to the operational 
systems and processes: 
[BUC13] “Actually, I’d like to make the 
provision in a completely different way.” 
[explains how] [Researcher] “So you’re 
going to change it?” [BUC13] Yes, but I first 
have to get all the estimates. And anyway 
the estimates are not always of a good 
quality, and it’s not my departments job to 
do this. I have to encourage someone who 
is also a member of the MT [Management 
team] who has to record and gather that 
information.” 
[BUC13 discussing a correction as a result of 
making a process more transparent] “I 
don’t know why this hasn’t been done 
[BUC13] “Eigenlijk zou ik de voorziening 
heel anders willen vormen.” [legt uit hoe] 
[Researcher] “Dat ga je veranderen dan?” 
[BUC13] “Ja maar dan moet ik al die 
voorcalculatie informatie in een systeem 
krijgen. En sowieso zijn die voorcalculaties 
niet altijd even best gemaakt en het ligt niet 
bij mijn afdeling om dat te doen. Ik moet 
iemand aansporen die ook in het MT 
[Management Team] zit die die informatie 
moet vastleggen en verzamelen.”           
[BUC13 over een correctie gemaakt als 
gevolg van het transparant maken van het 
proces ] “Ik weet ook niet waarom dat niet 
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before. It’s a very complex process;  it’s very 
complicated how all these flows go. So no 
one wanted to get their hands burnt. But 
actually, if you go back to basics, it’s not all 
that difficult.”  
eerder is gedaan. Want het is een heel 
ingewikkeld proces, het is heel ingewikkeld 
hoe al die stromen lopen. Dus niemand 
durft zich daaraan te branden. Maar als je 
het heel plat slaat is het eigenlijk niet zo 
moeilijk.” 
Hence, during their accounting choice process, BU controllers also made other decisions that 
affected accounting choices, either directly or in the future. These choices were not only related 
to the timing/structuring of transactions (postponing the finalization of projects, the timing of 
hedging transactions) as referred to in Section 2.1. BU controllers also deliberated whether or 
not to change existing processes and/or operating systems, and initiated changes to the 
customer payment conditions. BU controller interventions therefore consist of various choices 
or actions, and a wide range of reasons were given for these choices and actions.  
5.2.5 Summary 
Based on the identified accounting choice categories of activities and the accounting choices 
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Other choices, initiate: 
Timing of sales 
Change operating system/ procedures 
Change customer payment conditions 
Hedging choices 
Controller deliberations 
Figure 6 The accounting choice process 
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The identified categories of activities within the accounting choice process are strongly 
interrelated, and are therefore grouped together in one cluster. Although there is a logical flow, 
this process is highly iterative. The controller deliberations play an important role in the 
accounting choice process. Sometimes, however, deliberations do not play a role because BU 
controllers make decisions on basis of rule based behavior. The controller deliberations follow 
different patterns. In some situations, a routine process was followed based on corporate 
instructions or a systematic approach based upon experience within the BU. In other situations, 
the approach was not routine because either the situation was incidental (such as restructuring) 
or the BU controller decided that a routine approach had to be changed (such as a new way to 
calculate the provision for obsolete inventory). 
The final accounting choices are straightforward: either the controller did nothing or the 
controller made an adjustment. The adjustments were categorized into two main categories: 
the timing of revenues/expenses and the valuation adjustments. Different patterns of choices 
were identified relating to the timing of revenues and expenses: where some controllers 
consider their timing carefully, others do not mention the phenomenon ‘timing’ and do not 
seem to identify this as a choice. In valuation choices, some BU controllers referred to 
considering more or less conservative choices whereas others did not refer to this as a choice or 
consideration. 
BU controllers also made other choices that affect the financial outcome immediately or in the 
future. BU controllers showed different behavior when they found that the operating systems 
or processes were not working satisfactorily. Some BU controllers seemed to accept the 
situation as it was, whereas others initiated changes in the systems or processes. Other BU 
controllers were actively involved in the timing of sales, changing customer payment conditions, 
and the timing of hedging transactions. 
The accounting choice process revealed different patterns of behavior between BU controllers. 
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5.3 CONTROLLER STYLE AND OTHER CONTROLLER RELATED FACTORS 
5.3.1 Controller style  
The BU controllers involved in this research showed different patterns of behavior relating to 
the timing of revenues and expenses. Also, some BU controllers seemed to identify more 
choices than others. After analyzing these patterns, different controller styles were identified. 
BU controllers have different approaches in analyzing the financial results: some talked in a 
terminology of presenting the ‘right’ financial results:  
[BUC2] “And a sense of fairness of a 
controller is also very important. In general, 
controllers have an important sense of 
fairness. That’s often the reason why they 
choose that direction: the numbers have to 
be right.” 
[BUC5] “I want to be able to understand 
everything. I don’t just do anything, I’m a 
perfectionist, everything has to be right.” 
[BUC2] “En het rechtvaardigheidsgevoel 
van de controller is ook belangrijk. Over het 
algemeen hebben controllers wel een groot 
gevoel voor rechtvaardigheid, dat is vaak 
een reden waarom ze die hoek ingegaan 
zijn, de cijfers moeten kloppen.” 
[BUC5] “Ik wil alles kunnen snappen. Ik doe 
niet zomaar iets en ik ben perfectionistisch 
alles moet kloppen.” 
Other BU controllers talked about ‘the game’, and were triggered by identifying the ‘grey areas’. 
[researcher about a change in the system 
for making an estimate] “You weren’t 
inclined to defer it to the next year?” 
[BUC3] “No, of course it also had to do 
with….we had a loss and this makes it still 
presentable. It’s also a sort of game.”  
[BUC16] “Yes, I want to have the financial 
accounting in order, but I’m especially 
triggered by our range of choices and also 
the game. From the half-year result 
onwards I’m busy with: where will we end 
up and why. What can we and can’t we 
influence, and do we want that….. it’s more 
[researcher over het veranderen van een 
schattingssystematiek] “Je wilde het niet 
over het jaar heen tillen?” [BUC3] “Nee, 
het heeft er natuurlijk ook mee te maken, 
we hadden een verlies en dit maakt het 
nog toonbaar. Het is ook een beetje een 
spel.” 
(BUC16) “Ja ik wil financial accounting op 
orde hebben, maar ik ben vooral wel 
getriggerd door de bewegingsruimte die 
we hebben en ook het spel, vanaf de 
halfjaarcijfers ben ik bezig: waar komen 
we op uit en waarom. ... Waar kun je nog 
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like, how do you keep your options open as 
long as possible until you have the total 
picture and can provide a consistent story 
how you get to that result.” 
wel en niet bijsturen en wil je dat…. Meer 
ja, wat hier geldt van hoe houd je zo lang 
mogelijk alles open totdat je een 
totaalplaatje hebt en een eenduidige 
verhaallijn erover heen kunt leggen op 
welk resultaat kom je uit.” 
One controller explained that this was also a learning process: when working as a business 
controller he/she realized that practical situations are not as black and white as represented in 
theory: 
[BUC9] “In my opinion, that’s what I 
learned: that from an accountancy and 
theoretical perspective everything is black 
and white. And then you’re involved in the 
business and then…and I also noted that in 
discussions with you that sometimes it is 
just grey.” 
[BUC9] “Dat vind ik wel dat ik geleerd heb. 
Dat vanuit de accountancy vanuit de theorie 
is alles heel zwart wit of kan alles heel zwart 
wit zijn. En dat je in de operatie zit, in de 
business en dat je dan inderdaad… en dat 
merk ik ook in discussies met jou ook dat het 
dan ook gewoon grijs is.” 
When the findings were presented in the BU controllers’ group discussion, the participants 
stated that they noted that there were different types of controllers within the organization; 
the more financial accounting-oriented and the more management-oriented controllers:  
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[GDC2] “These are I think, yes there are two 
extreme types. One is more of a 
bookkeeper and the other is more 
management, both advising and 
managing.”  
[GDC4] “But you have to make a difference 
– you actually said it yourself – between 
someone who is more into reporting, more 
financial accounting oriented; where the 
rules are very important and black and 
white. And someone, as you referred to 
yourself - someone in the business and 
where everything is not black and white, 
but whose focus is more on judgment.” 
[GDC2] “Dat zijn denk ik, ja je hebt twee 
extreme types. De een is heel erg 
boekhouder en de andere is echt meer van 
management, meedenken maar ook 
sturen.”  
[GDC4] “Maar dat je toch onderscheid kunt 
maken – je noemt het eigenlijk zelf al – 
tussen iemand die meer in de verslaggeving 
zit, financial gericht. Waar eigenlijk de 
regels toch wel heel belangrijk zijn en zwart 
witte en iemand wat je zelf zegt. Die in de 
business zit en waar het mijns inziens ook 
veel minder zwart wit is. Waar het veel 
meer aankomt op judgment.” 
The two types of controllers identified show different behavior when making their accounting 
choices; they have different control styles. These styles are hereafter labeled as the ‘financial 
accounting style’ and ‘management control style’.  
Controllers using the ‘management control style’ predominantly focused on the overall review, 
not only at the year-end but also at month ends. The accounting choice pattern of, where 
possible, smoothing the expenses and revenues, in order to present a consistent ‘overall 
picture’ fits with the management control style: 
[BUC17] “I dislike monthly results that… one 
month they go one way, then the next 
month they go the other; and we can’t 
explain it, because they’re caused by 
administrative issues. Well I dislike that. I 
want that, unless there really are special 
external circumstances… actually I just want 
to think every month: these are my results. 
They are either good or bad and have we 
[BUC17] “Ik heb een hekel aan 
maandresultaten die…De ene maand 
schieten ze links en dan rechts. Terwijl we 
het eigenlijk niet kunnen uitleggen, het 
eigenlijk administratieve dingetjes zijn. Nou 
daar heb ik een hekel aan. Ik wil dat, tenzij 
er echt sprake is van bijzondere 
omstandigheden van buiten. Ik wil eigenlijk 
gewoon iedere maand denk ik van: dit is 
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been able to manage to improve them or 
not.”  
         
mijn maandresultaat in de zin van: het is 
goed of slecht weer geweest, we hebben 
daar goed of slecht op kunnen bijsturen.” 
BU controllers with the ‘financial accounting style’ on the other hand present the expenses and 
revenues ‘as they come’ and did not refer to considerations of timing of revenues/expenses: 
[BUC7 answering the question of specific 
accounting choices at year end]  “Actually 
there are no choices, no.” [Researcher] 
“Just the accrued expenses I assume?” 
[BUC7] “Well, we analyze that every month. 
The accrued expenses, we just account for 
them every month. That’s simply… a matter 
of experience and analysis.” [Researcher] 
“That’s also quite straightforward?” [BUC7] 
“Yes, we’re never far off.” 
[BUC7 antwoordend op de vraag naar 
specifieke accounting keuzes per jaareinde] 
“Die zijn er eigenlijk niet, nee.” [Researcher] 
“Alleen je nog te betalen kosten denk ik?” 
[BUC7] “Ja…maar die bekijken we elke 
maand. De te betalen posten, die boeken 
we gewoon elke maand. Dat is 
gewoon…een stukje ervaring en 
cijferbeoordeling.”[ Researcher] “Dat is vrij 
hard ook?” [BUC7] “Ja, we zitten er nooit 
veel naast nee.” 
5.3.2 Technical financial accounting knowledge and interpretation of rules 
Apart from the different styles,  the technical accounting knowledge of BU controllers also 
impacts the accounting decisions. Some controllers commented on the knowledge of or the 
decisions made by their peer controllers:  
[BUC7] “I spoke to BUCx a few times on the 
phone and then I think: BUCx can’t be a 
bookkeeper, because eh…BUx talks about a 
provision but then I ask what about the 
profit and loss? Well I don’t really dare  say 
it out loud, but in my opinion BUCx doesn’t 
understand it. And I miss that.” 
[researcher] “Did you talk it over with 
BUCy?” [BUC13] “No, BUCy has a system ... 
[BUC7] “Ik heb BUx nu een paar keer aan de 
telefoon gehad en ik denk dan: BUX is geen 
boekhouder want eh BUx heeft het over 
voorziening, maar ik zeg hoe zit het met het 
resultaat. Nou ik durf het niet hardop the 
zeggen maar volgens mij snapt BUx het niet. 
Nee en dat mis ik wel.” 
[Researcher] “Heb je dat met BUCy 
overlegd?” BUC13 “Nee, BUCy heeft als 
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that’s not right. I know it’s not right, so I 
corrected it. It’s accounted for as prepaid 
expenses. BUCy accounts for it on the basis 
of purchase commitment. But that’s going 
to change now.” 
systematiek... maar dat is niet juist. Ik weet 
dat het niet juist is, dus heb ik het eruit 
geboekt. Het staat bij vooruitbetaalde 
kosten gewoon. BUCy boekt het op basis 
van verplichting. Nu gaat het anders 
worden.” 
Other controllers indicated that they feel that they have to update their knowledge: 
[BUC10] “Sometimes I think I should brush 
up my knowledge in that area.”  
[BUC4] “I do notice when I talk to you or 
other people of the department [Reporting] 
that maybe, sometimes, without realizing 
it, I don’t do things completely correctly. 
Everything changes so quickly.”              xxxx 
[BUC6] “I have very nice people in my 
department, but I can’t discuss complicated 
accounting issues with them. I need these 
people - don’t misunderstand me - but I 
can’t….and I’d like to do so.” 
[BUC10] “Soms denk ik wel eens, ik zou op 
dat gebied wel wat moeten bijspijkeren.” 
[BUC4] “Ik merk wel dat als ik dingen met 
jou of andere mensen van afdeling 
[Reporting] dat ik soms misschien dingen 
niet goed doe zonder dat ik het weet. Het 
gaat zo snel allemaal.” 
[BUC6] “Ik heb hele aardige mensen op de 
afdeling zitten maar daar kan ik geen zware 
vakinhoudelijke discussie mee voeren… En 
ik heb die mensen nodig - begrijp me niet 
verkeerd - maar daar kan ik niet... en daar 
heb ik wel behoefte aan.” 
Because of a lack of technical accounting knowledge, controllers sometimes may think they 
have an accounting choice relating to the smoothing of expenses, whereas they actually do not 
have a choice. Two of the accounting choices discussed by controllers were actually not a choice 
when following GAAP. One of these choices related to recognition of discount for rental 
expenses which was recognized when received, whereas according to GAAP this should be 
spread over the contract period. The other choice related to making an accrual for project costs; 
instead of making an accrual, these costs should have been accounted for in the year of 
disbursement being the period when the services were rendered for this project. When 
following the accounting standards, expenses have to be accounted for when the services or 
goods are delivered. This is mostly very straightforward and does not involve an accounting 
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choice. On the other hand, financial accounting knowledge combined with previous experience 
also sometimes leads to rule based behavior where BU controllers automatically make 
accounting choices, whereas they may have an option to make another choice. In Section 5.2.3, 
an example was provided relating to the capitalization choice made by a BU controller. The 
researcher expected that controllers with an auditing background or another strong financial 
accounting background would identify more accounting decisions. This did, however, not 
emerge from the interviews, probably due to the rule based behavior relating to accounting 
decisions. The BU deliberation in Section 5.2.3 relating to capitalizing expenses without even 
thinking about it, based on past experience, is an illustration of this rule based behavior. 
Apart from financial knowledge, an important factor in making accounting decisions is the 
interpretation of the accounting rules: 
[BUC2] “Then I try to follow the accounting 
rules. Sometimes the rule is not clear 
enough and then you have to judge what it 
is; if it lasts for several years,  then it should 
be capitalized. But if you consider the 
character of the item, then if it’s not 
something that lasts for several years, you 
have to expense it. These type of 
deliberations, they’re not so much earnings 
management but more an interpretation of 
rules.” 
[BUC2] “Dan probeer ik wel zoveel mogelijk 
aan te sluiten bij de accounting rules. Soms 
is die regel niet duidelijk genoeg dan moet 
je inschatten wat het is, is het iets wat 
meerdere jaren meegaat. Dan zou het qua 
bedrag geactiveerd moeten worden, maar 
als je de aard van de post ziet dan is het 
geen bedrag waar we langer dan een jaar 
plezier van hebben dus in de kosten boeken. 
Dat soort afwegingen, veel minder resultaat 
beïnvloeding. Meer interpretatie van de 
rules.” 
There is not always a straightforward answer, and the interpretation of the accounting 
standards can sometime lead to interesting and dynamic discussions among professionals. One 
interviewee referred to an internal discussion about whether or not a provision should be made 
in a specific situation and states: 
“There were eh…. internal and external 
differences in opinion about accounting for 
something or not. Internally, some pressure 
“Dat er eh… intern en extern verschillen in 
mening bestonden of je iets wel of niet kon 
opnemen. Waarbij er intern veel krachten 
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was on eh… accounting for it, and others 
strongly emphasized that it should not be 
accounted for.” [researcher] “There were 
different ‘camps’ weren’t there?” 
[interviewee] “Yes there really were 
different ‘camps’.”  
waren om eh... het wel op te nemen en ook 
wel flinke tegen.” [Researcher] “Daar had je 
echt verschillende ‘kampen’ he?” 
[geïnterviewde] “Ja daar had je echt 
verschillende kampen.” 
When it comes to the final decision relating to the interpretation of the accounting rules, the 
auditor was the decisive factor. The difference in interpretation of rules among professionals 
was also expressed in another interview. This interviewee referred to the same discussion (as 
above) and stated that, although he/she accepted the final outcome, he/she did not agree 
with the auditor.  
Due to these differences in controller styles, technical financial accounting knowledge and the 
differences in interpretation of the accounting rules, BU controllers make different choices. 
This was nicely illustrated in the corporate staff group discussion when the researcher 
explained that some BU controllers carefully planned the timing of the accounting for the 
expenses. One corporate staff participant found this surprising: 
[GDS1] “Well I think that’s quite interesting. 
The way I think about it, is that these type 
of choices should be more black or white.”  
[GDS1] “Ja ik vind het enigszins opvallend, 
als ik hem op mezelf zou projecteren dan 
zou dit weer een van die dingen zijn die juist 
nu weer wat zwarter of witter is.” 
BU controllers thus set different boundaries: what is ‘black and white’ for some, is a ‘grey area’ 
for others. 
5.3.3 Other controller characteristics 
Another characteristic specifically mentioned by some controllers during their interviews, was 
their prudent approach in making accounting choices, i.e. the direction of their accounting 
choices was conservative. Their underlying characteristic is a risk-adverse attitude. In the group 
discussion, controllers agreed that they were, in general, risk-adverse. The individual interviews 
indicated, however that there are differences between them:  
[BUC6] “Look at the moment that I eh… the 
prudence principle we were just discussing, 
[BUC6] “Kijk op het moment dat ik eh… het 
voorzichtigheidsprincipe waar we het al 
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can result in a completely different 
estimate because of different personal 
characteristics I think. Yes, and I think that I 
eh… might be slightly more prudent in that 
respect. I prefer not to be too aggressive in 
my accounting choices. So that will certainly 
be reflected in the estimates.” 
[BUC14 talking about a provision] 
“Certainly, in that case judgment is 
involved. And, if you are more 
opportunistic, then you make a higher 
estimate.” [researcher] “Being risk-
adverse.” [BUC14] “Yes, exactly.” 
[researcher] “Are you risk adverse?” 
[BUC14] “Hmm, I do take risks but I think it’s 
important to ensure that the incentives are 
right to optimize management, which in 
turn gets the best out of your people.” 
over hadden, dat kan door een verschillend 
karakter een heel andere inschatting 
opleveren denk ik. Ja, en ik denk dat ik eh… 
daar misschien nog voorzichtiger in ben. Ik 
ga het liefst niet op het scherpst van de 
snede daarin zitten, Dus dat zal zeker zijn 
weerslag hebben op inschattingen.” 
[BUC14 over een voorziening] “Ja zeker, in 
dat geval wel omdat er een stuk judgment 
in zit, absoluut. En als je dan wat 
opportunistischer bent dan zet je hem wat 
hoger neer.” [researcher] “Risicomijdend?” 
[BUC14] “Ja precies.” [researcher] “Ben jij 
risico mijdend?” [BUC14] “Hmm ik neem 
wel risico, maar ik vind met name dat je de 
goede incentives neer moet leggen om de 
besturing zo goed mogelijk te hebben om 
de performance goed wordt van de 
mensen.” 
It should be noted that, as outlined in Section 5.2.4., a prudent approach can also be caused by 
the fact that a controller is new to the business. 
Another element that emerged from the interviews is labeled in this research as ‘a critical 
attitude’. One controller specifically referred to being BU oriented, sometimes possibly at the 
expense of his/her critical attitude. Other interviewees mentioned in their interview that they 
wanted to understand everything, and it bothered them if this was not the case: 
[BUC10] “I think, if you consider that a 
controller on the one hand has to support 
his customers and on the other he has to be 
sufficiently critical. If I really look at myself 
critically, then I think that this side [support 
[BUC10] “Ik denk dat als je ziet, een 
controller moet aan de ene kant zijn klanten 
ondersteunen in het besturen en aan de 
andere kant moet hij genoeg kritisch zijn. 
Als ik dan heel kritisch op mezelf ben denk 
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customers] sometimes is more important to 
me than the other side. So, I am very 
much….involved in pleasing my customers.”  
 
[BUC17] “I feel that I always have to be able 
to understand it and be able to defend why 
I did something. It has to be right.” 
[BUC7 about corporate staff wanting BUC7 
to make an adjustment] “I don’t have it …it 
was in my numbers and I said,  I’m not going 
to do  anything with it. It annoys me if I 
don’t understand it and if I can’t explain the 
message.” 
ik dat deze kant [ondersteunen van klanten] 
wel eens wat zwaarder weegt dan die kant. 
Dus ik ben wel heel erg zo van ik maak het 
mijn klanten naar de zin.” 
[BUC17] “Ik vind dat ik het altijd moet 
kunnen begrijpen en verdedigen waarom ik 
iets heb gedaan. Het moet wel kloppen.” 
[BUC7 over een correctie te maken in 
opdracht van corporate staf] “Ik heb het 
niet….het zat in mijn resultaat. Ik heb 
gezegd 'ik doe er niks mee’. Het stoort me 
dat ik dat niet begrijp en dat ik de 
boodschap hier ook niet kan overbrengen.” 
Another BU controller referred to a critical attitude when applying the accounting rules: 
[BUC9] “That’s something I notice within 
the organization, that there are not many 
people who are as strict as I am.” 
[BUC9] “Dat merk ik wel binnen de 
organisatie dat er niet zoveel mensen zijn 
die er zo strak op sturen als ik.” 
This critical attitude establishes the boundaries within which ‘the game is to be played’. A 
critical attitude also affects the quality of the estimates; see Section 5.2.2 where controllers 
discussed how they reviewed business cases and the input provided by operational 
management. 
5.3.4 Summary 
The interviews revealed a number of controller characteristics that impact the accounting 
choices incurred. Based on the analysis of the controller characteristics, two controller styles 
were identified: a financial accounting style and a management control style. These styles lead 
to different accounting choices. Controllers using a management control style are focused on 
the overall view, they want to ‘tell a story’ and are more inclined to smooth expenses and 
revenues and use the estimates and judgment in order to provide a consistent presentation of 
the BU results. Some of these controllers also consider the impact on the behavior within the 
business as a result of their accounting choices in their decision process. Controllers using a 
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management control style seem to be more likely to identify so-called ‘grey area’s’ in the 
accounting rules than controllers using a financial accounting style. The latter are more focused 
on the financial accounting aspects and apply them in a straightforward way taking 
expenses/revenues ‘as they come’ and trying to use the best estimate for a provision without 
considering a possible more or less conservative estimate. 
Apart from the above-mentioned styles, the financial accounting knowledge of controllers also 
varied. This also influenced accounting decisions. Financial accounting knowledge was expected 
to lead to recognizing accounting choices and identifying a grey area. This did not emerge from 
the interviews. It was identified that financial accounting knowledge combined with previous 
experience sometimes led to routine-behavior, and therefore had an opposite effect: being less 
open-minded to recognizing accounting choices. 
Other differences between controllers identified were ‘risk attitude’ and ‘critical attitude’. A 
more risk adverse attitude leads to more conservative accounting choices and estimates. Being 
new to the business can, however, have the same effect. A controller with a critical attitude is 
more likely to critically review business estimates and to have a proactive approach in dealing 
with signaled operational processes and systems problems that affect the quality of the 
information to be used for accounting choices. The combination of the various characteristics 
result in defining different boundaries which led to different accounting choices.  
Although the BU controller ultimately makes the accounting choice, there are also other actors 
involved in the accounting choice process. In the next section, the actors involved and their 
characteristics are discussed, as well as other factors influencing the accounting choices. 
5.4 ACTORS AND FACTORS INFLUENCING ACCOUNTING CHOICES  
5.4.1 Actors in the general setting 
The BU controllers interviewed all worked in a specific setting which influenced both the 
accounting choices available and  the accounting choice process. This setting was partly the 
same for all the BU controllers and partly BU specific. In Section 5.1.1., the different external 
stakeholders were identified for the association’s different types of activities, the insurance 
activities, and the other commercial activities. Due to these different stakeholders, the 
dynamics of the BUs involved in these different types of activities are completely different. The 
BU involved in the activities of the association focuses on making sure that the agreed upon 
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activities are performed and that the allocated budget is spent on those activities. BUs involved 
in insurance activities are subject to additional regulation for financial institutions with a strong 
focus on solvency. Some controllers reflected during the individual interviews on the 
implication for accounting choices of these differences in dynamics between the business units: 
[BUC8] “Because, from the perspective of 
the association, you have to establish a 
certain social… well, an association is 
different from a commercial entity. For 
commercial entities, the bottom line has to 
be a profit and a ROS [return on sales].”  
[BUC4] “So, really it’s ‘not done’ for BUx 
[association activities] to spend too little. I 
think therefore that there’ll be an 
inclination to accelerate expense 
recognition of projects.” 
[BUC12] “And then, there is of course the 
discussion between entity A [insurance 
activities] and entity B [other commercial 
activities]. Entity A wants to have a 
prudent provision, whereas entity B wants 
to show a financial result that 
approximates as best as possible the 
commercial reality. Of course that’s quite 
a difference.” 
[BUC8] “Want vanuit de vereniging moet je 
een bepaald sociaal… nou ja een vereniging 
is anders dan een commercieel bedrijf. Bij 
de business moet er gewoon winst en een 
ROS [return on sales] onder aan de streep 
staan.” 
[BUC4] “Het is dus eigenlijk 'not done' voor 
BUx [verenigingsactiviteiten] om te weinig 
uit te geven. Daardoor denk ik dat je dan 
toch sneller kiest om een project maar in de 
kosten te nemen.” 
[BUC12] “En dan is er natuurlijk ook nog een 
discussie tussen entiteit A [verzekering] en 
entiteit B [commercieel]. A wil natuurlijk wel 
een prudente voorziening hebben. En het 
resultaat dat je in B wilt laten zien, wil je 
eigenlijk bedrijfseconomisch commercieel 
zo dicht mogelijk bij de waarheid hebben. 
Daar zit natuurlijk nogal een verschil.” 
These stakeholders therefore influence the accounting choices relating to the timing of the 
expenses (making sure the allocated budget is used for association activities) and the direction 
of the estimates of provisions (for insurance activities more prudent than for commercial 
activities). 
In Section 5.1, the dominant logics within the organization were also described, outlining the BU 
orientation of the controllers and the perceived freedom of accounting choices. One of the 
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standard questions asked in the interviews was: “What is, in your opinion, the attitude of top 
management relating to accounting choices?” The main recurring answer to this question was 
that there was little involvement in accounting choices from the top, and that BU controllers 
perceived freedom in accounting choices due to an absence of detailed accounting guidelines as 
discussed in Section 5.1. If BU controllers hesitated about any technical financial accounting 
aspects, they consulted the corporate external reporting department (in the quotes referred to 
as ‘Reporting’) for specific accounting choices: 
[BUC8] “Well, I discussed this with 
Reporting. Expenses [Depreciation] had to  
be continued for a number of years; this 
period was longer than the rental period. 
Well, then we decided to do a sort artificial 
depreciation [change of estimated 
depreciation period].”  
[BUC13] “Yes, I always try to ask Reporting 
for advice. Like that time involving 
revenues. I knew it wasn’t ‘right’, so to 
speak. Then I do want to check eh… if I can 
or cannot eh... and then I want Reporting to 
know how I accounted for it.” 
[BUC8] “Nou goed, Ik heb daar discussie 
met Reporting over gehad. De kosten 
[afschrijvingen] liepen nog jaren door, 
langer dan de termijn dan we dat hebben 
gehuurd. Toen dat besluit genomen was, 
toen hebben we een soort kunstmatige 
afschrijving [schattingswijziging] gedaan.” 
[BUC13] “Ja ik probeer Reporting altijd wel 
te consulteren. Zoals toen met die omzet. Ik 
wist wel dat het niet goed was. Zeg maar, 
maar dan wil ik het wel even checken van 
eh… dat ik het wel of niet eh... en dan wil ik 
wel dat Reporting weet hoe ik dat heb 
gedaan.” 
BU controllers also did not perceive much influence from the auditors on their accounting 
choices. During the individual interviews with the BU controllers, none of the interviewees 
referred to the auditor when they were asked the standard question: “Can you tell me 
something about the persons that influence your financial reporting choices?” If the researcher 
asked further, by asking why they did not mention the auditor, the interviewees commented 
that the auditor did not affect their accounting choices and that they were hardly ever 
contacted by the auditor. Some of the interviewees expressed their surprise at this lack of 
contact, and others explained that the frequency and intensity of their contact with the auditor 
had been decreasing over time. However, close contact with auditors for material and 
incidental accounting choices were an exception to this tendency. When discussing the choices 
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relating to restructuring provisions, provisions for onerous contracts, and pension provisions, 
interviewees referred to an active involvement of the auditor in the decision-making process. 
These choices were documented by BU controllers in an accounting memorandum and were 
reviewed by the corporate external reporting department and by group control, and were 
authorized by the CFO/board of directors: 
[BUC9 relating to a decision to capitalize] 
“So, yes we do look into that. Within the 
boundaries. A [accounting] memorandum is 
prepared. You can do this or that, and these 
are the consequences.” 
[BUC14 relating to a business case] “Eh… I 
generally ask Group Control to check it. 
They evaluate the set-up, then I have it 
checked for technical accounting issues and 
then to the CFO for decision-making by the 
board of directors.” 
[BU9 over een activeringsbeslissing] “Dus ja, 
daar wordt wel degelijk naar gekeken. 
Binnen de grenzen Ja, maar daar wordt dan 
ook een memo over geschreven. Je kan dit 
of dit en dan is dit de consequentie.” 
[BUC14] “Eh... wat ik meestal doe is stukje 
toetsing door GC. Die kijkt mee hoe ik hem 
opgebouwd heb, laat hem toetsen 
vaktechnisch en dan naar CFO voor 
besluitvorming vanuit directie.” 
Sometimes ‘triggering events’ were identified by a Finance superior and the BU controller was 
asked to document possible accounting choices. This was, for example, the case for one 
organizational unit where a restructuring was going to take place which had, at the time of 
preparing the annual report, not been communicated. The controller was asked to think about 
the financial consequences and possible accounting choices given that situation. The 
controller’s hierarchical finance manager explains: 
“Well we tried to find the optimum of – how 
should I put this… what we actually wanted, 
to be honest, what we actually wanted was 
to make a provision for the fact that we 
knew that an important part of the work 
force was going to be made redundant. It 
had not been communicated at an 
individual level and the accounting 
“Nou ja, wij hebben daar gezocht naar het 
optimum van, hoe zal ik het zeggen… wat 
we eigenlijk wilden, in alle eerlijkheid, wat 
we eigenlijk wilden was een voorziening 
treffen voor het feit dat we wisten dat een 
belangrijk deel van het personeel ging 
afvloeien. Het was nog niet op naamsniveau 
was het bekend en dat schrijft de 
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standards indicate that, in that case, you 
are not allowed to make a provision. Well I 
find that very frustrating, that’s the way I 
feel about it. In the end, we opted for items 
that could be provided for.” 
regelgeving voor dat je er geen voorziening 
voor mag opnemen. Nou, ik vind dat heel 
frustrerend, zo zit ik daar dan in. Uiteindelijk 
is er voor gekozen, wat mag je wel 
voorzien.” 
The CFO/board of directors, the auditor and finance superiors influenced accounting choices 
that were considered important for corporate purposes. The choices discussed all related to 
material amounts and incidental situations.  
5.4.2 Actors in the BU setting 
As outlined in Chapter 5.1, BU controllers have a hierarchical relation with their Finance 
superior and a functional relation with the BU manager. Due to the business orientation, the 
relation between the BU manager and the BU controller is very important. The interviews 
revealed that some BU Managers were more involved in the financial process than others. This 
difference was very clear in the way BUC9 and BUC4 talked about ‘their’ BU manager: 
[BUC9] “Yes, if it isn’t clear, then BU 
manager will say, This can’t be right. Or eh… 
- BUC9, now you’re wrong. And then I’d say, 
these are the numbers and this is how I 
calculated them. And then we actually 
always agree in the end, or I may have made 
an error in my calculations.”  
[BUC4] “In principle, the BU manager trusts 
me to manage all the financial matters. I 
report to the BU manager on how we are 
doing and what choices we might have to 
make. However, that is something the BU 
manager completely entrusts me with”.  
[BUC9] “Ja, als er dan onduidelijkheid is dan 
zegt BUM: dit kan echt niet kloppen. Of 
eh…: BUC9 nu zit je verkeerd. En dan zeg ik: 
Dit zijn de getallen en zo kom ik eraan. En 
dan komen we er eigenlijk ook altijd wel. Of 
het kan zo zijn dat ik een fout heb gemaakt 
in mijn berekening.” 
[BUC4) “In principe vertrouwt - BU manager 
- aan mij toe dat ik dat hele financiële stuk 
beheer. Ik zal BU Manager rapporteren hoe 
we er voor staan en welke keuzes we 
wellicht moeten maken. Maar dat is wel iets 
wat BU Manager volledig aan mij 
toevertrouwt.” 
If BU Managers have little affinity with (financial) information processes, then this also affects 
controllers because they have to exert more effort in explaining the financial consequences of 
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business decisions and the financial result developments of the business. On the other hand, 
managers with an affinity for finance, have a critical attitude and challenge the controller. One 
BU controller, who worked for various BU managers, reflected on the difference between BU 
managers: 
“I think someone like BU Manager A…. 
Some financial background is a minimal 
requirement for someone at a certain level. 
BU Manager A might be an extreme, 
calculating cost prices him/herself. 
Someone who does have some affinity is for 
example BU Manager B; both operational 
and financial. It enables you to make 
quicker decisions. At BUx we still have to fill 
in a target. I think that those decisions 
would have been taken months ago at BU 
A.” 
“Ik vind zo iemand als BU Manager A… Een 
beetje financiële achtergrond is toch wel 
een minimale vereiste voor iemand op een 
bepaald niveau. Misschien is BU Manager A 
dan weer uiterste, zelf kostprijs berekenen. 
Maar iemand die wel een beetje affiniteit 
daarmee heeft is bijvoorbeeld BU Manager 
B. Zowel operationeel als financieel. Je kunt 
dan sneller besluiten nemen. We moeten bij 
BUx nog steeds een target invullen. Die 
besluiten hadden we denk ik bij BU A 
maanden geleden al genomen.” 
BU controllers also refer to their business administrator/reporter as being a valuable sparring 
partner: 
[BUC3] “So if I myself … if I realize I’m  
getting involved in a conflict situation or I 
have to finally discuss it with my director,  
then indeed I first consult Administrator A.” 
 
[BUC16] “Let me phrase it like this. Because 
I know that Administrator/reporter B has a 
relatively good financial accounting/ 
accountancy background and tries to be 
very straightforward, then I try to challenge 
this to see: how far can we stretch this.” 
[BUC3] “Dus als ik dan zelf....ik zie, ik kom in 
een conflictsituatie, of ik moet het met 
uiteindelijk met mijn directeur bespreken 
dan neem ik dat eerst wel met 
Administrator A door ja.”  
 [BUC16] “Laat ik het zo zeggen. Omdat ik 
weet dat Administrator/reporter B een 
redelijk financial accounting/ accountancy 
achtergrond heeft en redelijk recht in lijnen 
probeert te zitten, probeer ik toch wel uit te 
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Not all BU controllers and BUs were supported by a business administrator. Not having a BU 
administrator implies that the BU controller has to spend more time on administrative tasks and 
has less time for overall analysis and review. Two BU controllers who both did not have a 
business administrator referred to the tension between administrative tasks and control: 
[BUC6] “In my opinion, there’s a lot of 
tension between accounting and 
controlling. Because accounting has to be 
done, so that involves a lot of time.” 
[BUC5] “Now and again, I think I’m too 
involved in bookkeeping, processing all the 
journal entries and making sure the 
financial report is finished. And I would like 
to focus more on controlling. I have too 
little time available and I sometimes regret 
that.” 
[BUC6] “ Ik vind dat er heel veel spanning 
staat op accounting versus controlling. He, 
want accounting moet door. Dus daar gaat 
heel veel tijd in zitten.” 
[BUC5] “Af en toe vind ikzelf dat ik teveel 
bezig ben met boekhouding bezig ben, dus 
het inboeken van alles en zorgen dat de 
rapportage er ligt en zelf af en toe iets meer 
richting de controlling kant wil, daar heb ik 
gewoon te weinig tijd voor en dat vind ik wel 
eens jammer.” 
Finally, other operational managers or employees in the business were also referred to by BU 
controllers when discussing their accounting choices; for example, when deciding that accruals 
were complete and when discussing provisions. It was interesting to note that only a small 
group of Controllers mentioned their peer controllers as a sparring partner. These controllers 
belonged to the same division and supported comparable businesses. The variety of types of 
businesses within the organization probably explains the lack of other controllers being involved 
in ‘peer consulting’. 
Apart from actors influencing the accounting choices, other factors had an impact on the 
accounting choices. These factors are discussed in Section 5.4.3. 
5.4.3 Factors influencing accounting choices 
The factors influencing the accounting choices can be classified into four categories. First, the 
corporate control factors which relate to the planning and control procedures. Second, the 
business factors which relate to the BU size, activities and the operating systems and processes. 
Third, the situational factors such as restructuring activities. Finally, the external reporting 
standards and changes therein.  
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 Corporate control factors 
In Section 5.1, the planning and control procedures within the organization were described. The 
extent to which the organization provides corporate accounting instructions affects the 
accounting choices available to the BU controller; the less detailed the instructions, the more 
choices available to the BU controller. The perceived freedom of accounting choices as outlined 
above was in contrast with the strict planning and control deadlines. Some controllers 
perceived the planning and control reporting deadlines to be very tight, and remarked that this 
impacts the quality of reporting: 
[BUC2] “Yes, well I specifically  mentioned 
the tight reporting deadlines. To me that’s 
at the expense of accuracy and I don’t see 
what objective can be achieved. Extend it 
with one week, and then everyone has the 
numbers available and under control.” 
[BUC6] “We can also report before 
Christmas. But when it comes to judgments, 
these become more and more inaccurate.”  
 
[BUC16] “Yes, but again it all has to do, 
when preparing the annual accounts, it all 
has to do with the financial result. So how 
long do you wait to ‘close the books’ in 
order to take events after balance sheet 
date into consideration or not.” 
[BUC2] “Ja, nou ik heb met name genoemd, 
de snelheid van rapporteren. Wat voor mij 
ten koste gaat van de zorgvuldigheid en het 
doel dat je ermee wilt bereiken zie ik niet zo. 
Rek het een week op en dan heeft iedereen 
zijn cijfers tijdig op orde.” 
[BUC6] “Wij kunnen ook voor Kerst 
rapporteren. Alleen als het over 
inschattingen gaat, die worden steeds 
onnauwkeuriger.” 
[BUC16] “Ja maar dat is ook weer, het heeft 
allemaal, rondom de jaarrekening heeft het 
allemaal te maken met resultaat. Dus hoe 
lang wacht je bijvoorbeeld met afsluiten van 
je jaarrekening zodat je wel of niet nog 
bepaalde events na balansdatum kunt 
meenemen of niet.” 
It should be noted that in the BU controllers’ group discussion, the tight deadlines themselves 
were not thought to be problematic, but rather the combination of tight deadlines and a lack of 
administrative support. Also, tight deadlines in combination with operating systems and 
processes that do not function properly were considered to cause problems for reporting 
quality. One controller explained that, due to time constraints, at the month-ends the results 
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were not subject to an in-depth preliminary discussion with BU Manager before the closing of 
the books:  
[Researcher referring to accounting choices 
relating to an accrual] “Do you discuss this 
with BU Manager X, these additional 
journal entries?” [BUC9] “No, that is 
something which is done at year-end, but 
eh….throughout the year, operationally it is 
just difficult to find the time. So then 
mostly, then I have the journal entries 
processed and then I discuss the results 
with BU Manager X. Then he/she says: This 
is right, this is not right. And if it is not right 
then I mention it in my monthly report, like 
‘this has to be looked into’. Then, indeed I 
do that the next month. At quarter-end, we 
tend sometimes to do it earlier. Ideally, it 
should be done every month, but that’s 
operational….no.” 
[Researcher met betrekking tot een 
overlopende post]. “Deze info spreek je met 
BU Manager X door voor de laatste 
boekingen? [BUC9] Nee dat is iets wat per 
jaareinde wel gebeurt, maar eh... 
gedurende het jaar is dat operationeel 
gewoon moeilijk de tijd voor. Dus dan is het 
meestal, dan heb ik de boekingen gedaan en 
dan is het dat ik met BU Manager X cijfers 
bespreek. Dan zegt zij/hij dit klopt wel, dit 
klopt niet. En als het niet klopt dan neem ik 
het op in mijn maandrapportage zo van, dit 
moet nog verder uitgezocht worden. Dat 
doe je dan dus inderdaad de maand daarna. 
Bij het kwartaal doen we het nog wel eens 
iets eerder. Idealiter zou je het iedere 
maand doen, maar dat is 
operationeel...nee.” 
 
Six other controllers also referred to a different approach at month-end compared to year-end. 
Of these six controllers, four also referred to a more in-depth analysis during the year: at 
quarter-end (2 controllers) or hard-close (2 controllers). The phenomenon ‘hard-close’ refers to 
the period-end at October. This period was the basis for the preliminary review by the external 
auditors. Specific corporate staff instructions, similar to year-end instructions, were sent to BU 
controllers in order to ensure proper documentation of the accounting choices and the 
presented financial result. By providing extra instructions for the hard-close and year-end, it 
might thus be part of the corporate control expectations that the month-end results are 
accepted to be subject to a more global review then the hard-close and year-end results.  
Interestingly BU controllers also seemed to be less strict in their accounting choices at month-
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end than at year-end, especially in deciding the timing of revenues and expenses. In the 
individual interviews, BU controllers referred to timing decisions within the year (refer to 
quotes in Section 5.2.4). One BU controller explicitly referred in the interview to behaving 
differently at month-end compared to year-end: 
[BUC2] “At the month-end I  act differently 
than at the year-end for the annual 
accounts. The latter are meant  for external 
purposes, which is a clearly defined period. 
In my opinion the rules are more strict there 
than for the internal month-end close. At 
the internal month-end close, I would be 
more inclined to smooth earnings and 
manage them more towards budget.” 
[BUC2] “In de maandafsluiting zal ik er 
anders mee omgaan dan bij een 
jaarrekening, bij een jaarafsluiting. Dat is 
bedoeld voor externe doeleinden, is 
duidelijk een afgebakende periode. Daar 
tellen toch voor mijn gevoel wat strengere 
regels voor dan dat je voor de interne 
maandafsluiting hebt. Bij de interne 
maandafsluiting zou ik meer geneigd zijn en 
toch wat meer egalisatie van resultaat voor 
te staan en meer richting budget te sturen.” 
Apart from the general corporate control factors, BU specific factors were also identified 
that influenced the accounting choices of BU controllers; the business unit factors. 
 Business Unit factors 
Some BU controllers indicated that their processes were very straightforward. There were 
differences in the BU activities and how these were structured. BUs were more or less capital 
intensive, some worked with inventories, others provided services, there were differences in 
debtor’s collection methods, etc. These different activities resulted in different accounting 
choices available to the BU controllers. 
[BUC8] “It’s a straightforward process.”  
[BUC5) “Also, because I think our 
accounting is just not complicated.” 
 
[BUC8] “Het is een simpel proces.”  
[BUC5] “ook omdat ik denk dat wij gewoon 
een vrij simpele administratie hebben.”  
The importance of well-functioning operational processes and systems for reporting quality as 
referred to above was a frequently discussed topic during the individual interviews. Some BU 
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controllers do not seem to have complicated or problematic operational processes, whereas 
others have to spend a great deal of time gathering and checking the data: 
[BUC14] “Compiling the information from 
data takes a lot of effort, because we have 
to use three sources.” 
[BUC12] “And sometimes, being a 
controller here, you have to do more than 
controllers in other companies. Because 
here you mainly focus on ‘how do I get my 
information correct’? Whereas in other 
companies, they just receive the 
information, and that’s it.” 
[BUC14] “De totstandkoming van de 
informatie, de data is vrij moeizaam omdat 
we daar putten uit drie bronnen.” 
[BUC12] “En soms moet je hier als controller 
veel meer dingen doen dan een controller in 
een ander bedrijf. Want hier ben je vooral 
bezig met hoe krijg ik mijn informatie goed. 
Terwijl in andere bedrijven krijgen ze 
gewoon de informatie, punt.” 
Controllers who work for BUs where operating processes and systems do  not run smoothly not 
only have to spend more time preparing their financial accounts, but they also have to decide if 
it is possible to change these underlying processes, identifying how to change them, and making 
sure that the business allocates resources for these changes.  
Finally, BU controllers support BUs of different sizes. Interestingly, the amount that was 
considered by the BU controllers to be a ‘material amount’ varied considerably in a range 
between ‘a few thousand euros’ and ‘a few hundred thousand euros’. Some of them referred to 
accounting choices that they considered material but that were not considered material by 
others. One BU controller supporting a small BU that did not meet its targets discussed the 
accounting choices which were material for the BU, but immaterial for group purposes. The BU 
controller reflected on the reaction of Finance when discussing the financial results of his/her 
BU:  
“I did notice, for example, with Finance 
Manager X that compared to the numbers 
at BUY etcetera, then this is…… yes Finance 
Manager X, almost made fun of me.”  
“Ik merkte wel bijvoorbeeld bij Finance 
Manager X dat in de aantallen bij BU Y en 
zo, dan is dit......ja Finance Manager X 
lacht me nog net niet uit, maar het scheelt 
niet veel.” 
Another BU controller talks about the dilemmas of supporting a small BU: 
 
 
124 Accounting Choices of Controllers 
“You know that you have to follow the 
rules. But then you also know that within 
the entire organization, a specific [small] 
business will not be noticed. That’s why 
sometimes you are slightly less strict. Then 
you think: they’ll never look into that.” 
“Je weet vaak wel dat je dingen volgens 
de regels moet doen maar dan weet je dat 
het op het totaal bij bepaalde [kleine] 
businesses toch niet opvalt. Daardoor ga 
je er soms misschien iets soepeler mee 
om. Dan denk je: daar kijken ze toch nooit 
naar.” 
During the BU controllers’ group discussion the participants remarked that not only the size of 
the BU matters but also its strategic position within the organization and/or the situational 
circumstances. 
 Other factors: Situational factors and external reporting standards 
The strategic position can also affect the accounting choice process and the final accounting 
choice. One BU controller explained that the BUs operating system should be improved in order 
to better allocate the revenue recognition. However, since corporate had decided that these 
activities were not core-business and were held-for-sale, it was decided not to further invest in 
the system. Other examples of situational circumstances affecting accounting choices that have 
already been identified in the previous sections were: BUs in a restructuring situation and BUs 
with onerous contracts, as well as situational factors like changes to the Management Team. 
The latterchanges the actors involved in the decision-making process. Finally, the external 
reporting standards also affect accounting choices. As outlined in Section 5.3.2, some 
accounting rules were interpreted in different ways. Changes in accounting standards can also 
result in changes in choices. During the research period no such changes were effectuated. 
5.4.4 Summary 
BU controllers work in a setting which is partly the same for all BU controllers, and partly 
different for each BU controller. The accounting choices are influenced by the combination of 
all the actors and factors identified in these settings, rather than one single factor.  
The organizational setting in this study is characterized by a perceived freedom of accounting 
choices. Corporate reporting staff consulted when BU controllers hesitate about the technical 
aspects of accounting choices. An active involvement of corporate finance staff, the board of 
directors, and the auditor is limited to specific material accounting choices, such as 
restructuring provisions. The difference in treatment of month-end accounting choices and 
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year-end choices is a general characteristic that emerged in virtually all the interviews. This can 
possibly be explained by the tight deadlines and the focus of corporate on year-end and hard-
close, requesting additional documentation for these periods. 
The external stakeholders involved are a BU-specific characteristic rather than a corporate 
characteristic, depending on the BU’s activities. Other BU specific actors influencing the 
accounting choices are the BU manager and the BU business administrator. Other operational 
managers or employees in the BU are consulted when making accounting choices involving 
business judgment. Only a few BU controllers refer to their peer controllers; these peer 
controllers work for one division and their BUs have similar activities.  
The type of BU activities influence the type of reporting items and accounting choices to be 
made. An important BU-factor identified that influences accounting choices was the quality of 
the operational systems and processes. Situational circumstances of the BU, such as a 
restructuring program or a strategic reorientation, also affect accounting choices.  
Finally, the external reporting standards as well as the more detailed corporate accounting 
instructions are an important factor affecting the available accounting choices. 
The BU controller setting is summarized in Figure 7. 
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5.5 CONTROLLERS DELIBERATIONS 
As outlined in the previous section, the accounting choice process is not straightforward, but a 
result of BU controllers’ deliberations and sometimes the result of rule based behavior. 
Examples of controller deliberations relating to three subjects are presented in this secion. 
These reveal the complexity of the decision-making process, and the multitude of factors 
involved. First, an example of BU controllers’ deliberations relating to the provision for bad 
debts is presented. This is followed by the deliberations relating to timing of accruals. Finally, 
several controller deliberations of three interviewees relating to the same provision for 
obsolete inventory are presented. 
5.5.1 The provision for bad debt 
The provision for bad debts was discussed with 12 BU controllers. Depending on the BU 
activities and the type of invoicing, the outstanding amount of debtors receivable varied. Some 
BUs invoice their customers for services to be rendered in the coming year, other BUs invoice 
customers after delivery of the goods or services. The type of customer also varied; some BUs 
have business-to-business activities and other BUs business-to-consumer activities or a 
combination of both. Some BU controllers discussed this accounting choice in more detail than 
others. 
Invoicing and debtors collections is performed by the corporate shared service center. The 
corporate accounting manual provides instructions relating to the calculation of the provision 
for bad debts based on the ageing of the invoices. The corporate shared service center 
calculates a provision for the business unit based on this instruction. It is the BU controller’s 
responsibility to review this proposal and – if they consider it necessary – to make an 
adjustment to the proposed provision based on their review of the bad debt risk. 
Three BU controllers specifically referred to the corporate accounting manual when discussing 
their provision for bad debt. Two of these BU controllers referred to the system of calculating 
the provision of bad debts, whereas the other BU controller referred to the moment of writing 
off bad debtors. Hence, only 2 of the 12 BU controllers used the system for calculating the 
provision outlined in the corporate accounting manual and prepared by the corporate shared 
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The deliberations of one BU controller who followed the corporate accounting manual are 
described below. This interviewee had an audit background and had recently become a BU 
controller. The style of the BU controller can be characterized as a financial accounting style: no 
reference was made to considering timing choices, and the BU controller discussed the 
accounting choices from a technical point of view. Following the corporate instructions fitted in 
this approach. When discussing the system for calculating the provision, the BU controller 
thought that the corporate system for calculating the provision was too conservative: 
[Researcher] “How does this system for 
calculating the provision reflect your debtor 
risk profile?” [BUC] “Not very well, eh… 
while [explains specific payment 
agreements]  well that risk is of course, well, 
not so great. And those amounts are also 
provided now. So if you would use this 
system of fixed percentages, then that does 
not reflect the economic situation.” 
[Researcher] “Hoe vind je die systematiek 
aansluiten op jouw debiteurenrisico?” 
[BUC] “Minder, eh… omdat [legt 
specifieke betalings-afspraken uit]. Nou 
dat risico is natuurlijk, nou zeg, niet 
zoveel. En die is dus ook voorzien nu, 
daardoor. Maar als je die systematiek zou 
hanteren dan is het nemen van vaste 
percentages, doet dan geen recht aan de 
economische situatie.” 
Although the BU controller thought that accounting for debtors using the calculated provision 
resulted in an amount of debtors receivable that did not reflect the estimated value of the 
debtors, the BU controller still applied the system: 
[Researcher] “Nevertheless, you used the 
corporate system?” [BUC] “Because 
accounting wise, I already had a provision 
and it ‘fitted’. My debtor position fitted, so 
to speak, in the provision I have.” 
[Researcher] Yes, but you said that it is 
actually too high, so to speak. In your 
opinion it is slightly….” [BUC] “My provision 
is sufficient, is sufficient, let’s put it like 
that.” [Researcher] “Yeah, Yeah, exactly. 
Since you apply it consistently it 
[Researcher] “Maar je hebt hem wel nu 
gehanteerd?” [BUC] “Omdat het 
cijfermatig, ik had al een potje staan dus 
het paste erin. Mijn debiteurenpositie zeg 
maar past in de voorziening die ik heb.” 
[Researcher] “Ja, dus maar hiervoor zeg je 
eigenlijk hij is te hoog zeg maar. Naar jou 
idee is ie wat aan de….” [BUC] ”Mijn 
voorziening is ruim, is ruim genoeg, laten 
we het zo maar zeggen.” [Researcher] “Ja, 
ja. precies, maar omdat je het consequent 
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probably…or… or is this the first time you 
have applied it?” [BUC] “I eh…no.  it’s of 
course the second time that I’ve applied it. 
With the September results I had to do it 
and at the year-end. In September I really 
got to the bottom of it… so.. what do I 
need? And then I already had that provision 
and well …just leave it there. Then I looked 
in the accounting manual, well that involves 
these categories. Yes, and the debtors 
position fluctuates, of course, as well. 
Payments are also quite reliable. So, yes at 
that moment the Accounting Manual fitted, 
so to speak, with the provision. You know, 
that provision is xx euro… it’s not much, it’s 
not material. That’s why I eh…” 
doet waarschijnlijk of.. of...is het nou voor 
het eerst dat je hem toepast.”[BUC] “Ik 
eh..nee. Het is natuurlijk de 2e keer dat ik 
hem toepas. Met de septembercijfers heb 
ik het een keer moeten doen en met 
jaareinde. In September heb ik hem 
gewoon echt uitgeplozen, van joh  wat 
heb ik nou nodig en toen had ik dat potje 
al en.. nou ja laat maar staan. Daarna ging 
ik kijken in het accounting manual, nou ja 
dat zijn die termijnen. Ja, en die 
debiteurenstand die fluctueert natuurlijk. 
Er wordt goed vrij goed betaald ook. Dus 
ja op dat moment paste de Accounting 
Manual standaarden zeg maar op de 
voorziening toen. Weet je die voorziening 
is xx euro.. is niet veel , is niet materieel 
vandaar dat ik eh..”  
Hence, the BU controller decided to do nothing as the provision that was accounted for was 
approximately the provision according to the calculation following the Accounting Manual. 
Since it was the BU controller’s first year,  how this provision was calculated previously remains 
unknown. This deliberation still fits the ‘financial accounting style’ following the corporate 
instruction. It also reflects a prudent approach, because the BU controller knows the provision 
is too conservative. Finally, the BU controller concludes that the amount is not material. Later in 
the interview, another deliberation relating to this provision is expressed. The BU did not meet 
its financial targets for the year. The BU controller referred to this when reflecting on the 
influence of personality on accounting decisions: 
[Researcher] “How does your personality 
influence your accounting choices, in your 
opinion?” [BUC] “Quite a lot I think, yes. If 
you…”[Researcher] “How?” [BUC] “Oh, 
[Researcher] “Hoe denk je dat je 
persoonlijkheid invloed heeft op je 
verslaggevingskeuzes?” [BUC] “Veel denk 
ik wel, ja. Als jij..” [Researcher] “Hoe?” 
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how? Well…if you’re not independent then 
you’re easily influenced to….flatter certain 
numbers, that’s it. If I for example…just as 
an example that provision calculation for 
debtors eh….just imagine I wanted, so to 
speak…they could have used a better 
financial result. I could have also made a 
calculation for the provision for bad debts 
of xx euro, then xx euro would have been 
released and the financial results increased 
accordingly. But I didn’t do that.” 
[Researcher] “No, and how do you think 
does your personality played a role in this?” 
[BUC] “Eh ..yes, o yes, because I find I 
cannot act that way. Or is that not what you 
mean?”[Researcher] “Yes, yes, exactly your 
professional ethics or something like 
that?”[BUC] “Yes indeed, it is about my 
ethics, yes.” 
[BUC] “O, hoe? Ja ...als je niet 
onafhankelijk bent kun je heel snel 
beïnvloed worden om bepaalde...om 
cijfers te flatteren, dat is het. Als ik 
bijvoorbeeld ...even als voorbeeld die 
voorziening onderbouwing debiteuren 
eh...Stel ik had gewild, zeg maar...Ze 
hadden best een beter resultaat kunnen 
gebruiken. Ik had ook een onderbouwing 
voor de voorziening voor dubieuze 
debiteuren kunnen maken voor xx euro, 
dan had er xx euro vrij kunnen vallen ten 
gunste van het resultaat maar dat heb ik 
niet gedaan.” [Researcher] “Nee, en in 
wat voor opzicht speelt je persoonlijkheid 
daar een rol zeg maar?” [BUC] “Eh ja o ja, 
omdat ik vind dat ik dat niet kan maken 
voor mezelf. Of bedoel je dat niet?” 
[Researcher] “Ja, ja precies je ethiek 
ofzo?” [BUC] “Ja dat is mijn ethiek 
inderdaad ja.” 
The BU controller could have chosen to calculate a less conservative and more realistic 
provision which better reflected the economic reality. However, he/she did not want to release 
the provision because that would increase the financial result. The interviewee thus considered 
releasing the provision as earnings management because the BU had not met its targets. Earlier, 
the BU controller stated that the amount was not material. The BU controller apparently uses 
two concepts of materiality: one for corporate purposes, where the amount is not material 
enough to adjust, and one for BU purposes, where the amount is material enough to affect the 
overall presentation of the financial results. 
In the above deliberations relating to the provision for bad debts, the BU controller describes 
the valuation activity as well as the overall review. Not only the accounting instructions and the 
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professional judgment of the BU controller influenced the accounting choice, but also the fact 
that the BU did not meet its targets. Although the BU controller’s style in general could be 
labeled as a financial accounting style, the decision not to release part of the provision in order 
to avoid the BU management reaching its target has characteristics of a management control 
style. Finally, the perceived materiality plays a role in the decision. Figure 8 summarizes the 
choice process. 
 
Figure 8 Accounting choice process of an interviewed BU controller relating to provision for bad debt 
5.5.2 Timing of expenses 
The accounting choices relating to prepaid and accrued expenses were discussed with 13 BU 
controllers. In this section, deliberations of two BU controllers relating to the timing of expenses 
are described. The first part outlines the deliberations of a BU controller relating to the 
reporting item ‘accrued expenses’ at period-end, and demonstrates the various factors affecting 
the accounting choice. The second part outlines the deliberations of another BU controller 
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items and situations where the timing of expenses can play a role, as well as the involvement of 
different actors in these accounting choices. 
 Deliberations relating to accrued expenses OF BU controller A 
The deliberations of one BU controller, hereafter referred to as BU controller A, relating to 
accrued expenses are described below. This interviewee has an audit background and has been 
supporting the BU for several years. The interview revealed that the BU controller only 
performs a detailed review of the accrued expenses at the year-end, as he/she thinks that a 
review throughout the year is not a useful exercise:  
“Look, I do the monthly reporting 
completely by myself, also for a number of 
reporting items we do not do on a monthly 
basis…eh…this type of accrual for 
example… throughout the year I’m not 
going to make an estimate. Then I just say… 
the system provides the information, this is 
what’s needed. So I really, at the year-end 
close, I really perform a detailed review. 
When we had the hard-close, then we also 
looked slightly more into the detail, but too 
much can…. during those last two months, 
so much can still happen, then that 
estimate is not useful at all.” 
“Kijk de maandrapportage doe ik volledig 
zelf, omdat we ook bij een aantal posten 
eh maken we tussentijds geen ...he... dit 
soort eh.. zo'n reservering bijvoorbeeld 
daar ga ik… tussentijds ga ik die niet 
inschatten. Dan zeg ik gewoon... het 
systeem zegt me gewoon dat het dit is, 
waar ik sta. Dus ik doe het echt met de 
jaarafsluiting dan ga ik er echt in detail in. 
Toen we de hardclose hebben gehad toen 
hebben  we er ook iets nauwkeuriger naar 
gekeken maar teveel kan ...in die laatste 
twee maanden kan er nog zoveel 
gebeuren dan heeft die inschatting 
helemaal geen zin.” 
At month-end, BU controller A relies on the information provided by the system, but at year-
end, a detailed review is performed. On the basis of this review, the BU controller determines 
the estimate of the accrual: 
[Researcher] “Do you determine that 
estimate all by yourself?” [BUC_A] “No, 
generally I determine this together with the 
people - there are two employees in the 
[Researcher] “Die schatting, die bepaal jij 
helemaal zelf?” [BUC_A] “Nee ik bepaal 
die in de meeste gevallen samen met 
degene die, er zitten twee mensen op de 
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department who are involved in the 
purchasing activities. Eh… so they know far 
more about the suppliers and the way of 
working with these suppliers [explains how 
they determine the estimate]. And I focus 
on reviewing the system of how they 
determined the estimate and eh… and the 
completeness.” 
afdeling die het hele inkooptraject doen. 
Eh… dus die kennen ook veel beter de 
leveranciers en de wijze van werken van 
de leverancier [legt uit hoe ze de schatting 
bepalen]. En ik kijk dan meer naar de 
systematiek hoe ze dat gedaan hebben en 
eh...en de volledigheid.” 
BU controller A then continued the interview by stressing the importance of the completeness 
of the accrual, indicating that he/she has a prudent attitude: 
“Because, what we always do is eh….well 
you probably already got that message -  we 
are very conservative. Because of course… 
well, margin is a sensitive instrument in our 
business, so we are very concerned about 
negative adjustments afterwards. We 
always estimate conservatively. That also 
means that…and that is especially the 
case... at the moment you say: we expect an 
ROS [return on sales] of x% and now we are 
actually on [below], then you know what I 
do, I lower my accrual for expenses. You 
see? So, those are the moments that 
tension can occur. And I choose not to be 
too aggressive with those accruals, too low 
so to speak. We prefer to carry forward 
something to the next year…. so that there 
is something left for next year.” 
“Want wat we wel altijd doen is eh… nou 
goed, dat heb je misschien wel eens 
eerder meegekregen, dat wij wel van de 
voorzichtigheid zijn hè? Want natuurlijk… 
nou, marge is een gevoelig motortje 
binnen ons bedrijf dus we zijn huiverig 
voor tegenvallers achteraf. We zitten 
altijd aan de voorzichtige kant. Dat 
betekent ook dat.....en dat komt met 
name op spanning te staan op het 
moment dat je zegt: wij verwachten een  
ROS [return on sales] van x% en we zitten 
nu eigenlijk op [lager]  en weet je wat ik 
reserveer wat minder. Snap je? Dus dat 
zijn momenten waarop spanning zou 
kunnen ontstaan. En ik kies er dan toch 
voor om niet te scherp in die 
reserveringen te gaan zitten, aan de lage 
kant zeg maar. We nemen liever wat mee 
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The researcher then asked what this conservative attitude meant; if it also implied making a 
higher accrual than necessary in the ‘good’ years: 
[Researcher] “Well, you can be sure that 
you have accrued for all your expenses but 
it can also be the case that you think, well… 
in a specific year, I’m going to account for 
an extra accrual.” [BUC_A] “Yes, no that is 
right. If we… in that case what you notice -  
and now we’re in a phase where there’s a 
lot of pressure on the results … eh… I’ll be 
the first one to say: I think we should be 
slightly less conservative, you know… or 
rather be more considerate in determining 
the amount of the estimate than before. 
Before it was like, eh… yes we already made 
an ROS of x% which exceeded the forecast. 
Let’s make a prudent accrual, especially 
given the expectations relating to the next 
year… you see… so, indeed we did… not do 
this in such a way that it would lead to a 
different interpretation of the financial 
results, I would find that really wrong. But 
eh...xx euro more or less… eh that is less of 
an issue.”  
[Researcher] “Want ja, je kunt zeker zijn 
dat je alle kosten hebt gereserveerd maar 
het kan ook zijn van dat je denkt van 
nou….een bepaald jaar, ik neem wat extra 
kosten.” [BUC_A] “Ja, nee dat klopt. Als 
wij… wat je dan eigenlijk merkt en nu 
zitten we in een fase waarin de resultaten 
zwaar onder druk staan eh… ben ik de 
eerste die zal zeggen; ik denk dat we nu 
wat minder scherp hè… of juist scherper 
in de bepaling van de hoogte van die 
voorziening zitten dan voorheen. 
Voorheen was het dan zo, van eh…ja we 
hebben al een ROS van x%, we hadden 
eigenlijk een forecast [ lager ]  laten we 
maar iets meer reserveren, zeker als je 
weet dat de vooruitzichten van het jaar 
daarop.. he dus daar gingen we 
inderdaad… niet zo inderdaad dat er een 
hele andere interpretatie van de cijfers 
zou kunnen ontstaan, dat zou ik echt fout 
vinden. Maar eh...xx euro meer of minder 
eh... daar kijken we dan niet op.”  
BU controller A referred in this discussion to a ‘margin of conservativeness’, where it was 
possible to be more conservative in a ‘good year’ as long as it did not change the interpretation 
of the financial results. When the subject of materiality was discussed further, BU controller A 
also remarked that the extent of estimated accruals had decreased during the last years 
because the operating systems/processes recording the underlying data had considerably 
improved. Also, suppliers invoiced on a timelier basis: 
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“What you do notice is that eh… the 
operational data are more and more 
reliable. So we are improving all the time. 
This means that the margin you have for the 
accounting choices becomes increasingly 
narrower. So the quality of the system… we 
have been working with that data base for 
a number of years, eh… what we always do, 
we record the purchase prices. That system 
of recording is also increasingly reliable. 
And what is also important, if the suppliers 
invoice on a timely basis, then the accrued 
expenses are lower at the year end, so the 
estimated amount decreases every year. If 
that estimated amount decreases, you also 
have less margin available for your 
accounting choices.” 
“Maar wat je echt ziet is dat eh... dat de 
basisvastlegging wordt steeds 
nauwkeuriger. Dus wij worden steeds 
beter, dus de marge waarmee je kunt 
spelen wordt steeds kleiner he? Dus 
kwalitatief is het hele systeem...we 
werken nu met die database een aantal 
jaren, eh....wat altijd gebeurt, wij voeren 
inkooprijzen in. De systematiek van die 
invoer wordt ook steeds nauwkeuriger. 
Eh...wat ook een heel belangrijk aspect is 
dat als leveranciers tijdig factureren en er 
ook veel minder eh.. hè wat er nog open 
staat aan het eind van het jaar. Dus dat 
zijn allemaal dingen waardoor uiteindelijk 
de reservering ook elk jaar kleiner wordt. 
Als het kleiner wordt kan er ook minder 
speling in zitten.” 
In these deliberations, the controller describes the activities operational review, financial 
review, as well as overall review. BU controller A is conservative when making estimates and is 
therefore characterized as risk-adverse. BU controller A has a different treatment for month-
end close and the year-end close or hard-close. At the hard-close, a more detailed review is 
performed, probably due to the corporate hard close instructions. The estimates at year-end 
are influenced by the financial results achieved compared to forecast. The other factors of 
influence on accounting choices relating to the timing of expenses emerging from this 
discussion is a combination of the function of the operating system and the knowledge of 
operational employees. Also, the timely invoicing of supplier affects the residual amount to be 
estimated. The choice process is summarized in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 Accounting choice process of BU controller A relating to accrued expenses 
 Deliberations relating to timing of various expenses of BU controller B 
The deliberations of the second BU controller, hereafter referred to as BU controller B, relate to 
the timing of various expenditures. This interviewee had a controller’s background and had 
been supporting the BU for several years.  
According to BU controller B, the accounting decision relating to accrued expenses at the 
period-end was generally very straightforward: 
“We just eh... yes we just determine that 
based on experience, to the extent that we 
can estimate it. And we also immediately 
deal with it, in the sense that eh… if it turns 
out to be different than the estimated 
amount, then we immediately adjust it. We 
do not keep anything ‘in the air’... I also 
make sure, that if you make an accrual in 
one month, then the next month it has to 
“Dat laten we gewoon eh… ja dat laten we 
bepalen op basis van ervaring, hoever we 
dat kunnen inschatten. En we rekenen het 
ook snel af in de zin van eh… als het 
anders is geworden dan slikken we het 
door, of direct maar we houden niks in de 
lucht… Ik heb ook elke maand dat je iets 
reserveert en je krijgt dan de volgende 
maand dan is de opdracht van: volgende 
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be gone. Or you have to make a new 
accrual.”  
maand wil ik ook dat ie weg is. Of je maakt 
een nieuwe reservering.” 
The interview further revealed that BU controller B found that decisions relating to the timing 
of expenses in specific situations were not always straightforward. BU controller B discussed the 
deliberations relating to a complex situation where, due to changes in regulations, the expenses 
relating to specific services increased. The new regulation also resulted in an acceleration of the 
timing of incurring these expenses, whereas the timing of the revenue recognition for these 
services did not change: 
“That immediately had an effect of xx euro. 
And of course that will be corrected in due 
course and then... well then I had a 
discussion with [BU administrator] about 
well… should we really smooth these 
expenses and relate them to the revenues? 
I said… well… we discussed the advantages 
and disadvantages. That’s something I can 
discuss easily with [BU administrator] and, 
on the other hand, [BU administrator] also 
informs me. And then I think, well, basically 
the choice is always easy. The main 
principle is: we always account for it; then 
we can discuss it later.” 
“En dat had gelijk een effect van xx euro. 
En dat gaat zich dan wel weer corrigeren 
en dan… nou ja goed, dan heb ik zo met 
[BU administrator] een volgende discussie 
van ja, moeten we dat nu eigenlijk gaan 
nivelleren dat je zegt, nou moet ik dat nu 
weer terug gaan verwijzen? Ik zeg van 
nou… we hebben wat over de voor en de 
nadelen. Daar kan ik dan goed met [BU 
administrator] over sparren en [BU 
administrator] informeert mij aan de 
andere kant ook. En dan denk ik, nou ja 
goed… in principe is de keuze in die zin 
altijd makkelijk. Het principe is gewoon 
altijd zo: we nemen hem. Dan gaan we 
later wel discussiëren”  
In both the above deliberations, BU controller B expressed a strong preference for accounting 
the expenses at the moment of incurring them as opposed to smoothing them. Interestingly, 
another accounting choice discussed by BU controller B was the change of timing of the 
expenses relating to a marketing stand that was going to be used for several years. In this case, 
BU controller B thought it was more appropriate to smooth the related expenses over time: 
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“At the [xx] trade fair you use a marketing 
stand; the supplier designs this stand, builds 
it and dismantles it every year. The 
following year, the supplier builds it again. 
Well, of course the initial expenses relating 
to designing the stand etcetera are the 
highest. So, initially these guys invoice large 
amounts and gradually that decreases. So, 
actually you account for these expenses as 
operational expenses. In my opinion… we 
have had that trade fair for three years and 
I think these expenses should be spread 
evenly over the years. So, I am creating a 
kind of suspense account in order to release 
these expenses gradually. In the old 
situation we had this stand for a long time. 
This was a choice that was made before my 
time. I always thought…but well, it was 
known that it was treated that way, so the 
auditors also knew. However, it has always 
troubled me. Anyway those expenses were 
accounted for in that way. But then I got the 
new invoices and I thought: how am I going 
to account for that? And then I discussed 
this with BU controller X and now I made 
the choice: I spread them evenly over the 
year.” 
“Op de [xx] beurs daar zet je een stand 
neer. En die standbouwer die ontwerpt 
hem, die bouwt hem en die breekt hem 
ook elk jaar weer af. En die bouwt hem 
dan volgend jaar weer op. Nou de hoogste 
kosten zitten hem natuurlijk in het 
ontwerpen en dat soort dingen. Dus hoe 
factureren die jongens eigenlijk. Die 
factureren eerst heel veel en dan wordt 
het steeds minder. Maar goed dan maak 
je het eigenlijk operationele kosten. Ik 
heb zoiets, we hebben drie jaar die beurs 
en ik vind dat die kosten gelijkmatig 
moeten. In afwijking van factuur ga ik een 
soort tussenrekening maken zodat ik die 
kosten afschrijvingstechnisch… in de oude 
situatie hebben we de stand heel lang 
gehad, een keuze die eigenlijk al voor mijn 
tijd zijn gemaakt. Waarvan ik altijd zoiets 
had, maar goed men weet dat dat zo was, 
dus in die zin, richting de accountants. 
Maar dat was altijd een doorn in mijn oog. 
Dus die kosten liepen wel gelijk. Maar 
toen kreeg ik de nieuwe facturen en toen 
had ik zoiets van: hoe moet ik hier nu mee 
omgaan. En daar heb ik met BU controller 
X over gespard en dat ik nu de keuze heb 
gemaakt: ik spreid ze eigenlijk gelijkmatig 
over het jaar.” 
In this case, BU controller B changed the method of timing the expenses when the situational 
circumstances provided opportune to do so. When a new stand was built, BU controller B seized 
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the opportunity to account for this in his/her preferred method. According to BU controller B, 
smoothing the expenses over the years better reflected the economic reality. 
The above deliberations show that BU controller B has a strong preference for immediately 
accounting for the expenses incurred. On the other hand, BU controller B wants to reflect the 
financial situation of the business in the financial results, and therefore decides to smooth the 
expenses for the marketing stand over time. The preference for immediately accounting for 
expenses when they occur or smoothing them over a period thus depends on the type of 
expenses. The accounting choice process of BU controller B relating to the timing of expenses is 
summarized in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10 Accounting choice process of BU controller B relating to the timing of various expenses 
In the above deliberations of BU controller B, relating to the timing of the various expenses, 
he/she referred to two other actors involved in the accounting choices: the BU administrator 
and BU controller X. BU controller X worked for a BU that was involved in the same type of 
activities as the BU of the interviewee. Below the involvement of the various actors in the 
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In every interview, the researcher asked the BU controller which other persons were involved in 
the accounting choice process. BU controller B noted that within the BU, three people were 
involved in the accounting decisions: the BU controller him/herself, the BU administrator, and 
the BU manager:  
“Actually it is a three-some. [BU 
administrator] as chief administrator, who 
of course deals with a lot of administrative 
issues, margin analysis; actually with a large 
part of the preparation. I have to admit that 
I also have a lot of practical experience 
myself – that sounds pretentious – that I 
know what’s going on. Besides, I have the 
BU Manager - we are on the same wave 
length, decision wise. Anyway, I do agree 
things with him/her, in a very pragmatic 
way for the reporting. What’s happening 
today, what’s different from this time last 
year. We do that on a weekly basis, then we 
just look at revenue related issues. On a 
monthly basis we look more into the other 
expenses and the balance sheet. However, 
if something happens today, then we 
obviously discuss that. This is really the 
BU…the people I discuss things with 
directly.”  
“Eigenlijk is dat een drietrap. [BU 
administrator] als hoofd administratie die 
natuurlijk heel veel administratieve zaken 
pakt, marge analyse eigenlijk een heel 
stuk van de voorbereiding. Ik moet eerlijk 
zeggen dat ik zelf wel een praktijkmens 
ben dat ik zelf ook wel veel - dat klinkt 
pretentieus - dat ik weet wat er speelt. 
Daarnaast heb ik BU Manager. We zitten 
wel op één lijn, een gelijke beslislijn. Maar 
goed daar stem ik het wel mee af. 
Gewoon heel praktisch in de rapportage. 
Wat gebeurt er vandaag, wat is er anders 
dan vorig jaar om deze tijd. Dat doen we 
zelfs wekelijks, dan kijken we puur naar 
omzet achtige zaken. Maandelijks meer 
de indirecte kosten en de balans. Maar 
gebeurt er vandaag iets, dan praten we 
daar natuurlijk over. Dat is eigenlijk de BU, 
de spil waar ik heel direct mee praat.” 
BU controller B then continued, explaining that he/she also discussed accounting choices with 
actors outside the BU, namely Division controller A and peer BU controller X: 
“Then there is Division controller A, as 
controller; I regularly discuss things with 
him/her. Division controller A sets out the 
general direction that is presented in the 
“Dan heb je Divisie controller A als 
controller, daar spar ik veel mee. Divisie 
controller A zet een lijn uit dat via het 
controllersoverleg komt. Als ik in 
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controllers meeting. If I consider his/her 
background, then BU controller X is an 
important sparring partner. To whom, just 
like Division controller A by the way…. every 
now and then I ask them something. Then, 
I pretend not to have an idea and I ask: what 
do you think? They know my position. 
These are the most important.” 
achtergronden kijk dan is BU controller X 
is daar voor mij een hele belangrijke 
sparringpartner. Die net als Divisie 
controller A overigens, ik leg wel eens wat 
dingen bij hen in de week. Dan doe ik net 
of ik niks weet en dan vraag ik: wat vinden 
jullie? Ze weten ook hoe ik er in sta. Dat 
zijn de belangrijkste.” 
Hence, BU controller B referred to four other actors involved in the accounting choice decision 
process: BU administrator, BU manager, Division controller A and peer BU controller X.  
When discussing the specific accounting choices, BU controller B did refer to the involvement of 
BU administrator and BU controller X. BU controller X was consulted on his/her view on the 
presentation of ‘economic reality’ – such as the choice of timing of expenses of the marketing 
stand - whereas accounting technical matters were discussed with the BU administrator. In the 
interview, BU controller B referred to the cooperation with the BU administrator as follows: 
“Of course, that’s very accounting oriented. 
You can distinguish between accounting 
and controlling. Controlling wise, I 
frequently, of course, work in a ‘solo 
function’. Let’s put it this way… that’s 
something which is true at a lot of 
companies. The department here is, of 
course, focused on accounting within the 
guidelines. And... eh well that... if you 
consider the guidelines, then there are 
specific issues relating to taxes, where you 
are confronted with onerous rules and of 
course there are accounting rules, which we 
have agreed with each other in the 
accounting manual. And also there are  
simply the rules of integrity, of course. Well, 
“Dat is natuurlijk heel erg administratief 
gericht. Je kunt het onderscheid maken 
tussen administratief en controlling. Qua 
controlling ben ik dan veel vaker 
natuurlijk een éénpitter. Laat ik het zo 
zeggen…dat zul je bij alle bedrijven meer 
zien. De afdeling zoals je die hier ziet is 
natuurlijk echt gericht op het registreren 
binnen de richtlijnen. Eh... en ja dat... als 
je kijkt naar richtlijnen, dan heb je daar 
nog met een aantal dingen van 
belastingen, waar je eigenlijk heel erg in 
de zware richtlijnen zit en je hebt 
natuurlijk de richtlijnen zoals we dat met 
de accounting manual afspreken en 
gewoon ook natuurlijk de richtlijnen dat 
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you know it’s not like we talk to each other 
about these on a daily basis.” 
je integer bent. Nou ja, weet je dat zeggen 
we niet dagelijks tegen elkaar.” 
Interestingly, for none of the specific accounting choices discussed, did BU controller B refer to 
the involvement of Division controller A. Moreover, BU controller B only referred to the BU 
manager for one accounting choice. This was an accounting choice relating to a valuation issue 
of ‘other receivables’. In this situation, the BU administrator had provided a signal to the BU 
controller about potential problems with this receivable. BU controller B decided to provide for 
the amount, and discussed the issue with the BU manager after the adjustment had been 
accounted for.  
“BU administrator signals the issue. Initially 
I didn’t notice it because I’m not so deeply 
involved in the bookkeeping activities. Then 
you get the discussion: should you 
immediately provide for it or should you 
wait a little until we’ve discussed it. Well, I 
said we should immediately account for the 
loss. Subsequently I did talk to the BU 
manager and the product manager, asking 
why it happened this way. I want to have an 
answer to that.”  
“BU administrator signaleert dat. Dat zie 
ik niet in eerste instantie, zit ik niet diep 
genoeg in boekhouding. Dan krijg je 
discussie; moet je dat meteen als verlies 
pakken. Of moet je even wachten tot we 
de discussie zijn aangegaan. Nou, ik heb 
gezegd we pakken hem nu als verlies. En 
vervolgens heb ik wel tegen BU manager 
en de productmanager gezegd van 
waarom is het zo geworden en niet zo. 
Daar wil ik wel een antwoord op hebben.” 
The BU controller thus discussed the above situation with the BU manager and product 
manager in order to understand how this could have happened, rather than discussing the 
accounting choice itself. 
The above deliberations show that, depending on the circumstances, the BU controller involves 
different actors in making accounting choices. Moreover, actors are sometimes confronted with 
the accounting choices incurred rather than involved in the accounting choice process itself.  
5.5.3 The provision for obsolete inventory 
This section discusses accounting choices relating to a provision for obsolete inventory. Three 
interviewees discuss the provision for obsolete inventory. They all have their own views on the 
estimated amount to be accounted for in the financial statements. Interestingly, they are all 
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convinced of their own estimate and suspect other actors who have a more conservative 
approach to have an underlying motive of earnings management. 
 Deliberations of BU controller A  
BU controller A, who has been working for this BU for several years, had prepared an estimate 
for the provision for obsolete inventory and made an adjustment to the provision in line with 
this estimate. BU controller A was overruled by BU controller B, the finance superior of A, who 
made an additional provision. BU controller A reflects on this additional provision and explained 
that this was too conservative, as the businesses had taken action by lowering the new 
purchases, stimulating sales of the current items in stock. He/she had taken these lower level of 
purchases into consideration when determining the provision: 
“An additional provision for obsolete 
inventory was made - obsolete inventory -  
more than we had counted on. I didn’t 
agree to that. We had already taken that 
into account with the purchases for the 
next season. However, at that moment, it 
was decided to account for an additional 
provision because it was strategically 
interesting to manage the 2011 result 
downwards and show an increase in 2012. 
That’s nice for the business, that’s the way 
it  works. They want to show a positive 
result and have a basis for intervening and 
therefore increase the provisions. I think 
that a part of the provision will be released 
this year.” 
“Toen is voor de overige voorraad nog een 
extra voorziening getroffen. Meer dan dat 
wij rekening mee hadden gehouden. Ik was 
het daar niet mee eens. We hadden met 
inkopen voor het huidige nieuwe seizoen al 
rekening mee gehouden. Maar goed op dat 
moment werd besloten om meer 
voorziening te treffen vooral omdat het 
strategisch handig was om resultaat van 
2011 zoveel mogelijk te drukken en 2012 
weer groei te laten zien. Dat is mooi voor de 
business, zo werkt dat gewoon. Die willen 
graag een positief resultaat zien en 
onderbouwing voor ingrepen en dus 
voorzieningen treffen, ik denk dat er dit jaar 
wel weer een stuk vrijvalt.” 
BU controller A’s opinion was that the amount that was finally provided for was too prudent, 
and that the provision was increased in order to build some ‘reserves’. 
 Deliberations of BU controller B 
BU controller B, the finance superior of BU controller A, who was also one of the interviewees, 
explained his/her deliberations about that same provision: 
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“Yes, with the knowledge we had at that 
time, we decided on an amount. There I 
see, if we refine the method, that we should 
have increased it slightly. Eh…we will, we 
now have that insight, and we also do that. 
Eh… it also depends on the sales; how much 
will you still sell of your obsolete inventory. 
What is the quality of your inventory?“  
“Ja, daar hebben we met de inzichten die 
we toen hadden iets vastgesteld. Daar zie ik 
wel als we het verfijnen dat we hem nog wat 
hoger hadden moeten vaststellen. Eh...dus 
dat zullen we ook, nu het inzicht dat we 
hebben zullen we dat ook gaan doen. 
Eh...hangt ook af van de doorverkoop. 
Hoeveel verkoop je nog van de oude 
voorraad. Hoe is de kwaliteit van je 
voorraad.” 
BU controller B hence did not try to ‘build reserves’ but tried to make a best estimate of the 
provision with the available knowledge at the year-end. Moreover, he/she even thinks the 
provision should have been slightly higher, given current insights. 
In his/her turn, BU controller B thought that corporate finance staff wanted to manage earnings 
and ‘build reserves’ by pressuring BU controller B to increase the provision: 
[Responding to the question of the 
researcher whether BUCb was not put under 
pressure by CS to increase the provision]. 
“Yes, and relating the provision for obsolete 
inventory I said: I want to keep up the 
pressure in this organization and I’ll not give 
into the building of reserves. And eh, well it 
was said: just increase it with [amount]. But 
I don’t think….my [BU] manager also said: 
“Can’t we do that?”Then I said: “Just take a 
step back, this is a discussion among 
financials.” Then I looked into how I could 
decide on that provision [explains details of 
some specific items] And with the other 
inventory it was really… I felt the pressure 
[Op de vraag om of BUCb onder druk werd 
gezet door CS om hogere voorziening te 
nemen]. “Ja, en van de voorraden heb ik 
gezegd: nou ik wil een gezonde spanning in 
deze organisatie hebben en ik ga niet 
toegeven aan potjes bouwen. En eh...nou ja 
er werd wel gezegd: plug er nog maar een 
[bedrag] bij. Maar dat vind ik niet...en mijn 
[BU] manager zei ook al van: kunnen we dat 
niet doen?. Ik zei van: even aan de zijlijn, het 
gaat even om de financials discussie. Toen 
heb ik gekeken hoe kan ik dat nou 
vaststellen [uitleg hoe vastgesteld]. Eh...bij 
de andere handel was het echt, ja ik voelde 
de druk  in de organisatie: we moeten 
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in the organization; we have to go for it and 
sell this stuff. If I had made a provision, the 
behavior would have been different. And 
that’s what CSx [corporate staff] asked me: 
BUCb why didn’t you do that?  [increase the 
provision] I said, CSx, you may call me a 
dumbo, but I think…you know, if you want 
a lazy organization then you should do just 
that. But that’s not my way of doing things.” 
beuken, we moeten rammen want er moet 
handel uit. Als ik een voorziening had gehad 
dan was er een ander gedrag geweest. En 
dat heb ik ook... CSx [corporate staf] zegt 
ook tegen mij: BUCb waarom heb je dat niet 
gedaan. [voorziening verhogen] Ik zeg: CSx, 
je zit er anders in dan ik, he jij mag mij dom 
noemen, mag je doen. Maar ik vind dat je, 
weet je, als je een luie organisatie wilt, dan 
moet je dat doen. Maar zo zit ik er niet in.” 
In the above deliberation, BU controller B indicated that he/she also considered the impact of a 
provision on the behavior within the business, and was therefore reluctant to make the 
provision too high. 
 Deliberations of corporate finance staff x 
Corporate finance staff X, the corporate staff member referred to by BU controller B, was also 
one of the interviewees, and also discussed the same provision: he/she had another view on 
the situation: 
“And I think that in the end, our provision is 
still not adequate if I consider the actual 
developments. But I did ask critical 
questions on a regular basis. And there’s a 
moment when the business says: this is it, 
this is just what it is worth and eh…that you 
say: well, if you all think that this is the 
value. I did discuss this with the CFO: I think 
the value could be lower. The CFO agreed, 
but at the end it is the business that 
decides.” 
“En ik denk dat we uiteindelijk nog een te 
lage voorziening hebben. Als ik naar de 
huidige ontwikkelingen kijk, maar ik heb wel 
telkens kritische vragen gesteld. En er komt 
een moment dat de business zegt: dit is het, 
dit is het gewoon waard en … eh dat je dan 
zegt: nou ja als jullie allemaal vinden dat dit 
het waard is. Ik heb nog wel bij [CFO] 
neergelegd: ik denk dat het nog lager zou 
kunnen zijn. Dat vond [CFO] ook, maar 
uiteindelijk is het dan toch de business die 
daar de doorslaggevende factor geeft.” 
The above indicates that corporate finance staff x was also not trying to build reserves, but 
sincerely thought the provision was not prudent enough. Interestingly, corporate finance staff X 
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indicates that it is not the CFO who made the final decision, but that it is the business that 
decides. This is in line with the dominant ‘professional logic’ referred to in Chapter 5.1. 
 Different views on the amount, underlying motivations and dominant logic 
The above deliberations of three interviewees relating to the same provision show that the 
professional judgment relating to the estimates of provisions varied considerably. BU controller 
A, being the closest to the business and having worked there for a number of years, was 
convinced that the final provision provided for is too conservative. On the other hand, 
corporate finance staff X was convinced that it was not conservative enough. Interestingly, the 
more or less conservative approach of colleagues was not accepted by the interviewees, as they 
suspected earnings management motivation for this more conservative approach.  
Also the underlying motivation for making a provision varied. BU controller B referred to 
influencing behavior and calculated that making the provision too high would reduce the 
incentive in the business to sell it for a good price. Although the interviewees suspected the 
more conservative approach of the others to be motivated by earnings management, none of 
the interviewees mentioned the intention to build reserves. In contrast, they were concerned 
about the risk of the provision being too low. 
Finally, corporate finance staff and the CFO did not overrule the business, but considered the 
business to be the expert in determining the provision, which is in line with the dominant 
‘professional logic’. 
5.5.4 Summary 
The accounting choice process is not straightforward and it is not possible to determine a direct 
relation between factors of influence and the final accounting choice incurred. Combinations of 
factors and circumstances influence accounting choices. Moreover, for different choices the BU 
controller involves different actors in the decision-making process. BU controllers have different 
intrinsic drives for making accounting choices and make different professional judgments 
relating to the value of balance sheet items. Although interventions or proposed interventions 
sometimes have the appearance of earnings management, they are not necessarily intended to 
manage earnings. Based on the accounting choice itself, it is therefore impossible to determine 
whether the intention is to manage earnings or whether other intentions are involved. The 
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6 DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research aims to provide insights into the accounting choices of controllers and addresses 
the following three research questions: 
1. What accounting choices are available to controllers? 
2. How are accounting choices made by the controller? 
3. What factors affect the accounting choices of controllers? 
The findings in Chapter 5 answered the three research questions in the specific empirical 
setting. An analytical framework20 was designed to analyze the findings. 
The accounting choices available that were identified fell into two broad categories: 
‘adjustment’ or ‘do nothing’. Adjustments relate to the change in valuation of assets and 
liabilities, the timing of revenues and expenses, and classification adjustments. The ‘do nothing’ 
is not necessarily a passive option, but sometimes also involves considerable deliberation 
whether or not to make an adjustment, and finally deciding to do nothing.  
The empirical findings provide insights into how accounting choices are made. An accounting 
choice process emerged from the findings, identifying four categories of activities: operational 
review, financial review, valuation review, and overall review. These activities are strongly 
interrelated and not necessarily sequential. The controller deliberations play an important role 
in the accounting choice process. These deliberations either follow a routine pattern or are case 
specific for a particular accounting choice. Controllers also make choices as a result of rule 
based behavior. Furthermore, different controller styles were identified - a financial accounting 
style and a management control style – with different accounting choice patterns.  
Factors affecting the accounting choices of controllers were also identified. The accounting 
choice process is, however, not a straightforward process where specific factors lead to a 
predicted outcome. Besides being influenced by the controller-related factors, accounting 
choices are influenced by a multitude of other factors. These factors together form a ‘unique’ 
setting for the specific accounting choices the controllers have to make. Moreover, differences 
in both technical financial accounting knowledge and interpretation of the accounting standards 
                                                            
20 The analytical framework is outlined in the beginning of Chapter 5, Figure 4. 
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lead to different accounting choices made by controllers, and different perceptions of the 
boundaries of these choices. Finally, a number of new factors influencing accounting choices 
were identified. The quality of the operational systems and processes is, for example, an 
important element in the quality of the reported earnings. If these systems/processes do not 
function properly, additional estimates of accruals have to be made due to a lack of 
information. 
In this chapter, the first section discusses the findings relating to the ‘black box of the 
accounting choices of controllers’. This is followed in Section 6.2 by an analysis of the 
theoretical implications of these subjects, and in Section 6.3, by an analysis of the practical 
implications of this research. Finally, the limitations of this research and the concluding remarks 
are presented in 6.4. 
6.1 OPENING THE ‘BLACK BOX’  
This section first reflects on the process of opening the black box, the journey of discovery. The 
second section elabores further on the content of the black box. 
6.1.1 Personal reflections on the journey of discovery 
This research led to taking another route than originally planned, as using an economic 
perspective – which was an important basis of the original itinerary - did not fully explain the 
findings. Therefore the journey was rescheduled and the institutional logics perspective was 
included. This section reflects on the underlying philosophy of the researcher: does the journey 
of discovery also imply a change in the philosophical assumptions of the researcher? 
The researcher is a practitioner working in a variety of finance functions for a variety of 
organizations, for over 25 years. A key element of working in finance as a practitioner is the use 
of planning and control cycles: goals and targets are defined in the planning phase and the 
outcome is reported in the control phase. Reporting criteria are defined (internally and 
externally) and can be considered as a ‘socially constructed reality’ for the group of individuals 
working with these planning and control cycles. The individuals are thought to have the same 
‘lived experience’ relating to the reporting criteria. As explained in Section 4.1.2 Shapiro’s 
(1997) line of reasoning appeals strongly to the researcher. Another important aspect of 
working in finance is the assumption of accounting choice behavior from an economic 
perspective. The choice alternatives are identified and the ‘best’ alternative is chosen, weighing 
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the costs and benefits of each alternative. Yet, everyone who has worked for a long time as a 
practitioner has experienced that decisions do not always seem to be based on an economic 
perspective. Thus, as a practitioner, it is important to find ways to create settings that ensure 
that actual behavior is aligned with the envisioned economic behavior. 
The academic reader might tend to classify the researcher in the ‘positivist box’ based on the 
above description. The approach of the researcher is, however, interpretive. As outlined in 
Section 4.1.2, the researcher continually questioned her own interpretation of the findings: did 
they reflect the ‘lived experience’ of the participants in this study? Measures were defined, 
described in Chapter 4, and followed up to justify the research results. The underlying 
philosophical assumptions of the researcher have thus not changed. In contrast, the journey of 
discovery is a reflection of the interpretive approach of the researcher. 
The journey did, however, change the researcher’s view on the assumed ‘social constructed 
reality’ on accounting choices. The ‘lived experience’ relating to accounting choices was not the 
same for the participants, but sometimes varied considerably. Also, the accounting choice 
process was far more complex than the researcher could have imagined at the start of the 
research.  
The next section further discusses the contents of the black box. 
6.1.2 Revelations of the‘black box’ 
The findings reveal that the accounting choice process is complex and that accounting choices 
are made in specific settings that influence these choices. Studies identifying determinants and 
predicting the outcome of accounting choices, such as mainstream earnings management 
studies, neglect this process and the complex setting in which accounting choices are made. 
Findings from these type of studies neglect the underlying complex dynamics that drive the 
accounting choices. By analyzing BU controller deliberations, this study revealed that ‘some 
things are not what they seem to be’: 
- The do-nothing-choice is not necessarily passive but can be an active intentional choice;  
- The adjustment-choice is not necessarily deliberated, but can be a result of rule based 
behavior; 
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Considering the influence of the complex setting of BU controllers and the signaled differences 
in behavior, interpretation of accounting rules and professional judgment of BU controllers 
when making their accounting choices triggers a discussion relating to the subject of the BU 
controller’s perceptions of ‘representing a true and fair view’ in the financial statements. 
Also the (underlying) subjects of rule based accounting choice behavior and the knowledge and 
interpretation of accounting rules are interesting subjects for further discussion. 
The above-mentioned differing views of interviewees on the ‘best estimate’ of a provision is 
influenced by information asymmetry between the Business Units and corporate staff. The 
business oriented role of the controller and the dominant professional logic within the 
organization facilitates optimal use of the information available within the BU when making 
accounting choices. Nonetheless, BU controllers involved in the BU decision-making process 
may have a less critical attitude related to those business decisions. The signaled ‘competing 
logics’ also play a role in the accounting choice process. On the one hand, BU controllers are 
expected to solve their own professional problems within the Business Unit, and on the other, 
BU controllers are expected to show full transparency. The dominant logics within an 
organization and awareness of its influence on accounting choices of BU controllers is therefore 
also a subject addressed in the next section. 
When making their accounting choices, BU controllers decide whether or not the operational 
systems are reliable. Sometimes additional accounting adjustments have to be made because 
the systems do not function optimally. Also, it may be more difficult to assess the valuation of 
assets because the required management information is not available. Consequently the 
operational systems have an important impact on the quality of the financial statements.. 
However, not only the influence of the systems is interesting. Also BU controller behavior 
relating to shortcomings of the systems are worthwhile of further reflection. The empirical 
findings showed that some controllers tried to change the system, whereas others did not, or 
they had not succeeded and eventually accepted the system as it was.  
Finally, the dominant research approach in mainstream accounting research relating 
determinants to predictable outcome deserves further attention. The findings reveal that the 
accounting choice process is such a complex process that isolating one factor and determining 
its effect is an almost impossible task. Also the method of identifying abnormal accruals based 
on archival financial analyses can be viewed in a different perspective. A lack of abnormal 
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accruals can also be a sign of earnings management: perhaps preparers considered making an 
impairment, but finally opted for the ‘do-nothing’ choice.  
These topics are discussed in the next section. 
6.2 THEORETICAL IMPLICATION OF FINDINGS 
6.2.1 The ‘true and fair view’ perception 
As outlined in Chapter 2.1, financial statements have to provide a true and fair representation of 
the corporate (or BU) financial position’. Opening the black box of the accounting choice process 
leads to three considerations relating to the perception of a ‘true and fair representation of the 
financial position of the BU’ (hereafter referred to as ‘true and fair view’). 
First, an important new element in the accounting choices revealed by this empirical research 
material is the deliberation relating to an ‘adjustment’ versus a ‘do-nothing’ decision. For 
example, deliberating whether or not to make an impairment or change an accounting method 
because it may better represent the financial position of the entity. In principle, the choice ‘to 
do nothing’ does not qualify for the definition of accounting choices used in this study based on 
on that of Fields, Lys and Vincent (2001): a decision that influences the output of the accounting 
system, being the (published) financial statements. If the controller decides to do nothing, 
he/she does not actively make an adjustment. And yet, controllers deliberated and discussed 
some accounting choices, wondering whether or not to make an adjustment, and finally 
consciously decided not to make an adjustment. One controller even perceived having managed 
earnings by consciously deciding to follow the revenue recognition principles of previous years, 
i.e. by doing nothing. Hence, ‘doing nothing’ can involve an active choice. Furthermore, the 
empirical findings revealed that professionals can have considerable differences in opinion 
relating to whether or not to make a provision (Section 5.3.2). Also, BU controllers seem to have 
different boundaries as to what they consider a ‘grey area’ or a ‘black and white’. Other 
resreach models that analyze accrual movements in financial statements and/or use surveys 
asking controllers to evaluate hypothetical accounting choices, do not reveal the above findings. 
Although the findings of this research are only valid within the context of the domain studied, 
research exploring accounting choice behavior of controllers in other contexts can further 
enrich financial accounting knowledge. Findings of earnings management studies that debt 
covenants (Jha, 2013; Wang & Lin, 2013) and earnings around zero (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997) 
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influence accounting choice behavior could, for example, be enriched by interpretative research 
into accounting choice behavior of controllers in these types of situations. This would provide 
further insights into the perceptions of individuals relating to the boundaries of earnings that 
are available within GAAP in these type of situations.  
Second, the above-mentioned different perceptions of BU controllers relating to the boundaries 
of the accounting choices, the ‘grey area’, was found to be influenced by controllers’ rule based 
behavior. This relates to the first stage – rule following mode - of the dual mode rationality 
discussed in Section 3.1. This first stage, shaping the decision room, was different for the 
various BU controllers.  Section 5.2.3 describes how one controller reflected on this rule based 
behavior when a director made him/her conscious of this rule based by asking for the reason 
for his/her choice. Section 5.3.2 describes how a controller made an adjustment – an accrual for 
project cost – without realizing that this was not ‘within GAAP’ adjustment. Another controller 
did not make an adjustment, but accounted for the rental-discount ‘as it came’ - at the moment 
of the invoicing - whereas he/she should have made an adjustment spreading the discount over 
the contract period. Hence, the adjustment choice (or the do-nothing choice) is not always a 
deliberate choice of a controller, but is also found to be a result of rule based behavior based on 
past experience. This research was not designed to specifically identify all the types of rule 
based behavior of BU controllers. Using an observer method would have been better for this 
purpose as the data gathered are ‘closer’ to the controller’s real behavior and more likely to 
reveal other rule based behavior decisions. Performing the same type of research from the 
perspective of rule based behavior would be an interesting area for further research in order to 
identify how this leads to different accounting choices by controllers, and thus give another 
presentation of their perceived true and fair view. 
The third consideration relates to the differences in opinion relating to ‘the best estimate’ of a 
provision. Section 5.5.3 describes the deliberations of three interviewees relating to the same 
provision for obsolete inventory, and reveals that individuals can have a considerable difference 
of opinion of what – in their perception – is the right amount for a provision. Since they 
perceived their opinion as ‘the truth’, the opinions of other individuals were considered to be 
driven by an earnings management intention. The findings thus reveal that different individuals 
have different perceptions relating to the same accounting item. This confirms findings by 
Kepsu (2012), that accounting estimates are actor-dependent and that “correct estimates are 
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not unambiguous” (p. 67). These different perceptions may (partly) be caused by their personal 
characteristics such as conservatism and critical attitude. This is difficult to establish on the 
basis of this research, since the personal characteristics of the interviewees were not 
specifically studied. The influence of information asymmetry on these different estimates is 
discussed in Section 6.2.2. This is based on the contextual difference between the three 
interviewees: their ‘distance from the business’.  
To summarize, the ‘true and fair view’ is an individually perceived phenomenon influenced by 
the preparer of the financial statements and the context in which the accounting choices are 
made. Earnings management focuses on accounting choices that are made in order to “obscure 
or mask true economic performance”. This research reveals that presenting a ‘true economic 
performance’ is a challenge in itself. Taking a step back and focusing on how individuals 
perceive a true and fair view and how the context in which they make their accounting choices 
influences this perception is therefore a useful contribution to existing financial accounting 
research. 
6.2.2 Dominant logics and accounting choices 
The context of this research was a business oriented role of the BU controller combined with a 
professional logic where BU controllers are expected to use their professional judgment in their 
accounting choices, set their boundaries, and present the financial outcome of the BU in a 
consistent way. BU controllers perceived that they had, to a large extent, freedom in making 
their accounting choices. On the other hand, the empirical findings also revealed a ‘corporate 
staff logic’ which assumes full transparency, including the communication of the available BU 
accounting choices at a corporate level. This logic competes with the expected professional 
behavior of BU controllers. On the one hand, BU controllers are expected to solve their own 
professional problems within the Business Unit, and on the other, BU controllers are expected 
to show full transparency. In this section, two considerations relating to this context are further 
discussed. 
First, the differences in perception of three interviewees relating to ‘a best estimate’ of a 
provision referred to in the previous section are analyzed in the light of the business oriented 
role of the controller. The contextual difference of these interviewees was their ‘distance from 
the business’. The further the distance of the interviewee from the business, the more 
conservative the estimate of the required provision for obsolete inventory. The advantage of 
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business orientation within the organization is the access to and use of business knowledge in 
accounting decisions relating to, in this case, the provision for inventory. Due to information 
asymmetry, corporate staff have limited access to such knowledge. On the other hand, the 
controller can be so involved in the business and the business decisions, that he/she becomes 
less critical in the valuation review of assets because of a strong belief in the actions taken by 
the business. In their article ‘Executive overconfidence and the slippery slope to financial 
reporting’, Schrand and Zechman (2012) conclude that overconfident executives are more likely 
to have an optimistic bias in their reporting, which is not necessarily intentional. Bouwman 
(2014) found that CEO optimism was positively associated with earnings smoothing and smaller 
(in absolute value) earnings surprises. These findings can also be applied to a BU manager, 
being the ‘CEO’ of the BU. The empirical findings confirmed the findings of existing research 
relating to the influence of the BU manager in the accounting choice process. If a controller is 
part of the BU management team, and is very confident of the BU manager’s (and the 
management team’s) strategy, this may result in a similar optimistic bias in reporting, as 
signaled by Schrand and Zechman. It should be noted that this is a tentative explanation: as 
outlined in Section 5.5.3 other individual controller-related factors also influenced their 
deliberations. It would, however, be a research opportunity to follow up this subject since it 
provides another perspective on the discussion of ‘role conflict’ of controllers due to their 
business partner role and their functional role. In this line of reasoning, the controller may have 
an optimistic bias in the financial reporting without perceiving a role conflict, since he/she 
perceives the reported numbers to reflect the ‘true and fair view’ of the BU. 
Second, the context of the competing logics is an interesting subject to study further. BU 
controllers have more information about the BU situation than corporate finance staff. BU 
controllers therefore have to decide to what extent they want to share this information and 
what information they share with corporate finance staff. Section 5.1.2 outlines how BU 
controllers discussed dealing with ‘surprises’, these being major variances from the expected 
outcome. This involved not immediately reporting unexpected variances, but first investigating 
the underlying reason for these variances, and also the smoothing of fluctuations in results as 
far as allowed within the accounting standards, in order to avoid extreme reactions within the 
organization. The line of reasoning of the BU controllers is consistent with findings by J.R. 
Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) relating to the tendency of CFOs to smooth earnings: “ The 
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interviews reveal a persistent theme among CFOs: “the market hates uncertainty.”  Without 
exception, every CFO we spoke with prefers a smoother earnings path to a bumpier one, even if 
the underlying cash flows are the same. In general, this preference is as obvious to them as 
saying, “good is better than bad” ” (pp. 47-49). Smoothing earnings decreases the transparency 
for corporate finance staff. Combined with the possible optimistic bias of BU controllers, it is 
understandable that this causes an uneasy feeling for corporate finance staff. On the other 
hand, corporate finance staff assume that BU controllers are professionals and are able to use 
their judgment to present the results in a consistent way, reflecting the financial position of the 
BU. Awareness of these two competing logics within an organization and their effect on 
accounting choices is thus important. Further research into the influence of these competing 
logics on accounting choices would be valuable. 
With respect to this subject, De Loo et al. (2006) revealed different behavioral patterns of 
controllers relating to the sharing of information. They found that controllers either fully shared 
(relevant) information with higher levels in the organization, or only partly shared this 
information. The empirical findings of this study revealed two different styles of BU controllers, 
the ‘financial accounting style’ and ‘management control style’: the latter focused on the overall 
review, and had a tendency to make accounting choices resulting in smoothing expenses and 
revenues. The question is whether these two different styles are influenced (or caused) by the 
patterns identified by De Loo et al. The relation of these BU controller styles and the identified 
patterns of information sharing behavior is an interesting avenue for further exploration. 
6.2.3 Operational systems and accounting choices 
The empirical findings of this research revealed the importance of operating systems and 
processes for the accounting choice process. When a BU controller decided that the 
information provided by the operating systems was not complete or reliable, then additional 
estimates were made to determine the accruals. Moreover, for accounting choices relating to 
the valuation of assets - such as a provision for obsolete inventory – the availability of 
operational information in order to make such a choice was found to be an important element. 
Hence, the quality of the operating system and the generated information is important for the 
quality of the reported earnings. 
In their opinion, auditors make a reference to their review of the internal control within an 
organization. Organizations reporting under US GAAP are obliged - pursuant to Section 404 of 
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the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act - to include a ‘Management’s report on internal control over 
financial reporting’ in their annual accounts. Although they do directly or indirectly address the 
underlying operating systems and processes in this report, this is often at a very global high-
level. Yet, there must be differences in the functioning of these systems between organizations, 
resulting in differences in quality of reported earnings. In this context, research by Janvrin and 
Mascha (2014) is interesting. They studied the financial close process by conducting a field 
investigation with CFOs from 22 organizations. Fourteen of these participants noted that their 
financial close processes were highly dependent on multiple systems which “were often 
patched together rather than being carefully integrated” (p. 12). Besides being a risk for the 
timeliness of the financial close process, this may also influence the quality of the reported 
numbers. Although a great deal of research relates to the quality of systems and the quality of 
financial reporting within the individual research areas of Accounting Information Systems and 
Financial Accounting, it is surprising that more studies have not been performed combining 
these two areas of research. 
Another consideration is the controller behavior relating to shortcomings of these systems. The 
empirical findings revealed that some controllers changed the system or tried to change the 
system, whereas others accepted the shortcomings. It is beyond the scope of this study to 
analyze the reasons for this difference in behavior, and yet this is another area which is 
interesting to further research. Studying these type of choices from an actor-network 
perspective may for example provide new insights into this behavior. 
In a broader context, the functioning of operating systems and processes is also important for 
the quality of management information. The empirical findings reveal the necessity of 
management information for accounting choices relating to the valuation of assets, such as a 
provision for obsolete inventory. Standard setters underlined the importance of management 
information for financial reporting by implementing IFRS 8, requiring organizations to disclose 
segment information that is actually being used internally by management. In their post-
implementation review, the IASB (2013) stated what their expected effect of IFRS 8 was: “When 
we developed IFRS 8, we thought that it would allow investors and other users of financial 
statements to see the entity’s operations from a management perspective. This would enable 
investors to understand the risks that management face each day and to assess how well those 
risks are managed” (p. 10). IASB conclude in their report that, on an overall-basis, the standard 
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has achieved the expected objective. The IASB report is supported by academic research and 
working papers relating to the implementation of IFRS 8. Academic research studying the 
relation of management information and financial reporting on a more general level is, 
however, more difficult to find. Weißenberger and Angelkort (2011) studied the effects of 
integration of management accounting systems and financial accounting systems. They found 
that it was not so much the technical integration of the systems, but rather the mediating 
influence of a ‘consistent financial language’ that increased the controller’s effectiveness21. 
Their research was performed from the perspective of the quality of management accounting, 
and not from the perspective of financial accounting.  
Combining the research areas of accounting information systems and financial accounting, it 
would be interesting to further explore the above-mentioned subjects. This confirms Granlund’s 
(2011) conclusion, that management accounting researchers should focus more on the IT 
aspects in their research and that accounting information researchers should focus more on 
accounting issues in their research.  
With hindsight, the influence of (the quality of) the operating systems and processes on 
accounting choices and financial reporting seems logical and obvious. Still, when performing the 
literature review, this was not found as a subject of study in relation to accounting choice 
behavior. This is discussed in the next section. 
6.2.4 Complementing mainstream accounting research findings 
This section discusses the additional insights that the empirical findings provided relating to the 
mainstream accounting research findings. First, this section outlines the findings that relate to 
the factors influencing accounting choices in relation to the factors identified in the literature 
review. This is followed by a discussion of the findings in relation to research methods based on 
archival analysis of abnormal accruals in financial statements. 
As outlined a number of times in this thesis, the accounting choice process is complicated and 
not simply a matter of identifying factors and outcomes. It is the complex setting and the 
combination of factors that lead to the final accounting choice. The months of coding efforts, 
trying to identify factors, and unsuccessfully trying to relate them to an accounting choice, have 
                                                            
21 The method used in this study was a survey. Controller effectiveness was measured by ‘output quality’ and by ‘controllership 
impact on management decisions’.  
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nevertheless been valuable, as new factors have been identified, and other factors were found 
not to be applicable in the context of this research.  
Frequently mentioned factors that were not identified in the literature review were the 
influence of the operational systems and processes and the influence of corporate accounting 
instructions. The corporate accounting instructions are characterized in this research domain by 
freedom in accounting choices but with strict and tight planning and control deadlines. Also the 
use of the business administrator as a sparring partner for the controller was an unexpected 
factor of influence. The role of the business administrator may be context specific due to the 
business oriented role of the controller within the organization. In general, the dominant logic 
in the organization, i.e. that of a professional logic with a business oriented approach, had an 
important influence on the accounting choice process.  
Another aspect emerging in virtually every controller interview was the different approach of 
month-end and year-end accounting choices. Although the characteristics of the accounting 
choice were not used in the initial theoretical framework for analyzing the factors involved, they 
emerged from the empirical data and confirmed findings by Merchant et al. (1994) relating to 
the influence of the characteristics of an accounting choice and the perceived acceptability of 
earnings management. Their finding that the judgment was affected by the characteristics 
materiality and timing (quarter-end versus year-end) were confirmed in this study. The 
characteristic ‘purpose’ – being an increase in bonus - which Merchant et al. found to influence 
the judgment was not confirmed, probably due to the context of this research. The organization 
does not appear to have a strong bonus-driven culture. 
A factor that was expected to be identified but which was not revealed by the empirical findings 
was the influence of ‘previous experience as an auditor’. This factor did not specifically 
influence accounting choices. It was rather the combination of personality, previous work 
experience, and knowledge that affected the accounting choices and also resulted in a 
controller style. In the light of this finding, it would be interesting to further research how these 
different factors influence the decision-making process. Surveys used in previous studies that 
concentrate on one or two of these factors, only ‘tell part of the story’.  
Appendix 4 provides an overview of the findings relating to the factors of influence. As stated 
before, these factors have to be considered within the context of this research.  
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Earnings management research, which focuses on studying accounting choices, predominantly 
uses archival research analyzing financial statements in order to identify ‘abnormal accruals’. 
The empirical findings revealed that an accounting choice ‘to do nothing’ can be the result of a 
careful deliberation whether or not to make an adjustment. A consistent level of accruals22 does 
therefore not necessarily imply that the quality of earnings is unchanged, or that earnings are 
not managed; perhaps an impairment or a change of accounting method was deliberated in 
order to better reflect the financial position of the entity, but the final decision was to postpone 
this adjustment. Also, the importance of operating systems and processes in the accounting 
choice process was identified. The functioning of these systems/procedures influences the type 
of accruals and the composition of the accruals. The example given in Section 2.1 (Figure 3) is 
used as an illustration. In this example, the accruals of one situation, where all sales are 
invoiced at period end, are compared with another situation, where all sales are not yet 
invoiced at period end. 










Sales 1000 1000 Sales 1000 1000
cash received = cash on 
balance sheet 500 500
cash received = cash on 
balance sheet 500 500
accrued income accrued income 100 100
invoices outstanding 500 invoices outstanding 400
less: bad debt -100 -100 less: bad debt -100 -100
debtors on balance sheet 400 400 debtors on balance sheet 300 300
net income = equity on 
balance sheet 900 900
net income = equity on 
balance sheet 900 900
accrual accrual
 
Figure 11 Different types of accruals in two situations 
Although the total amount of accruals is the same, the types of accruals are different and the 
quality of the accruals can be different depending on the functioning of the operational 
systems/processes. If the operational information of sales to be invoiced is available and can be 
reconciled to the amount of accrued income in the income statement, then the accrual ‘accrued 
income’ is non-discretionary. If the operational information is not completely available, for 
example due to timing differences in the closing of operational system, which was the case for a 
                                                            
22 Taking into consideration the change of accruals relating to changes in activities, such as revenue growth. 
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system used by one of the controllers, then the amount to be invoiced partly involves making 
an estimate, thus becoming a discretionary component of the accrual. Therefore, when 
analyzing financial statements, not only the trends in accruals is important, but also the 
composition of these accruals. Impairment decisions and changes in accounting estimates 
influence the financial statements but are difficult to evaluate for completeness and timeliness 
on the basis of archival analysis. Also, determining the non-discretionary and the discretionary 
element of an accrual is difficult to establish for some accruals.  
To summarize, research into accounting choice behavior of controllers by studying their choices 
and deliberations when making these choices provides additional insights into earnings 
management research. Extending archival analysis of financial statements with qualitative 
analysis of the underlying accounting choice deliberations would therefore be an avenue worth 
exploring in earnings management research. 
6.3 PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Depending on the background of the practitioner reading this thesis, he or she will probably 
identify different practical implications. The researcher, also being a practitioner, asked other 
practitioners to read the findings and provide feedback on the practical implications for them. 
The topics resulting from their feedback are included in this section.  
First, the findings underline the importance of continuous education of controllers relating to 
financial accounting standards in general, but also relating to accounting instructions and policy 
choices within the organization. By discussing practical examples, controllers and finance staff 
become aware of differences in the interpretation of the rules and the perceived boundaries 
within which choices are considered to be allowed. Moreover, if organizations aim for 
consistency in financial reporting, they should not only address the education of theoretical 
knowledge, but also address the accounting choice behavior of controllers. The signaled 
difference in behavior at month-end and at year-end, combined with the identified differences 
in controller style and differences in perceptions of materiality, can all lead to inconsistent 
reporting behavior within an organization. Awareness of these differences and triggering 
discussions about this within the organization enables management to communicate 
expectations relating to the accounting choice behavior of controllers.  
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Second, it is important to be aware of the dominant logics within the organization and their 
influence on the accounting choices of controllers as well as their influence on the transparency 
of the accounting choice decisions. The business oriented approach and a professional logic in 
this empirical setting results in the availability of local BU information for the BU controllers 
which can be used when making their accounting choices. Also, BU controllers use their 
professional judgment when dealing with the dilemmas and BU related issues without having to 
use the resources of corporate finance staff. This way of working, however, competes with the 
‘corporate staff logic’, expecting transparency in the decision-making process and the 
communication of the accounting choices available within the BU.  This may lead to a less 
critical attitude of BU controllers due to their involvement in the BU decision-making processes. 
Awareness of these influences and making a conscious trade-off between the different drives 
that the above-mentioned competing logics trigger, enhances a mutual understanding between 
BU controllers and corporate finance staff. 
Third, the empirical findings revealed that the auditor was involved in accounting choices 
discussed at a corporate level, but was hardly involved in BU controller accounting choices at a 
local level. BU controllers have local knowledge that corporate finance and the auditor do not 
have. A focus on continuous education of BU Controllers relating to awareness of events and 
situations in this local context that trigger accounting choices is therefore important. Due to 
information asymmetry, neither corporate finance nor the auditor can identifty these type of 
choices. 
Finally, the importance of functioning of operational systems for the quality of the financial 
information will come as no surprise to practitioners. Paying attention to the alignment and 
integration of management information systems and the financial information resulting in a 
consistent financial language and increasing controller’s effectiveness in line with the 
suggestion made by Weißenberger et al. (2011) is probably also part of the control strategy of 
the majority of practitioners. However, the BU controller behavioral aspect relating to operating 
systems and processes that do not function optimally, and the differences in behavior of BU 
controllers that emerged from the findings, is something that is not regularly discussed in 
practice. Awareness of these differences in attitudes and understanding the causes of these 
differences can lead to another approach when attempting to change or improve the quality of 
operating systems and procedures. 
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The last section of this chapter outlines the limitations of this research project and finishes with 
the concluding remarks. 
6.4 LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This research studied the accounting choice process using an economic and institutional 
perspective in the context of the research domain: the BU controllers within one organization. 
The findings of this study are therefore only applicable within the context of the research 
domain. A number of characteristics that are probably domain specific are the following. The 
role of the controllers in this study was strongly business oriented. Moreover, the organization, 
was not listed on the stock exchange, but had specific characteristics relating to ownership, as 
outlined in Section 5.1.1. Also the organization does not have an incentive (bonus) driven 
culture. In addition to these characteristics, there are probably far more other domain-specific 
characteristics that influenced the outcome of this study.  
Another limitation relates to the accounting choices discussed. Given the finding that 
controllers make accounting choices from habit, it is likely that not all accounting choices were 
discussed. Although a systematic approach was taken by the researcher to review the BUs’ 
financial statements in order to identify the accounting choices made by the BU controller, a 
non-financial researcher with an inquisitive mind may identify more accounting choices. Some 
accounting choices may seem so self-evident to the controller and the researcher, that they did 
not even consider discussing these choices. 
As outlined in the research methodology, the researchers audit/control background has 
influenced the data collection and the findings. In the methodology chapter it is explained how 
the awareness of this ‘perspectival subjectivity’ is a strength rather than a threat in presenting 
reliable findings. Furthermore, Chapter 4 outlines the ‘measures of justification’ used to justify 
the research results. The journey of discovery reflects the process of critical reflection. 
Moreover, it was a conscious decision to support the findings with quotes in order to take the 
reader along in the thought processes of the interviewees and researcher. All these measures 
have resulted in a well-structured interpretive research process that has led to the research 
findings presented here. 
In the previous chapters and sections, the reader is given insights into the complexity of 
accounting choices and the dilemmas and choices the BU controllers face in their decision 
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process. It reveals the deliberations of BU controllers when presenting their perceived ‘true and 
fair view’ of the financial situation of the BU in the financial statements. This study contributes 
to accounting theory by providing a new approach to analyzing accounting choices, resulting in 
an explanatory analytical framework. This framework can be used and further developed when 
analyzing accounting choice behavior in other contextual settings. Moreover, it has revealed the 
important role that logics and rule based behavior play in the accounting choice process. For 
practitioners, it is therefore important to be aware of the logics within the organization, 
including competing logics, and to understand their influence on accounting choice behavior.  
The findings have provided thoughts and suggestions that should trigger further research 
projects that would be valuable for both academics and practitioners. The final concluding 
remark for this thesis, which the researcher sees as a challenge to take up for further research is 
the following: 
The true and fair view of the financial statements of an entity is an individual perception. 
Understanding the underlying deliberations and identifying differences in perceptions enriches 
financial accounting research, where the ‘true and fair view’ is assumed to be an unambiguous, 










An organization’s financial statements are intended to provide a ‘true and fair’ view of its 
financial position at year-end and its financial performance over the year. This is what auditors 
state in their Auditor’s Report, referring to the General Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
used as a basis for preparing financial statements. The information presented in these 
statements is, however, partly based on estimates and judgments relating to issues such as 
provisions for obsolete inventory, the likelihood and amount of settlement of claims and 
disputes, etc. Many controllers are regularly confronted with situations where these estimates 
and judgments are unavoidable. How do they determine which amount represents ‘a true and 
fair view’ for the user of the financial statements?  
The objective of this study is to obtain insights into the accounting choices of controllers by 
studying which accounting choices are available to controllers, the accounting choice process 
which leads to the accounting choices of the controllers, and the factors affecting these choices. 
The following research questions were formulated: 
1. What accounting choices are available to controllers? 
2. How are accounting choices made by the controller? 
3. What factors affect the accounting choices of controllers? 
Little research has been conducted on this particular subject, but there are ample studies on 
‘earnings management’ (EM), a related area. EM studies accounting choices or other actions 
incurred in order to influence the outcome of earnings with a specific intention. This research 
investigates accounting choices in general, which is broader than EM. Moreover, EM research 
generally focuses on identifying determinants affecting EM using either archival analysis or 
experiments as research methods. The accounting choice process of controllers, i.e., how 
controllers make their choices, remains ‘a black box’. In this research, the researchers aim is to 
‘open the black box’. The unique characteristic of this study is that it analyzes the actual 
accounting choices made by BU controllers instead of accounting choice behavior in 
experimental settings.  
This summary starts with an explanation of the research design. This is followed by the findings, 
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Research design 
This research has an exploratory nature and uses a qualitative and interpretive approach. The 
domain of analysis consists of Business Unit (BU) controllers from one organization. As 
preparation of the interviews, the data collected and analyzed consisted of the financial 
statements and management reports of the Business Units, the Letter of Representations 
signed by the BU controller and the BU manager, and a ‘prequestionnaire’. In total, 18 BU 
controllers and 3 corporate staff employees were interviewed. The empirical data consists of 98 
accounting choices that are discussed. Two group discussions were organized after the first data 
analysis: a group discussion with BU controllers, and a group discussion with corporate staff. 
The outcome of the group discussions was used for further analysis and refinement of the 
findings. The ‘initial research route’ was primarily based on theory used in EM research and was 
based on an economic perspective. This theory, however, did not not fully explain the empirical 
findings. Following a different route, adding the perspective of institutional logics, resulted in an 
analysis which did fully explain the findings.  
Findings 
The findings reveal that the accounting choice process is not a straightforward sequential 
process with different phases, but rather a ‘chaotic’ process with the BU deliberations playing 
an important role. The findings answer the three research questions in the specific empirical 
setting. 
Controllers are confronted with a broad range of available choices. The accounting choices that 
were identified fell into two broad categories: ‘do nothing’ or ‘adjustment’. The ‘do nothing’ 
choice is not necessarily a passive attitude of the controller, but can also be a deliberate choice. 
Moreover, it was noted that BU controllers not only identify accounting choices, but also other 
choices that affect the financial outcome. These choices involved ‘transaction choices’ such as 
the timing of purchases/sales and hedging transactions as well as the change of operating 
systems and/or processes, and the change of customer payment conditions. 
An accounting choice process emerged from the findings, with four categories of activities 
identified: operational review, financial review, valuation review, and overall review. Although 
there is a logical flow, this process is not sequential but highly iterative. The controller 
deliberations play an important role in the accounting choice process. These deliberations 




corporate instructions or a systematic approach was based on experience within the BU. In 
other situations, the approach was ‘case specific’. The research also revealed that controllers’ 
perceptions relating to the numbers to be presented – the true and fair view - can vary 
considerably. Furthermore, it was found that BU controllers also make habitual decisions, 
therefore, they do not always realize which accounting choices are available. 
There was no relation between individual factors of influence and the accounting choices 
incurred. The mix of corporate- and BU specific factors as well as the situational factors 
identified were different for each BU Controller. It was this unique setting that influenced the 
accounting choices, rather than one specific factor. The individual BU controller-related factors 
play an important role. Two controller styles emerged from the analysis: the financial 
accounting style and the management control style. These different controller styles result in 
different accounting choices. The ‘professional logic’ - with a strong decentralized business unit 
orientation - played an important role in the accounting choice behavior of the BU controllers. A 
‘corporate staff’ logic was identified, which partly competed with this professional logic 
however, the professional logic was dominant. 
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Limitations of research 
This research studied the accounting choice process using an economic and institutional 
perspective in the context of BU controllers in one organization. The research results are 
therefore applicable to this specific context.   
Recommendations 
The main contribution of this study to accounting research is a new approach in analyzing 
accounting choices, using an interpretive methodology. Moreover, the overall framework of 
analysis provides insights into the complexity of the accounting choice process, the different 
types of choices that BU controllers are (perceived) to face during this process, and their 
deliberations when making these choices. Understanding controller deliberations and their 
perceptions relating to ‘a true and fair view’ enriches financial accounting research. Further 
interpretive research relating to accounting choice behavior using either an institutional 
perspective or other theoretical perspectives can contribute to this field of research. Studying 
accounting choices in a different contextual setting using the analytical framework of this 
research, would be an interesting next step.  
The findings also revealed factors influencing accounting choices that were not identified in the 
in the literature review, based on existing research. An important factor that emerged from the 
empirical material was the influence of the operational systems and management information 
(systems) on accounting choices. Research combining the research areas of Financial 
Accounting and Accounting Information Systems and/or Management Accounting will enable 
further exploration of this finding.  
There are a number of practical implications. The findings underline the importance of 
continuous education of controllers relating to financial accounting standards in general, but 
also relating to accounting instructions and policy choices within the organization. Moreover, it 
is important to be aware of controllers’ accounting choice behavior in order to ensure 
consistency in financial reporting within an organization. Different styles of controllers result in 
different accounting choices. The dominant logics and possibly competing logics within the 
organization also influence accounting choice behavior. Awareness of these logics within the 
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SAMENVATTING (DUTCH SUMMARY) 
De jaarrekening moet een getrouw beeld geven van de grootte en de samenstelling van het 
vermogen en van het resultaat van een organisatie. Dit is wat de accountants vermelden in de 
accountantsverklaring bij de jaarrekening, daarbij verwijzend naar de verslaggevingsrichtlijnen. 
Deze financiële rapportage is echter deels gebaseerd op schattingen met betrekking tot de 
waardering van posten zoals debiteuren en voorraden en ook op aannames met betrekking tot 
het zich voordoen van specifieke gebeurtenissen, zoals claims en disputen. Controllers worden 
regelmatig geconfronteerd met de noodzaak om invulling te geven aan deze schattingen en 
aannames. Hoe stellen zij vast welk bedrag een ‘getrouw beeld’ weergeeft voor de gebruiker 
van de financiële rapportage? De doelstelling van dit onderzoek is het verkrijgen van inzicht in 
de accounting keuzes van controllers door middel van het onderzoeken van de beschikbare 
accounting keuzes voor controllers, het proces dat leidt tot de accounting keuzes van de 
controllers en de factoren die invloed hebben op deze keuzes. De volgende onderzoeksvragen 
zijn daartoe geformuleerd: 
1. Welke accounting keuzes zijn beschikbaar voor controllers?  
2. Hoe maken controllers accounting keuzes? 
3. Welke factoren beïnvloeden de accounting keuzes van controllers? 
Er is weinig onderzoek gedaan naar dit specifieke onderwerp. Wel is er veel onderzoek gedaan 
naar ‘earnings management’ (EM). Er is eigenlijk geen goede vertaling van dit begrip in het 
Nederlands: ‘resultaat sturing’ is waarschijnlijk de beste benadering van een vertaling. Dit 
onderzoeksgebied heeft ook betrekking op accounting keuzes. Maar dit zijn dan wel specifieke 
keuzes, namelijk keuzes met de intentie om de uitkomst te beïnvloeden om een bepaald doel te 
bereiken, zoals het behalen van een winstvoorspelling die afgegeven is aan analisten. Dit 
onderzoek richt zich echter op accounting keuzes in het algemeen en is dus breder dan earnings 
management. Bovendien ligt de nadruk bij EM research op het identificeren van factoren die 
invloed hebben op earnings management waarbij gebruik gemaakt wordt van analyse van 
(trends in) gepubliceerde jaarcijfers en experimenten. Het accounting keuze proces van 
controllers is daarbij nog een zogenaamd ‘black box’. Dit onderzoek streeft ernaar om deze 
‘black box’ te openen. Het onderscheidende kenmerk van dit onderzoek is de analyse van 
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gedrag met betrekking tot accounting keuzes zoals zich dat in de praktijk voordoet in plaats van 
accounting keuze gedrag in een experimentele setting.  
In deze samenvatting wordt eerst de onderzoeksopzet toegelicht. Vervolgens wordt ingegaan 
op de bevindingen, waarbij antwoord gegeven wordt op de drie onderzoeksvragen. De 
samenvatting eindigt met de aanbevelingen die voortkomen uit dit onderzoek. 
Onderzoeksopzet 
Het onderzoek is exploratief, waarbij een kwalitatieve en interpretatieve onderzoeksmethode 
gehanteerd wordt. De onderzoekspopulatie bestaat uit Business Unit (BU) controllers die allen 
bij dezelfde organisatie werken. De data die verzameld en geanalyseerd is ter voorbereiding van 
de interviews van de BU controllers bestaat uit de financiële- en management rapportages van 
de Business Units, de Letters of Representations getekend door de BU controller en de BU 
manager en een ‘prequestionnaire’. Naast interviews met 18 BU controllers, zijn 3 
medewerkers van corporate staf geïnterviewd. Het empirisch materiaal bevat 98 accounting 
keuzes die besproken zijn. Na de eerste data analyse hebben twee groepssessies 
plaatsgevonden; een groepssessie met BU controllers en een groepssessie met corporate staf. 
De uitkomsten van deze sessies zijn verwerkt in de verdere data analyse. De oorspronkelijke 
‘onderzoeksroute’ was voornamelijk gebaseerd op de theorie gebruikt in EM research, 
uitgaande van een economisch perspectief. Hiermee konden echter de empirische bevindingen 
niet volledig verklaard worden. Door een andere weg in te slaan en gebruik te maken van het 
perspectief van ‘ institutional logics’ 23 konden de empirische bevindingen wel volledig verklaard 
worden.  
Bevindingen 
Het accounting keuze proces is niet een eenduidig en lineair proces met verschillende fasen. 
Het is een complex proces waarbij de overwegingen van de controllers een belangrijke rol 
                                                            
23 Institutional logics heeft betrekking op de gehanteerde ‘logica’ van een persoon of binnen een organisatie. De definitie van 
institutional logics is: “sociaal geconstrueerde, historische patronen van gebruiken in de praktijk, veronderstellingen, waarden, 
overtuigingen en regels waarmee individuen hun bestaan vorm geven en betekenis geven aan hun sociale werkelijkheid.” (in 
het engels: “the socially constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which 
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, and provide meaning to their social 
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spelen. De empirische bevindingen beantwoorden de drie onderzoeksvragen in de specifieke 
empirische setting. 
Controllers worden geconfronteerd met veel beschikbare accounting keuzes. De accounting 
keuzes zijn in twee hoofdcategorieën in te delen: ‘niets doen’ en ‘adjustment’ (een boeking 
maken). Als een controller ‘niets doet’ is dit niet noodzakelijkerwijze een passieve houding. Dit 
‘niets doen’ kan namelijk ook het resultaat zijn van een weloverwogen beslissing om de cijfers 
niet aan te passen. Behalve accounting keuzes maken controllers ook andere keuzes die invloed 
hebben op het resultaat. Deze keuzes betreffen niet alleen de zogenaamde ‘transactiekeuzes’ 
zoals de timing van inkopen/verkopen en hedging transacties maar betreffen ook keuzes met 
betrekking tot het wel of niet aanpassen van operationele systemen/processen en het initiëren 
van veranderingen in betalingscondities.  
Het empirisch materiaal verschaft inzicht in hoe controllers accounting keuzes maken. Uit de 
bevindingen kwam een accounting keuze proces naar voren dat bestaat uit vier activiteiten: 
operationele beoordeling, financiële beoordeling, beoordeling waardering, en totaal 
beoordeling. Hoewel er een logische volgorde in deze activiteiten te onderkennen is verloopt 
het proces niet lineair; het is een sterk iteratief proces. De overwegingen van de controller 
spelen een belangrijke rol in dit proces. Hierbij zijn verschillende patronen te onderkennen: 
‘routine matig’ of ‘case specific’. Bij een routinematig proces worden de corporate instructies 
gevolgd of een andere systematische benadering die gebaseerd is op eerdere ervaringen in de 
Business Unit. Van een case specific benadering is sprake als een routinematige benadering niet 
mogelijk is of als nieuwe inzichten leiden tot aanpassing hiervan. Uit het onderzoek bleek 
tevens dat de percepties van BU controllers met betrekking welk bedrag ‘het getrouwe beeld’ 
weergeeft aanzienlijk kunnen verschillen. Ook kwam naar voren dat de keuze van controllers 
soms ook gemaakt worden ‘uit gewoonte’. Hierdoor realiseren zij zich niet altijd welke keuzes 
beschikbaar zijn. 
Het was niet mogelijk om afzonderlijke factoren van invloed te relateren aan de gemaakte 
accounting keuzes. De combinatie van organisatie- en business unit specifieke factoren met 
daarnaast nog situationele factoren was voor iedere BU controller verschillend. Het was deze 
unieke setting die de accounting keuzes beïnvloedden en niet de afzonderlijke factoren. De 
individueel controller-gerelateerde factoren spelen een belangrijke rol. Uit de empirische 
bevindingen kwamen twee ‘controller-stijlen’ naar voren: de financial accounting stijl en de 
 
 
172 Accounting Choices of Controllers 
management control stijl. Deze verschillende stijlen leiden tot verschillende accounting keuzes. 
Ook werd geconstateerd dat de heersende ‘professionele logica’ – met een sterke decentrale 
business oriëntatie - een belangrijke rol speelde bij de accounting keuzes. Daarnaast kwam een 
‘corporate staf logica’ naar voren, die deels op gespannen voet staat met de professionele 
logica. De professionele logica was dominant binnen de organisatie. 
De bevindingen zijn samengevat in het analytisch model hieronder: 
 
Beperkingen van het onderzoek 
In dit onderzoek zijn de accounting keuzes van BU controllers van één organisatie geanalyseerd 
vanuit een economisch en institutioneel perspectief. De onderzoeksresultaten zijn derhalve van 
toepassing binnen deze specifieke context.  
Aanbevelingen 
Dit onderzoek laat een nieuwe benadering zien van analyse van accounting keuzes, gebaseerd 
op een interpretatieve methodologie. Het onderzoek heeft geresulteerd in aan analytisch 
model waarmee inzicht wordt gegeven in de complexiteit van het accounting keuze proces, de 
keuzes waarmee BU controllers geconfronteerd worden in hun besluitvormingsproces en de 
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de overwegingen van controllers bij het maken van accounting keuzes en hun perceptie van het 
‘getrouwe beeld’ van het resultaat verrijkt financial accounting research. Nader interpretatief 
onderzoek naar accounting keuzes vanuit het perspectief van de institutionele theorie of 
andere theoretische perspectieven kan hieraan bijdragen. Het bestuderen van accounting 
keuzes in een andere context, gebruik makend van het analytisch schema dat naar voren 
gekomen is uit dit onderzoek, zou een interessante volgende stap zijn.  
Uit de bevindingen kwamen ook factoren van invloed naar voren die niet uit de literatuurstudie 
bleken. Eén van de factoren die duidelijk naar voren kwam is de invloed van de operationele 
systemen en de management informatie (systemen) op de accounting keuzes. Nader onderzoek 
met betrekking tot dit onderwerp zou aangevlogen kunnen worden door het combineren van 
de onderzoeksgebieden financial accounting en accounting information systems en/of 
management accounting.  
Er zijn ook een aantal praktische aanbevelingen. De empirische bevindingen bevestigen het 
belang van permanente educatie van controllers met betrekking tot externe 
verslaggevingsrichtlijnen maar ook met betrekking tot corporate accounting procedures en 
instructies. Om consistentie in de verslaggeving binnen de organisatie te bewerkstelligen is het 
bovendien van belang om zich bewust te zijn van het accounting keuze gedrag van controllers. 
Verschillende controller-stijlen leiden tot verschillende accounting keuzes. De dominante 
logica’s en wellicht concurrerende logica’s hebben ook invloed op het accounting keuze gedrag. 
Het is daarom belangrijk dat top management en corporate finance zich bewust is van de 









APPENDIX 1 PREQUESTIONNAIRE  
Background and work-experience 
1. What is your education? 
2. How many years have you worked for this organization? 
3. What was your previous work experience? 
a. Type of business 
b. Type of function 
c. Have you worked for an audit firm? If so, for how many years? 
4. How would you rate your reporting knowledge (on a scale from 0-10)? 
5. How would you rate your business knowledge relating to the business that you are 
supporting just now (on a scale of 0-10)?  
6. What is your age (optional ;-) 
Involvement at decision-making relating to the financial statements 
7. Who are the most important persons involved when you have to make decisions relating 
to financial statements and reporting?  
Bonus related targets and other important targets 
8. Are there bonus related targets within your Business Unit? 
a. If so, what are these targets? 
b. For whom are the targets applicable? 
9. Are there other targets important for your Business Unit (for example relating to 
external reporting/contracts?) 
a.  If so, what are these targets? 
b. What is the purpose of these targets? 
Use of estimates/choices for your financial statements  
10. For what reporting items are you using estimates or making accounting choices? (For 
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APPENDIX 2 INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Short introduction – purpose of research (5 minutes) 
Discuss information gathered before the interview (30-45 minutes) 
1. Background information of controller (based on prequestionnaire – 5 minutes)  
Maybe controller wants to give additional explanation  
2. Accounting choices process – the ‘actors’ (5-10 minutes) 
Can you tell me something about the persons that influence your financial reporting 
choices?  
(for each actor) Can you tell how you work together with him/her?  
3. Discuss the identified accounting choices (15-30 minutes) 
a. Can you tell something about the choices you had to make for the items you 
mentioned? 
b. Discuss items not identified in prequestionnaire (e.g., accruals, provisions, 
depreciation periods etc.) 
 
Accounting choice process – opinion relating to factors influencing accounting choices (10-25 
minutes) 
4. What professional dilemmas did you encounter in making the estimates and review of 
reporting items? 
5. How do you think that your personality influences your accounting choices? 
6. Other factors: 
a. What is in your opinion the influence of the compensation scheme? 
b. What is the impact on your choice of the fact that the organization also is an 
association?  
c. What is, in your opinion the attitude of top management relating to accounting 
choices? 




APPENDIX 3 POSTQUESTIONNAIRE CONSIDERATIONS AND 
OUTCOME 
Extant research includes studies that relate personal characteristics to earnings management 
decisions and perception (Elias, 2002; Greenfield et al., 2008), to reporting behavior (Hartmann 
& Maas, 2010; Jia, 2008) and to the role of the business controller (De Loo et al., 2011; Ten 
Rouwelaar & Bots, 2008). Since this study is of an exploratory nature, there is no in-depth focus 
on psychology-literature. It is interesting, however, to explore if and how the findings of 
previous studies can be used in explaining accounting choice behavior of controllers. Therefore 
a questionnaire was developed based on the questionnaires used in the aforementioned 
studies. The purpose of this questionnaire was to obtain additional background information 
which could help to explain the motivational triggers of controllers in making their choices and 
could be used for further discussion in group sessions.  
The questions were translated in Dutch since all participants were Dutch. Due to the difficulty of 
translation of some questions, not all questions were used. A 5 point Likert scale was used for 
all questions. The summary of the studies that were used as a basis for the questionnaire and 
the number of questions used from these studies is provided below: 
 
 
The questionnaire was sent to the interviewees after the interview. In total 16 out of the 18 BU 
controllers completed the questionnaire. It should be stressed that this is not a statistical 
analysis but merely data collection to provide possible additional insight in controller behavior. 
The ‘score’ for professional commitment, ethical orientation and machiavalism was calculated  
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by adding all the scores per category (taking into account the ‘direction’ of the question) and 
dividing the outcome by the number of questions per category.  The outcome is listed below: 
 
When analyzing the accounting choices it was, however, not possible to identify a pattern in the 
above factors and the accounting choices of the BU controllers. Therefore, the outcome was not 
used as a basis for further discussion in the group sessions. 
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